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ABSTRACT
Essays on Microeconomic Theory
by
Qinggong Wu
Chairs: Tilman Bo¨rgers and Stephan Lauermann
The present work collects three essays on microeconomic theory.
In the first essay, I study a model in which a finite number of men and women look for
future spouses via random meetings. I ask whether equilibrium marriage outcomes
are stable matchings when search frictions are small. The answer is they can but
need not be. For any stable matching there is an equilibrium leading to it almost
surely. However unstable—even Pareto-dominated—matchings may still arise with
positive probability. In addition, inefficiency due to delay may remain significant
despite vanishing search frictions. Finally, a condition is identified under which all
equilibria are outcome equivalent, stable, and efficient.
In the second essay, a joint work Kfir Eliaz, we model a competition between two
teams as an all-pay auction with incomplete information. The teams may differ in
size and individuals exert effort to increase the performance of one’s own team via an
additively separable aggregation function. The team with a higher performance wins,
and its members enjoy the prize as a public good. The value of the prize is identical
to members of the same team but is unknown to the other team. We show that there
exists a unique monotone equilibrium in which everyone actively participates, and
in this equilibrium a bigger team is more likely to win if the aggregation function is
concave, less likely if convex, or equally likely if linear.
In the third essay, I study a situation in which a group of people working on a com-
mon objective want to share information. Oftentimes information sharing via precise
communication is impossible and instead information is aggregated by institutions
within which communication is coarse. The paper proposes a unified framework for
modeling a general class of such information-aggregating institutions. Within this
class, it is shown that institution A outperforms institution B for any common objec-
tive if and only if the underlying communication infrastructure of A can be obtained
from that of B by a sequence of elementary operations. Each operation either removes
redundant communication instruments from B or introduces effective ones to it.
vi
CHAPTER I
A Finite Decentralized Marriage Market with
Bilateral Search
1.1 Introduction
The stable matching is the main solution concept for cooperative two-sided matching
problems under nontransferable utility. Many centralized mechanisms are designed to
implement stable matchings.1 However, whether outcomes of decentralized two-sided
matching markets correspond to stable matchings remains unclear. The present pa-
per addresses this question by considering a decentralized two-sided matching market
modeled as a search and matching game. Following Gale and Shapley (1962) I inherit
the interpretation that the game represents the situation in which unmarried men and
women gather in a marketplace to look for future spouses. The game starts with an
initial market a` la Gale-Shapley, henceforth referred to as a marriage market, consist-
ing of finitely many men and women with heterogeneous preferences. In every period
a meeting between a randomly selected pair of a man and a woman takes place, dur-
ing which they sequentially decide whether to marry each other. Mutual agreement
leads to marriage. Married couples leave the game. Disagreement leads to separation.
Separated people continue searching. The game ends when no mutually acceptable
pairs of a man and a woman are left. Search is costly due to frictions parametrized
as a common discount factor that diminishes the value of a future marriage. A
game outcome, reflecting who has married whom and who stays single, corresponds
to a matching for the initial market. The central question addressed in the paper is
whether matchings that obtain in equilibria are stable matchings for the initial market
when search frictions are small. The analysis focuses on a near-frictionless setting in
order to test the general conjecture that if in a decentralized market the participants
have easy access to each other with low costs then equilibrium outcomes would be in
the core of the underlying market.2 The paper shows that the answer to the central
question is indeterminate at best and No in general, in contrast to what has been
1See Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for a survey of the theory of the stable matching. Roth (2008)
surveys applications in designing centralized mechanisms for two-sided matching markets.
2It is well known that the core of the marriage market is the set of all stable matchings.
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conjectured on this matter.3 First, for any stable matching there is an equilibrium
leading to that matching almost surely (Proposition 1.5.2), that is, every player ex-
pects to marry according to the pairing scheme implied by the matching. This result
establishes that the set of all stable matchings is contained in the set of all matchings
that may arise in equilibria. Then it is shown that the latter set may contain unstable
matchings as well: Under certain preference structures there are equilibria leading to
an unstable matching almost surely (Example 1). The paper proceeds to propose two
conditions, each of which rules out such equilibria: 1. The players do not condition
their behavior on the actions during any past failed meeting (Proposition 1.5.4). 2.
The players’ preferences satisfy the Sequential Preference Condition, a condition that
implies a certain degree of preference alignment (Proposition 1.5.6). However the two
conditions, separately or combined, are not sufficient to rule out equilibria in which
unstable matchings arise with positive probability; some of the probable matchings
may even be Pareto-dominated (Example 3). Another source of inefficiency is delay:
Significant loss of efficiency due to delay may be present in an equilibrium even if
search frictions are arbitrarily small (Examples 4 and 5). The paper ends with a
uniqueness result that is pro-stability and efficiency: If the players’ preferences sat-
isfy a strengthening of the Sequential Preference Condition which implies a stronger
degree of alignment, then all equilibria are outcome equivalent, stable, and efficient
(Proposition 1.5.8).
1.2 Literature
The present paper contributes to the literature on search and matching games in which
a marriage market is embedded. The central question of the literature agrees with
that of the present paper: Do equilibrium outcomes correspond to stable matchings?
An early paper in this literature, Roth and Vande Vate (1990) studies the steady
state of a search and matching game with short-sighted players and concludes that a
stable matching obtains almost surely. Later papers consider sophisticated players.
McNamara and Collins (1990), Burdett and Coles (1997), Eeckhout (1999), Bloch and
Ryder (2000) and Smith (2006) assume that the underlying marriage market admits
a unique stable matching that is positively assortative. Their results confirm that
equilibrium outcomes retain some extent of assorting. Adachi (2003) and Lauermann
and No¨ldeke (2014) consider a market with a general preference structure. Adachi
(2003) studies a model in which the steady state stock of active players is exogenously
maintained and confirms that equilibrium outcomes converge to stable matchings as
search frictions vanish. Lauermann and No¨ldeke (2014) considers endogenous steady
states and finds that all limit outcomes are stable if and only if the underlying market
has a unique stable matching.
The model considered in this paper also embeds a marriage market in a search and
3Roth and Sotomayor (1990), page 245.
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matching game. In contrast to the previously cited papers, all of which study steady
state equilibria in a stationary setting, the present model features a nonstationary
search situation. Indeed, the market shrinks as players marry and leave. Moreover,
all but Roth and Vande Vate (1990) consider a market with a continuum of nameless
players, whereas in the present model the market is finite and the players are identi-
fiable. Nonstationarity and finiteness make the present model qualitatively different
from most models considered in the literature. It follows that the set of matchings
that may obtain in equilibria of the present model is in general different from that of
a stationary and continuum model.
Another related literature investigates models embedding a marriage market in a se-
quential bargaining game reminiscent of the deferred acceptance protocol in Gale and
Shapley (1962). This literature includes Alcalde (1996), Diamantoudi et al. (2015),
Pais (2008), Suh and Wen (2008), Niederle and Yariv (2009), Bloch and Diamantoudi
(2011), and Haeringer and Wooders (2011).4 Like the present paper, these papers con-
sider a finite marriage market that shrinks as players marry and leave. The difference
between models in this literature and those in the search and matching literature,
including the present model, is the search technology. A sequential bargaining game
models a market with directed search: When it is his or her turn to move, a player
can reach and deal with any player of the opposite sex without delay or uncertainty.
In contrast, a search and matching game models a market with undirected search:
Bilateral meetings are stochastic; one needs patience and luck to encounter a partic-
ular person. One common finding among papers with a sequential bargaining model
is that some or all stable matchings can be supported in equilibria. Such equilibria
bear resemblance to equilibria that lead to a particular stable matching almost surely
in the present model, see Proposition 1.5.2. On the other hand, unstable matchings
may also obtain in equilibria of a sequential bargaining game, which is the case in
Diamantoudi et al. (2015), Suh and Wen (2008) and Haeringer and Wooders (2011).
This common finding is also in accordance with results in the present paper. How-
ever, because of random search, the model in the present paper may have equilibria
that have no counterpart in a sequential bargaining model. For instance, in a typical
sequential bargaining model, an equilibrium in pure strategies leads to one matching
deterministically, whereas in this model an equilibrium in pure strategies may lead
to several possible matchings, because the players’ strategies may depend on which
of the multiple probable paths the history has taken. In this respect, nonstationarity
has little influence in a sequential bargaining model because a player’s expected pay-
off remains unchanged as the game unfolds, whereas in the present model exogenous
uncertainty may drastically change a player’s continuation prospect.
4Marriage problems belong to a class of coalitional games under nontransferable utility called
“hedonic games”. Alcalde and Romero-Medina (2000) and Alcalde and Romero-Medina (2005)
investigate decentralized implementation of stable outcomes of many-to-one matching problems,
which are also hedonic games. Bloch and Diamantoudi (2011) study implementability of the core of
a general hedonic game.
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A third related literature5 studies whether the Walrasian price can be supported in
equilibria of a search and bargaining game in which an exchange economy, instead of
a marriage market, is embedded. Papers from this literature and the present paper
are united under the theory of non-cooperative foundation of cooperative solution
concepts. Indeed, the present model can be seen as the nontransferable utility version
of the models considered in Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990) and Gale and Sabourian
(2006).
The layout of the paper is as follows: Section 2 introduces the game. Section 3 sets up
an analytic framework. Section 4 provides the analysis. Section 5 concludes. Lengthy
proofs and additional examples are found in the Appendices.
1.3 The Game
The Marriage Market
There are two disjoint sets of players: the set of men M and the set of women W .
A generic man is denoted as m, a woman as w, and a pair of a man and a woman
as (m,w). A man might end up marrying some w ∈ W or remaining single. All
men’s preferences over W ∪ {s}, where s stands for being single, are represented by
u : M × (W ∪ {s}) 7→ R where u(m, ·) is m’s Bernoulli utility function over W ∪ {s}.
Likewise all women’s preferences are represented by v : (M ∪ {s}) ×W 7→ R where
v(·, w) is w’s Bernoulli utility function over M ∪ {s}. The marriage market (or
simply market) is summarized by the tuple (M,W, u, v).
Let m denote man m’s preference relation over W ∪{s} induced by u(m, ·): w m w′
if and only if u(m,w) ≥ u(m,w′). Likewise let w denote woman w’s preference
relation over M ∪ {s}. Player y is acceptable to player x if y x s. A market is
trivial if it does not have a mutually acceptable pair. A game starts with a market
satisfying the following:
A1 Preferences are strict: u(m, ·) is one-to-one for any m ∈M ; v(·, w) is one-to-one
for any w ∈ W .
A2 Normalization: u(m, s) = 0 for any m ∈M ; v(s, w) = 0 for any w ∈ W .
A3 The market is finite: |M | <∞ and |W | <∞.
A4 The market is nontrivial.
5Surveyed in Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) and Gale (2000).
4
The Game Rules
The game starts on day one (t = 1) with an initial market (M,W, u, v) and unfolds
indefinitely into the future (t = 2, 3, ...). On each day a randomly selected pair
(m,w) ∈M ×W meet. The random meeting process will be described in detail later.
As they meet, m moves first to either accept or reject w. If m rejects w then the
pair separate and return to the market. If m accepts w then it is w’s turn to either
accept or reject m. If w accepts m then (m,w) marry and leave the game for good;
otherwise the pair separate and return to the market. Either the separation or the
marriage concludes the current day. m and w receive one-time payoffs of u(m,w) and
v(m,w), respectively, upon marrying each other. The value of a marriage delayed
by τ days is discounted by δτ where the common discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1) is meant
to capture the overall search frictions. The game ends when there is no longer a
mutually acceptable pair left in the market. A player receives a payoff of 0 when the
game ends if he or she stays unmarried at that time.6 Information is complete and
past actions are perfectly observable.
Notations and Terminology
Let H denote the set of all histories. Let Hˆ denote the set of all nonterminal histories
after which a new day starts but the pair to meet on that day has not been determined.
For h ∈ H let Γ(h) denote the subsequent subgame given h is reached. Note that
Γ(h) per se is a proper game if and only if h ∈ Hˆ.
Let Z denote the set of all terminal histories. A terminal history may be infinite.
The outcome matching of h ∈ Z is a mapping µh : M ∪W 7→ M ∪W ∪ {s} such
that µh(x) is player x’s corresponding spouse if x managed to marry at some point
along h, or otherwise µh(x) = s. In the latter case x is said to be single under h. If
h is finite then x is single if he or she stays unmarried until the game ends at h. If h
is infinite then x is single if he or she is unmarried after any finite subhistory of h.
The market (M ′,W ′, u′, v′) is a submarket of the initial market (M,W, u, v) if M ′ ⊂
M , W ′ ⊂ W , u′ is u restricted to M ′ × (W ′ ∪ {s}), and v′ is v restricted to (M ′ ∪
{s}) ×W ′. Abuse notation to write (M ′,W ′, u, v) for simplicity. Let S denote the
set of all nontrivial submarkets of the initial market. Given S := (M ′,W ′, u, v),
respectively use the notations x ∈ S to denote x ∈ M ′ ∪W ′, (m,w) ∈ S to denote
(m,w) ∈M ′ ×W ′, and S\(m,w) to denote the submarket (M ′\{m},W ′\{w}, u, v).
For S ∈ S and x ∈ S, let AS(x) denote the set {y ∈ S : y x s and x y s}. AS(x)
6It might be more natural to let the game end until no man or woman is left. Lemma 1.5.1 to
appear later, which still holds under this alternative game-ending rule, implies under the alternative
rule no one will marry and everyone’s expected payoff is 0 in any subgame perfect equilibrium when
the remaining market is trivial. Thus the default game-ending rule neither creates nor destroys
equilibria in effect, yet it simplifies the exposition.
5
is thus the set of all players in S with whom x forms a mutually acceptable pair. Let
αS(x) denote the greatest element in AS(x) ∪ {s} according to x.
For h ∈ H the remaining market after h, denoted as S(h), consists of the men and
women who are unmarried after h. Obviously S(h) ∈ S for any nonterminal h ∈ H.
The Contact Function
Recall that on each day a pair of a man and a woman are randomly selected to
meet each other. The random meeting process is modeled by the contact function
C : M ×W ×S 7→ [0, 1], where C(m,w, S) is the probability that (m,w) meet on
a day at the beginning of which the remaining market is S. The game rules thus
require that for any S ∈ S ,
B1 Only unmarried people meet: C(m,w, S) = 0 if m /∈ S or w /∈ S.
B2 A meeting takes place on each day:
∑
(m,w)∈S C(m,w, S) = 1.
In addition, assume the meeting probability of any remaining pair is considerably
large:
B3 There exists  > 0 such that C(m,w, S) >  if (m,w) ∈ S.
Note that by the definition of the contact function, the meeting probabilities on a
given day are determined by the remaining market at the beginning of that day.
This implies that Γ(h) and Γ(h′) are isomorphic for any histories h and h′ such that
S(h) = S(h′).
The game is summarized by the tuple (M,W, u, v, C, δ).
1.4 From Equilibria to Matchings
Equilibria
For most of the analysis the solution concept that will be applied is the subgame
perfect equilibrium. In addition I consider two equilibrium selection criteria to ac-
commodate more restrictive information settings.
For history h let g(h) denote the sequence (mt, wt, Rt)t=1:τ(h) where mt and wt are
the man and woman who met on date t under h, Rt ∈ {marriage, separation} is
the result of that meeting, and τ(h) is the date of the last concluded meeting under
h. A strategy profile σ satisfies the private-dinner condition if g(h) = g(h′)
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implies σ restricted to Γ(h) is the same as σ restricted to Γ(h′). The private-dinner
condition accommodates the information setting in which players are aware of who
met whom in the past and the results of those meetings but not what happened during
those meetings, presumably because the meetings took place over private dinners. In
particular, if a meeting ended in separation there is no telling whether it was the man
or the woman who said no. Note that the private-dinner condition implies a player’s
strategy cannot depend on actions taken during a failed meeting even if himself or
herself participated in it.
A strategy profile satisfies the Markov condition if for any history h the player who
moves after h conditions his or her behavior only on S(h). The Markov condition is
stronger than the private-dinner condition because g(h) = g(h′) implies S(h) = S(h′)
but not vice versa. The Markov condition is compatible with the more restrictive
information setting in which players are only aware of the current market.
When describing strategies, I will simply say “player x accepts/rejects player y under
condition K” to represent the statement that x accepts/rejects y at every decision
point satisfying condition K where it is x’s turn to make the pertinent decision. I say
(m,w) marry upon first meeting under strategy profile σ if on the equilibrium
path the first meeting between (m,w) results in marriage. (m,w) marry upon first
meeting if and only if on the equilibrium path (m,w) always accept each other.
Matchings
A matching for (M,W, u, v) is a scheme that pairs some players into married couples
and leaves others single. A matching is formalized as a function µ : M∪W 7→M∪W∪
{s} such that µ(x) ∈ W ∪ {s} if x ∈ M , µ(x) ∈ M ∪ {s} if x ∈ W , and µ(µ(x)) = x
if µ(x) 6= s. µ is unstable if there is a player x such that s x µ(x), in which case µ
is individually blocked by x, or if there is a pair (m,w) such that w m µ(m) and
m w µ(w), in which case µ is pairwise blocked by (m,w). µ is stable if it is not
unstable. Gale and Shapley (1962) shows that at least one stable matching exists for
any marriage market, and moreover there is a men-optimal matching commonly
agreed by all men as the best stable matching and likewise there is a women-optimal
matching. Given a matching µ for the market (M,W, u, v) letSµ denote the set of all
nontrivial submarkets (M ′,W ′, u, v) such that W\W ′ = µ(M\M ′) where µ(M\M ′)
denotes the µ-image of M\M ′. Observe that if S ∈ Sµ then µ restricted to S is a
matching for S; moreover if µ is a stable matching for (M,W, u, v) then µ restricted
to S is a stable matching for S.
Obviously the outcome matching of any h ∈ Z is a matching for the initial market.
A strategy profile σ and the contact function C jointly induce a probability measure
on 2Z and hence also induce a probability mass function on the set of all matchings
for the initial market. We say that a matching obtains if it arises as an outcome
matching. A strategy profile σ enforces a matching µ if µ obtains almost surely
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under σ. µ being enforced implies the players will almost surely be coupled together
or left single according to µ.
Near-Frictionless Analysis
This paper focuses on analyzing game outcomes when search frictions are small. With
respect to this approach we introduce the following terminology: An environment
(M,W, u, v, C) := {(M,W, u, v, C, δ) : δ ∈ (0, 1)} is the set of all games that share the
same initial market and contact function. A strategy profile σ is a limit equilibrium
of the environment (M,W, u, v, C) if there exists some d < 1 such that σ is a subgame
perfect equilibrium of the game (M,W, u, v, C, δ) for any δ > d.
1.5 Analysis
Preliminary Results
The following lemma collects some useful results for future reference.
Lemma 1.5.1. For a subgame perfect equilibrium σ let pi(x) denote the expected
payoff for player x under σ. The following are true for σ:
(a) pi(x) ≥ 0 for any x ∈M ∪W .
(b) (m,w) marry with positive probability only if m is acceptable to w. 7
(c) (m,w) marry with positive probability only if αSI (m) m w and αSI (w) w m
where SI denotes the initial market.
(d) pi(m) ≤ u(m,αSI (m)) for any m ∈M . pi(w) ≤ v(αSI (w), w) for any w ∈ W .
Proof: (a) follows from the observation that a player secures an expected payoff of 0
by rejecting everyone forever. The same observation implies a woman’s equilibrium
continuation payoff from rejecting a man is nonnegative, thus (b) follows. To show (c),
first observe that if w m αSI (m) then m is unacceptable to w, thus (m,w) will not
marry by (b). Suppose m w αSI (w) yet (m,w) marry with positive probability. w
is unacceptable to m. That (m,w) marry with positive probability implies m accepts
w with positive probability after some history h. Let h′ denote the immediate history
following h as m has accepted w. w rejects m with positive probability after h′
because otherwise m’s expected payoff from accepting w after h is u(m,w) < 0, less
7However, a pair (m,w), where w is unacceptable to m, might marry in equilibrium with positive
probability. For an example of this possibility see Appendix A.3. Before reading the example the
reader is recommended to go through Proposition 1.5.2 and Example 1 in the main text.
8
than the payoff of 0 from rejecting everyone forever. Let V denote w’s expected
payoff in the subsequent subgame Γ as she has rejected m after h′. That w rejects
m with positive probability after h′ implies δV ≥ v(m,w), then in turn implies there
exists some m′ w m such that (m′, w) marry with positive probability in Γ. Since
m′ w αSI (w), we can apply the same argument for m′ and conclude there exists
some m′′ such that m′′ w m′ and (m′′, w) marry with positive probability in some
subgame. Iteratively applying the same argument leads to the necessary contradiction
because M is finite. (d) follows from (c). 
Enforcing Stable Matchings
The foremost question of whether stable matchings may be enforced in equilibria
is addressed in this subsection. Proposition 1.5.2 below gives a positive answer by
showing that any stable matching can be enforced in a limit equilibrium. The proof
is based on a construction per se worth highlighting: For a matching µ of the initial
market, the µ-strategy profile σµ is described by the following table that specifies
what man m and woman w do if they meet each other when the remaining market is
S. In the table µS denotes the women-optimal matching for S.
m w
If S ∈ Sµ Accept w if w m
µ(m)
Accept m if m w
µ(w)
If S /∈ Sµ Accept w if w m
µS(m)
Accept m if m w
µS(w)
Let Vµ(x, δ) be player x’s expected payoff under σµ if the discount factor is δ.
Proposition 1.5.2. If µ is a stable matching for the initial market of the environment
(M,W, u, v, C) then:
(a) σµ enforces µ.
(b) (m,w) marry upon first meeting under σµ if w = µ(m).
(c) limδ→1 Vµ(m, δ) = u(m,µ(m)) and limδ→1 Vµ(w, δ) = v(µ(w), w).
(d) σµ satisfies the Markov condition.
(e) σµ is a limit equilibrium of (M,W, u, v, C).
Proof: The initial market is in Sµ. Observe that if (m,w) meet when the remaining
market is in Sµ then the meeting results in marriage if and only if w = µ(m) because
µ being stable implies w m µ(m) and m w µ(w) hold simultaneously if and only if
w = µ(m). Thus the remaining market after any history on the equilibrium path is
in Sµ, which combined with the previous observation implies (b). It also follows that
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(m,w) will not marry on the equilibrium path if w 6= µ(m). Consequently if µ(m) 6= s
then (m,µ(m)) remain in the market until the first meeting between them takes place.
Thus the probability that (m,µ(m)) marry is equal to the probability that they meet
eventually, the latter being bounded from below by
∑∞
n=0 (1− )n = 1, implying (a).
Following (a) and (b) we have u(m,µ(m)) ≥ Vµ(m, δ) ≥
∑∞
n=0 [δ(1−)]nu(m,µ(m)).
(c) follows from limδ→1
∑∞
n=0 [δ(1− )]nu(m,µ(m)) = u(m,µ(m)) and the analogous
equality for any w. (d) follows from the observation that a player’s behavior depends
on only the current remaining market.
Now show (e). Suppose (m,w) meet on a day when the remaining market is S. Let
µ denote µ restricted to S if S ∈ Sµ or µS otherwise. Thus µ is a stable matching
for S. Let Γ denote the subsequent subgame resulting from (m,w)’s separation.
By construction σµ restricted to Γ is equal to the µ-strategy profile σµ of Γ. Let
Vµ(x, δ|Γ) denote the expected payoff for player x ∈ S under σµ restricted to Γ.
Then limδ→1 δVµ(x, δ|Γ) = u(m,µ(m)) by (c) and δVµ(x, δ|Γ) < u(m,µ(m)) by (a);
the analogous equality and inequality respectively hold for w. Apply one-deviation
analysis for m and w. For δ sufficiently close to 1, δVµ(w, δ|Γ) < v(m,w) if and
only if m w µ(w), where the left side of the inequality is w’s expected payoff from
rejecting m and the right side that from accepting m. Thus accepting m if and only
if m w µ(w) is optimal for w. m’s expected payoff from rejecting w is δVµ(m, δ|Γ)
whereas that from accepting w is u(m,µ(m)) if w = µ(m), δVµ(m, δ|Γ) if w m µ(m),
or pu(m,w)+(1−p)δVµ(m, δ|Γ) if µ(m) m w where p is either 0 or 1. Thus accepting
w if and only if w m µ(m) is optimal for m if δ is sufficiently close to 1. 
Proposition 1.5.2 agrees with the common finding that the core of a coalitional game
can be supported in equilibria of a non-cooperative counterpart. For results along this
line in a similar search and matching context see Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990),
Adachi (2003), and Lauermann and No¨ldeke (2014). The limit equilibria constructed
above will also be used as important building blocks for more complicated equilibria.
Enforcing Unstable Matchings
In this subsection, the question of whether unstable matchings are enforceable in limit
equilibria is addressed with an affirmative example.
Example 1. Reward and punishment
To describe the initial market, player x’s preferences are represented by a list P (x)
such that P (x) = a, ..., b if and only if a x ... x b x s. Note that players
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unacceptable to x are omitted from P (x). The initial market is represented as
P (m1) = w2, w1, P (w1) = m1,m2,m3
P (m2) = w1, w2, P (w2) = m2,m3,m1,
P (m3) = w2.
A limit equilibrium σ is constructed to enforce µ such that µ(m1) = w2, µ(m2) = w1
and µ(m3) = s. µ is unstable because the pair (m3, w2) blocks it. σ is specified by
an automaton with the following states:
q0 : The initial state. In q0, m1 accepts w2; m2 accepts no one; m3 accepts no one;
w1 accepts m1; w2 accepts m1 and m2. The transition rules are:
q0 −→

q1 if (m1, w2) marry,
q2 if for some (m,w) 6= (m1, w2): w rejects m or (m,w) marry,
q0 otherwise.
q1 : An absorbing state. As the state has just become q1, the remaining market is
S1 := S0\(m1, w2) ∈ Sµ where S0 denotes the initial market. In q1 the players
follow the µS1-strategy profile where µS1 is µ restricted to S1.
q2 : An absorbing state. Let S2 denote the (history-dependent) remaining market
as the state has just become q2. In q2 the players follow the µ
S2-strategy profile
where µS2 denotes the women-optimal matching for S2.
On the equilibrium path (m1, w2) marry first. Then the state becomes q1 in which
µS1 (µ restricted to S1) is enforced, as implied by Proposition 1.5.2(a), because µ
S1
is a stable matching for S1. Thus µ obtains under any finite terminal history on the
equilibrium path. It is straightforward to verify that the game ends almost surely,
implying µ obtains almost surely. Thus σ enforces µ.
Now verify that σ is indeed a limit equilibrium. By Proposition 1.5.2(e), σ restricted
to subgames in q1 and q2 is a limit equilibrium of the respective subgames. Thus
it suffices to check q0. Consider the situation that the blocking pair (m3, w2) meet
on a day in q0. Apply one-deviation analysis. Suppose m3 has accepted w2. w2’s
action of rejecting m3 will switch the state to q2 in which the µ
W -strategy profile
will be implemented where µW is the women-optimal matching for the initial market.
By Proposition 1.5.2(c), w2’s expected payoff from rejecting m3 is approximately
v(µW (w2), w2) = v(m2, w2) for δ sufficiently close to 1, strictly greater than v(m3, w2).
Thus rejecting m3 is optimal when near-frictionless. Now consider m3. If he rejects
w2 then µ is enforced; otherwise if he accepts w2 then w2 will reject him, switching
the state to q2 in which µ
W is enforced. µ(m3) = µ
W (m3) = s implies rejecting w2 is
(weakly) optimal for m3.
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Consider the situation that (m2, w1) meet in q0. As in w2’s case above, it is optimal
for w1 to reject m2 for δ sufficiently close to 1. m2’s case is slightly different from
m3’s case above. If m2 accepts w1, the µ
W−strategy profile will be implemented
under which m2’s expected payoff is approximately u(m,µ
W (m)) = u(m2, w2) for δ
sufficiently close to 1. If m2 rejects w1, m2 will marry w1 eventually but only after






u(m2, w1), strictly greater than u(m2, w2) for δ sufficiently
close to 1. Rejecting w1 in q0 is optimal when near-frictionless. The optimality of σ
in other cases is either similar to those discussed above or can be verified by routine
inspection. 
A blocking pair would profit from marrying each other to circumvent an unstable
matching. To enforce an unstable matching such circumvention must be discour-
aged. In Example 1, a reward-punishment scheme, implemented in q2, is employed
to prevent the blocking attempt from (m3, w2). To see the point, note that if m3
initiated a blocking attempt by accepting w2, w2 would not oblige because she would
receive a reward, which is the promise of marrying the more preferable man m2,
from rejecting m3. In contrast m2 would be (weakly) punished
8 for initiating the
blocking attempt by being forced to stay single. Meanwhile, to ensure the reward
for w2 is credible, m2 needs to be available until either m3 or w2 has married. In
Example 1, m2 may marry only after (m1, w2) have married. m2’s potential attempt
to marry w1 early is discouraged by a similar reward-punishment scheme. Should
m2 accept w1 when (m1, w2) have not married, he would be strictly punished (by
marrying w2 eventually) for deviating and w1 would be rewarded (by marrying m1
eventually) for not obliging. The reward-punishment schemes resemble those used in
Proposition 1 in Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990) supporting non-core outcomes. In
their model, a reward-punishment scheme targeted at the blocking attempt between
a buyer and a seller entails reaction from at most three players (those whose welfare
would be affected should the attempt succeed), because all sellers are identical and
so are all buyers. In contrast, in the present model, because of a more complicated
preference structure, a reward-punishment scheme may require the entire market to
re-coordinate, which would make its implementability more difficult. Indeed, Propo-
sition 1.5.6 to appear later will show for certain markets no unstable matching can
be enforced.
Sufficient Conditions for Enforced Matchings to be Stable
In this subsection two points are made regarding the enforceability of unstable match-
ings. First, disabling reward-punishment schemes excludes unstable matchings from
matchings enforceable in equilibria. Second, enforceability of unstable matchings de-
8Example 1 relies on the knife-edge case that m3 rejects w2 when indifferent. Such fragility need
not be present in enforcing an unstable matching. In an earlier version of this paper I provided a
more complicated example in which all circumventing attempts are strictly punished.
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pends on the preference structure. Each point is made by a condition under which
all matchings enforceable in equilibria are stable.
The following lemma will be useful for the proofs of further results.
Lemma 1.5.3. If an unstable matching µ is enforced in a subgame perfect equi-
librium σ then for any pair (m,w) blocking µ, σ prescribes the following for any
on-equilibrium-path meeting between (m,w): m rejects w, moreover if m deviated to
accepting w then w would reject m with positive probability.
Proof: Consider any on-equilibrium-path meeting between a blocking pair (m,w).
Suppose w would accept m with probability 1 after she has been accepted by m. m
must reject w in the first place, because otherwise (m,w) would marry with positive
probability in equilibrium, a contradiction. It follows that m’s continuation pay-
off from rejecting w is weakly higher than u(m,w), the latter strictly higher than
u(m,µ(m)) since the pair (m,w) blocks µ, implying m would marry someone other
than µ(m) with positive probability in equilibrium, a contradiction. Thus w’s equi-
librium strategy is to reject m with positive probability in the current meeting. This
implies w’s expected payoff from rejecting m is weakly greater than v(m,w), the lat-
ter strictly greater than v(µ(w), w). Hence in the subsequent subgame Γ resulting
from w having rejected m, w will marry with someone other than µ(w) with positive
probability. Suppose m accepts w with positive probability in the current meeting,
then Γ is reached with positive probability, implying w would marry someone other
than µ(w) with positive probability in equilibrium, a contradiction. 
Lemma 1.5.3 implies that in order to deter a blocking pair (m,w) from circumvent-
ing the enforcement of an unstable matching, m must be punished for initiating a
blocking attempt and w rewarded for not obliging. Obviously such a scheme cannot
be implemented if the other players cannot tell whether (m,w)’s separation resulted
from a failed blocking attempt initiated by m but turned down by w, or from m hav-
ing rejected w as prescribed. As the upcoming proposition shows, the private-dinner
condition, which disallows the players from conditioning their behavior on the ac-
tions during any failed meeting, indeed rules out unstable matchings from matchings
enforceable in equilibria.
Proposition 1.5.4. No unstable matching can be enforced in a private-dinner equi-
librium.
Proof: Prove by contradiction. Suppose an unstable matching µ for the initial market
is enforced in a private-dinner equilibrium σ. µ is individually rational by Lemma
1.5.1(a), thus some pair (m,w) blocks µ. Consider the situation that (m,w) meet on
the first day of the game. Let h ∈ Hˆ denote the history corresponding to m having
rejected w on the current day. Let h′ ∈ Hˆ denote the history corresponding to m
having accepted w and w having rejected m on the current day. Thus g(h) and g(h′)
are both the one-entry sequence (m,w, separation). Let V and V ′ respectively denote
w’s expected payoffs in Γ(h) and Γ(h′). The private-dinner condition implies V = V ′.
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By Lemma 1.5.3, w would reject m with positive probability on the current day if
she was accepted, implying δV ′ ≥ v(m,w). h is on the equilibrium path by Lemma
1.5.3 because m rejects w on the current day in equilibrium. Thus µ is enforced by
σ restricted to Γ(h), implying v(µ(w), w) ≥ V . Since the pair (m,w) blocks µ, we
have v(m,w) > v(µ(w), w), implying δV = δV ′ ≥ v(m,w) > v(µ(w), w) ≥ V , a
contradiction. 
Proposition 1.5.4 identifies a condition on the equilibrium that negates enforceability
of unstable matchings for any initial market. In contrast the upcoming proposition
identifies a condition on the initial market that negates enforceability of unstable
matchings in any equilibrium.
Call (m,w) a top pair for submarket S if m = αS(w) and w = αS(m). (m,w) is a
top pair for S if for m, w is the best woman among those in S who find m acceptable,
and vice versa. A marriage market satisfies the Sequential Preference Condition
if there is an ordering of the men m1, ...,m|M |, an ordering of the women w1, ..., w|W |,
and a positive integer k such that:
1. For any i ≤ k, (mi, wi) is a top pair for Si := ({mj : j ≥ i}, {wj : j ≥ i}, u, v).
2. Sk+1 := ({mj : j ≥ k + 1}, {wj : j ≥ k + 1}, u, v) is trivial.
A stronger condition, introduced in Eeckhout (2000), implies that the market has a
unique stable matching.9 The present Sequential Preference Condition, albeit weaker,
is still sufficient for uniqueness. The unique stable matching pairs mi to wi for any
i ≤ k and leaves mi and wi single for any i > k. The Sequential Preference Condition
implies that the players’ preferences are aligned in a certain way, see Eeckhout (2000)
for a different formalization that highlights the alignment.
Lemma 1.5.5. If (m,w) is a top pair for the initial market then (m,w) marry with
positive probability, and upon first meeting, in any subgame perfect equilibrium.
Proof: If (m,w) is a top pair for the initial market then clearly they are a top pair
for any submarket in which both are present. w always accepts m in any subgame
perfect equilibrium because the equilibrium payoff from rejecting m is strictly less
than v(m,w) by Lemma 1.5.1(d). It follows that in any subgame perfect equilibrium
m always accepts w because his payoff from accepting w is u(m,w) whereas that from
rejecting w is strictly less than u(m,w) by Lemma 1.5.1(d). Thus (m,w) marry upon
first meeting in any subgame perfect equilibrium. That they marry with positive
probability follows from the assumption that they meet on the first day of the game
with positive probability. 
9The condition in Eeckhout (2000), sometimes also called the Sequential Preference Condition in
the literature, is equivalent to the present condition if |M | = |W |, every man is acceptable to every
woman and vice versa.
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Proposition 1.5.6. If the initial market satisfies the Sequential Preference Condition
then no unstable matching can be enforced in any subgame perfect equilibrium.
Proof: Let the men and women be ordered as in the definition of the Sequential
Preference Condition and k be the corresponding index threshold. Fix a subgame
perfect equilibrium σ that enforces some matching µ. (m1, w1) marry with positive
probability under σ by Lemma 1.5.5. It follows that µ(m1) = w1. It also follows that
a subgame with remaining market S2 is reached with positive probability, because
if (m1, w1) meet on the first day, which occurs with positive probability, then they
marry and the remaining market becomes S2. Suppose for any i < n ≤ k for some
n, µ(mi) = wi and a subgame with remaining market Si+1 is reached with positive
probability. By the inductive hypothesis a subgame Γ with remaining market Sn is
reached with positive probability. By Lemma 1.5.5, (mn, wn) marry with positive
probability in Γ under σ, implying that (mn, wn) marry with positive probability
in the initial game under σ. Hence µ(mn) = wn. It also follows that a subgame
with remaining market Sn+1 is reached with positive probability. By induction, for
any i ≤ k, µ(mi) = wi and a subgame with remaining market Si+1 is reached with
positive probability, implying the subgame with remaining market Sk+1 is reached
with positive probability. As the remaining market becomes Sk+1 the game ends and
any player x ∈ Sk+1 remains single. Thus µ(mi) = µ(wi) = s for any i > k. The
proposition follows from the observation that µ is the unique stable matching. 
For the sequential bargaining model considered in Suh and Wen (2008), if the un-
derlying marriage market satisfies the Sequential Preference Condition then there
is a unique equilibrium implementing the unique stable matching (Theorem 1).10
However, the Sequential Preference Condition does not guarantee a unique subgame
perfect equilibrium for the present model, as will be shown in a later example (Exam-
ple 3). In some of the additional equilibria, a lottery of matchings, instead of a single
matching, is induced due to the uncertainty in the search process, which is absent
from the model in Suh and Wen (2008).
Equilibria Inducing a Lottery of Matchings
Instead of enforcing a single matching, there may exist equilibria inducing a lottery
of multiple matchings. In this subsection examples are given showing that unstable
matchings, even Pareto-dominated ones, may obtain with positive probability in such
equilibria.
Example 2. Regret
10Theorem 1 in Suh and Wen (2008) uses the stronger condition from Eeckhout (2000), but remains
true under the present Sequential Preference Condition.
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The initial market is described by the following lists:
P (m1) = w2, w1, w3, P (w1) = m1,m2,m3,
P (m2) = w3, w2, w1, P (w2) = m2,m1,m3,
P (m3) = w2, w3, w1, P (w3) = m3,m2,m1,































































2). The contact function satisfies C(m,w, S) = C(mˆ, wˆ, S) for any pairs
(m,w) ∈ S and (mˆ, wˆ) ∈ S for any S ∈ S . The initial market has a unique stable




i for i = 1, 2, 3.
In the limit equilibrium σ to be described shortly, two matchings, µa and µb given
below, obtain, each with probability 0.5:

















2, µb(mi) = wi, i = 1, 2, 3.





µb. σ is specified by an automaton with the following states:























qa: An absorbing state. As the state has just become qa the remaining market is
Sa := S0\(m1, w1) ∈ Sµa where S0 denotes the initial market. In qa the players
follow the µˆa-strategy profile where µˆa is µa restricted to Sa.
qb: An absorbing state. As the state has just become qb the remaining market is
Sb := S0\(m′1, w′1) ∈ Sµb . In qb the players follow the µˆb-strategy profile where
µˆb is µb restricted to Sb.
q3 : An absorbing state. Let S3 denote the (history-dependent) remaining market
as the state has just become q3. In q3 the players follow the µ
S3-strategy profile
where µS3 denotes the women-optimal matching for S3.
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Note that σ satisfies the private-dinner condition. µa obtains almost surely conditional
on qa being reached. µb obtains almost surely conditional on qb being reached. qa
is reached if the first meeting between (m1, w1) takes place before the first meeting
between (m′1, w
′




1) takes place before
the first meeting between (m1, w1). It is easy to verify that µa and µb both obtain
with probability 0.5.
To see that σ is indeed a limit equilibrium it suffices to check the absence of prof-
itable one-deviations in q0 because µa restricted to Sa, µb restricted to Sb, and
µS3 restricted to S3 are stable matchings for the respective submarkets and hence
Proposition 1.5.2 is applicable to these cases. Let V (x, δ) denote the expected pay-
off for player x under σ if the discount factor is δ. For any h ∈ Hˆ such that
the state of h is q0, player x’s expected payoff in Γ(h) is also V (x, δ). We have
V (m) := limδ→1 δV (m, δ) = 12u(m,µa(m)) +
1
2
u(m,µb(m)) for any m ∈ M and
V (w) := limδ→1 δV (w, δ) = 12v(µa(w), w) +
1
2
v(µb(w), w) for any w ∈ W . Observe
that v(m,w) > V (w) if and only if m is w’s first choice. Thus accepting only her
first choice is optimal for every woman in state q0 given δ sufficiently close to 1. In
particular it is optimal for w2 to reject m1 despite they form a blocking pair against
µa and for w
′
2 to reject m
′
1 despite they form a blocking pair against µb. The men’s
incentives can be verified by routine inspection. 
Example 2 shows that, despite Proposition 1.5.4, unstable matchings may obtain in
private-dinner equilibria. Suppose (m1, w2), a pair that blocks one of the probable
outcome matchings µa, meet when the remaining market is the initial market. At this
point (m1, w2) do not both profit from circumventing the equilibrium by marrying
each other, because the game can still go either way, leading to µa or µb. Indeed, m1
would accept w2 yet w2 would reject m1, because w2 still has a chance to marry a




1) is the first couple to marry
then w2 will marry m2 eventually. However, if instead (m1, w1) is the first couple to
marry, then for w2, m2 is impossible and m1 is no more, forcing her to marry the last
choice m3. w2 would regret that she had rejected m1, as an old English saying goes:
He that will not when he may; when he will, he shall have Nay.
Regret occurs in a nonstationary setting because the search prospect may change
as the game unfolds. Regret does not occur in a model with a completely station-
ary search setting, such as the one in Adachi (2003). The model in Lauermann and
No¨ldeke (2014) also assumes a stationary search setting but has a trace of nonsta-
tionarity: Players may be forced to leave the market as singles, at the point of which
one’s continuation payoff drops to zero. It is this trace of nonstationarity that makes
possible the emergence of regret and unstable matchings in some equilibria in which
players are forced to leave as singles after having rejected acceptable options in the
past.
Example 3. Coordination failure
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The initial market is described by the following lists:
P (m1) = w1, w2, P (w1) = m1,m3,
P (m2) = w2, w3, P (w2) = m2,m1,
P (m3) = w3, w1, P (w3) = m3,m2.
Moreover, for any m ∈ M , if w and w′ are m’s first and second choices respectively




u(m,w′). Similarly for any w ∈ W , if m and m′ are





contact function satisfies C(m,w, S) = C(mˆ, wˆ, S) for any pairs (m,w) ∈ S and
(mˆ, wˆ) ∈ S for any S ∈ S . Observe that the initial market satisfies the Sequential
Preference Condition and so do all of its submarkets.
In the limit equilibrium σ, when the remaining market is the initial market, each
man accepts every acceptable woman and each woman accepts every acceptable man.
After the first marriage is realized the players follow the µS−strategy profile where
µS is the unique stable matching for the remaining market S right after the first
marriage. σ satisfies the Markov condition.
The following four matchings obtain with positive probability:
µ0 : m1 7→ w1, µ1 : m1 7→ w2, µ2 : m1 7→ w1, µ3 : m1 7→ s,
m2 7→ w2, m2 7→ s, m2 7→ w3, m2 7→ w2,
m3 7→ w3, m3 7→ w3, m3 7→ s, m3 7→ w1,
w1 7→ s, w2 7→ s, w3 7→ s.
µ0 is the unique stable matching for the initial market. Each of µi, i = 1, 2, 3 is
Pareto-dominated by µ0. It is easy to verify the following: µ0 obtains almost surely
conditional on the event E0 that a man meets his first choice on the first day of the
game. µi, i = 1, 2, 3, obtains almost surely conditional on the event Ei that mi meets
his second choice on the first day of the game. Let p(µ) denote the unconditional
probability that µ obtains under σ. For any i,











To see that the equality holds, note that conditional on none of Ei, i = 0, 1, 2, 3,
having occurred on the first day, the probability that µi obtains remains p(µi) because
σ satisfies the Markov condition. By the specification of the contact function we have
Pr(E0) = 1/3 and Pr(Ei) = 1/9 for i = 1, 2, 3. Thus p(µ0) = 1/2 and p(µi) = 1/6
for i = 1, 2, 3. Observe that under σ each player marries his or her first choice with
probability 2/3, second choice with probability 1/3, and stays single with probability
1/6.
To verify that σ is indeed a limit equilibrium, it suffices to check the absence of prof-
itable one-deviations when the remaining market is the initial market, since Proposi-
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tion 1.5.2 covers the other cases. Let V (x, δ) denote player x’s expected payoff under
σ if the discount factor is δ. V (x, δ) is also x’s expected payoff in Γ(h) for any h ∈ Hˆ
such that S(h) is the initial market since σ satisfies the Markov condition. It is easy
to verify that V (w) := limδ→1 V (w, δ) = 23v(m,w) +
1
6
v(m′, w) where m and m′ are
w’s first and second choices respectively. We have δV (w, δ) < V (w) < v(m′, w) where
the second inequality is by assumption, implying it is optimal for w to accept both
m and m′. Similarly it is optimal for each man to accept every acceptable woman. 
In Example 3, σ is strictly Pareto-dominated by the µ0-strategy profile, which by
Proposition 1.5.2 is also a limit equilibrium. Inefficiency arises because of a coordina-
tion failure due to self-confirmation of mutual doubts. Despite being each other’s first
choice, m1 does not commit to waiting for w1 because w1 does not commit to waiting
for m1 because m1 does not commit to waiting for w1 and so on ad infinitum. The
example shows that the Markov condition, which is stronger than the private-dinner
condition, and the Sequential Preference Condition combined are not sufficient to rule
out limit equilibria in which unstable matchings obtain with positive probability.
Delay
This subsection studies whether equilibrium delay may cause significant efficiency
loss even if search frictions are small. Two types of delay come to mind. The first
type refers to the situation that a game never ends. Recall a game ends when the
remaining market becomes trivial. A never-ending game implies at least one mutually
beneficial marriage is not realized while the pertained players stay unmarried into the
infinite future. Such a situation is not unlike a never-ending negotiation over how
to split the money on the table. The upcoming proposition essentially rules out this
type of delay in equilibrium.
Proposition 1.5.7. A game ends almost surely in any subgame perfect equilibrium.
The proof, found in Appendix A.1, hinges on the observation that in any subgame
perfect equilibrium, after any nonterminal history, the probability that no marriage
occurs during the next T days is less than some constant p < 1 if T is sufficiently
large. It follows that the probability that no marriage occurs for a duration of kT
days is less than pk, thus the probability that a marriage will occur during the next
kT days becomes arbitrarily close to 1 as k tends to ∞, implying the initial market
will eventually shrink to a trivial market.
In contrast to a never-ending game, the second type of delay is in its literal sense:
Some marriages are realized too late. We define what it means to be “too late” as
follows: LetM denote the set of all matchings for the initial market. For any strategy
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where pσ(µ) denotes the probability that µ obtains under σ and Vσ(m, δ) denotes m’s
expected payoff under σ if the discount factor is δ. Define Lσ(w, δ) for each woman
w analogously. Efficiency loss is thus measured as the difference between a player’s
expected payoff from the immediate resolution of the lottery induced by σ and his or
her expected payoff under σ. δ < 1 implies Lσ(x, δ) ≥ 0. We ask whether equilibrium
efficiency loss due to delay vanishes as search frictions vanish, that is, whether the
equality limδ→1 supσ∈Σ(δ) Lσ(x, δ) = 0 holds for any player x where Σ(δ) denotes the
set of all subgame perfect equilibria of the game with discount factor δ. Examples 4
and 5 show that equilibrium efficiency loss due to delay may remain as search frictions
vanish.
Example 4. Wait and see
The initial market is described by the following lists:
P (m1) = w1, w2, P (w1) = m2,m1,
P (m2) = w2, w1, P (w2) = m1,m2.
Each player receives a payoff of 3 from marrying the first choice and 1 from marrying
the second choice. The contact function satisfies C(m,w, S) = C(mˆ, wˆ, S) for any
pairs (m,w) ∈ S and (mˆ, wˆ) ∈ S for any S ∈ S .
Fix η ∈ (0.5, 1). Given δ sufficiently close to 1 there exists τ(δ) ∈ N such that 0.5 <
δτ(δ) and δτ(δ)−1 < η. Consider the strategy profile σ(δ) specified by an automaton
with the following states:
q0 : The initial state. In q0, each man accepts no one; each woman accepts her first
choice. The transition rules are
q0 −→

qM if (m1, w1) or (m2, w2) meet on the τ(δ)th day,
qW if (m1, w2) or (m2, w1) meet on the τ(δ)th day,
q3 if some pair marry before the τ(δ)th day,
q0 otherwise.
qM : An absorbing state. When the state has just become qM the remaining market
is the initial one. In qM the players follow the µ
M -strategy profile where µM is
the men-optimal matching for the initial market.
qW : Symmetric to qM in which the µ
W -strategy profile is followed where µW is the
women-optimal matching for the initial market.
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q3: An absorbing state. The remaining pair (m,w) accept each other.
Note that σ(δ) satisfies the private-dinner condition. Under σ(δ), no player marries
during the first τ(δ) − 1 days. The pair that meet on the τ(δ)th day marry on that
day and the other pair marry on the next day. It is easily verified that µM and µW
both obtain with probability 0.5, and that on the τ(δ)− nth day player x’s expected
payoff K(x, n, δ) is greater than δn+1(0.5× 3 + 0.5× 1) = 2δn+1 for any n such that
0 < τ(δ) − n < τ(δ). By the choice of τ(δ), 2δn+1 ≥ 2δτ(δ) > 1. To verify that
σ(δ) is a subgame perfect equilibrium given δ sufficiently close to 1, it suffices to
check the absence of profitable one-deviations in q0 because Proposition 1.5.2 and
Lemma 1.5.1 cover the other states. Suppose (m1, w1) meet in q0 on the τ(δ) − nth
day. w1’s expected payoff from accepting m1 is 1 whereas that from rejecting him is
K(w1, n, δ) > 1, thus rejecting m1 is optimal. m1’s expected payoffs from accepting
and rejecting w1 are the same as he will be rejected anyway, thus rejecting w1 is
optimal. The other cases are similar or can be verified by routine inspection.
Note that Vσ(δ)(x, δ) < δ
τ(δ)−1(0.5 × 3 + 0.5 × 1) = 2δτ(δ)−1 for any player x since x
cannot marry before the τ(δ)th day. Thus
Lσ(δ)(x, δ) = 0.5× 3 + 0.5× 1− Vσ(δ)(x, δ) > 2(1− δτ(δ)−1) > 2(1− η) > 0.
That σ(δ) is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game with discount factor δ suffi-
ciently close to 1 implies limδ→1 supσ∈Σ(δ) Lσ(x, δ) ≥ 2(1− η) for any x. 
In Example 4, each player waits to see if oneself will be lucky to marry his or her
first choice, the revelation of which is on the τ(δ)th day. As search frictions vanish,
players become increasingly willing to wait longer. Efficiency loss lingers as the length
of waiting grows in pace with the vanishing search frictions.
Example 5. War of attrition
Take the game in Example 4. Consider strategy profile σ(δ) under which each player
accepts his or her first choice in the remaining market with certainty and second choice
(if there is one) with probability q(δ) ∈ (0, 1). Note that σ(δ) satisfies the Markov
condition. We want to choose q(δ) so that σ(δ) is a subgame perfect equilibrium. Note
that when the remaining market is the initial one, w1 randomizes between accepting
and rejecting m1. Conditional on w1 having rejected m1 on a given day, all of the
following four events occur with probability q(δ)/4: (1) (m1, w1) marry tomorrow, (2)
(m2, w1) marry tomorrow, (3) (m2, w2) marry tomorrow, and then (m1, w1) marry on
the day after tomorrow, (4) (m1, w2) marry tomorrow, and then (m2, w1) marry on
the day after tomorrow. With the remaining probability 1 − q(δ) no one marries
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tomorrow. To make w1 indifferent between accepting and rejecting m1, we must have





v(m1, w1) + v(m2, w1) + δv(m1, w1) + δv(m2, w1)
)
+ (1− q(δ))v(m1, w1)
]
.
Substituting in v(m1, w1) = 1 and v(m2, w1) = 3 we conclude that q(δ) = (1− δ)/δ2.
The same indifference argument applies to each of the other players. (1−δ)/δ2 ∈ (0, 1)
for any δ > (
√
5− 1)/2 ≈ 0.618. It is easily verified that for δ sufficiently close to 1,
σ(δ) is a subgame perfect equilibrium if and only if q(δ) = (1− δ)/δ2.
Now evaluate the efficiency loss due to delay. σ(δ) induces a lottery in which each
player marries either player on the other side with probability 0.5. For any player x
and δ > (
√
5− 1)/2 obviously Vσ(δ)(x, δ) = 1/δ. Thus
Lσ(δ)(x, δ) = 0.5× 3 + 0.5× 1− 1/δ.
Note that Lσ(δ)(x, δ) is positive for any δ > (
√
5 − 1)/2 and limδ→1 Lσ(δ)(x, δ) = 1.
Thus limδ→1 supσ∈Σ(δ) Lσ(x, δ) ≥ 1. 
Example 5 resembles a war of attrition. A player “chickens out” to accept his or her
second choice with probability (1 − δ)/δ2, which tends to 0 as δ tends to 1. It is
notable that Lσ(δ)(x, δ) increases with δ: Ironically, the expected total cost of search
goes up as the average cost goes down. In both Examples 4 and 5, the efficiency gain
from vanishing search frictions is undone in equilibrium by increasing delay in such
a way that the incentives of the players are preserved, leaving the net efficiency loss
significant.
A Sufficient Condition for Equilibrium Uniqueness
In this subsection a condition on the preference structure is identified under which
the game has an essentially unique subgame perfect equilibrium if search frictions are
small.
For h ∈ Z define o(h) := (µh(m), th(m))m∈M where µh is the outcome matching of
h and th(m) ∈ {1, 2, ...} is the date of (m,µh(m))’s marriage under h if µh(m) ∈ W
or the date of the last day of h if µh(m) = s. th(m) = ∞ if µh(m) = s and h is
infinite. o(h) records each realized marriage and its date under h. If o(h) = o(h′)
then under h and h′ every player is married to the same person on the same day or
else stays single. Two strategy profiles are outcome equivalent if they induce the
same probability measure on {o(h) : h ∈ Z}. A game has an essentially unique
subgame perfect equilibrium if all of its subgame perfect equilibria are outcome
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equivalent.
A pair (m,w) is woman-acceptable if m is acceptable to w. Lemma 1.5.1(b) im-
plies equilibrium marriages may occur only between woman-acceptable pairs. For a
submarket S, player x ∈ S is a top player for S if x and some y ∈ S form a top pair
for S and moreover one of the following is true: (1) |AS(x)| = 1 or (2) |AS(x)| > 1
and x is a top player for S\(m,w) for any woman-acceptable pair (m,w) ∈ S such
that x /∈ {m,w}.
An immediate observation is that if x is a top player for S, and S ′ is derived from
S as a result of a sequence of other woman-acceptable pairs having left, then either
|AS(x)| = 0 or x is still a top player for S ′. The observation also implies that, despite
the recursive definition, whether x is a top player for S can be verified mechanically in
a finite number of steps. Since x (assumedly male) being a top player for S implies he
is part of a top pair for S, it follows that he continues to be part of a top pair for the
remaining market as other woman-acceptable pairs leave S (although his partner in
the current top pair might change), until x can no longer find an acceptable woman
who also finds him acceptable. In the case that every man is acceptable to every
woman and vice versa, x being a top player for the initial market implies he is the
favorite man of his favorite woman in the remaining market at any moment when he
is still unmarried.
Proposition 1.5.8. Suppose there is an ordering of the men m1, ...,m|M |, an ordering
of the women w1, ..., w|W | and a positive integer k such that:
1. For any i ≤ k, (mi, wi) is a top pair for Si := ({mj : j ≥ i}, {wj : j ≥ i}, u, v),
and moreover mi or wi is a top player for Si.
2. Sk+1 := ({mj : j ≥ k + 1}, {wj : j ≥ k + 1}, u, v) is trivial.
There exists d < 1 such that for any δ > d, (M,W, u, v, C, δ) has an essentially unique
subgame perfect equilibrium.
The proof is provided in Appendix A.2. Given the premise of Proposition 1.5.8,
the initial market has a unique stable matching µ such that µ(mi) = wi for i ≤ k,
and µ(mi) = µ(wi) = s for i > k. To sketch out the proof, for simplicity suppose
every man is acceptable to every woman and vice versa. The first step is proving by
induction on the market size that a top player w1 (assumedly female) for the initial
market marries her favorite man almost surely and upon first meeting in any subgame
perfect equilibrium for δ sufficiently close to 1. The inductive step goes as follows.
Suppose m1 is w1’s favorite man in the initial market. By Lemma 1.5.5, (m1, w1)
accept each other when they meet. Fix an equilibrium. Suppose w1 deviates to an
alternative strategy under which she accepts only m1 when the remaining market
is the initial market, and switches back to following the equilibrium strategy after
someone has married. For δ close to 1, w1’s expected payoff from the deviation is
strictly larger than v(m′, w1) where m′ is w1’s second favorite man, because if someone
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has married before (m1, w1)’s first meeting then in the continuation subgame, as the
market has become smaller to which the inductive hypothesis is applicable, w1 marries
her favorite man in the remaining market, which can be m1 or m
′, almost surely and
upon first meeting, whereas if (m1, w1) meet before anyone has married then they
marry each other. Thus w1’s equilibrium payoff must as well be strictly larger than
v(m′, w1), implying if no one has married, w1 rejects any man worse than m1. Given
w1’s behavior pinned down, it is shown that m1’s best response is accepting only w1
when no one has married. Combined with the inductive hypothesis, it follows that
(m1, w1) marry almost surely and upon first meeting. With (m1, w1)’s equilibrium
behavior determined this way, we may treat them as nonstrategic “dummy players”
who only accept each other. Then since one of m2 or w2 is a top player for the
submarket without (m1, w1), applying the analogous logic it is shown that (m2, w2)
also marry almost surely and upon first meeting, and so on and so forth until the
market unravels to the trivial Sk+1. From Lemma 1.5.1 it follows that every player
in Sk+1 must stay single.
The condition proposed in Proposition 1.5.8, for convenience referred to as Condi-
tion 1.5.8, is stronger than the Sequential Preference Condition. The initial market
from Example 3, for instance, satisfies the Sequential Preference Condition but fails
Condition 1.5.8. Indeed, in Example 3, although (m1, w1) is a top pair for the initial
market, if w1 goes “astray” and marries m3 then in the remaining market m1 is no
longer part of a top pair, and consequently his search prospect drops drastically be-
cause he has no chance of marrying his second choice w2. It is this possibility of a
large drop in the search prospect that makes m1 willing to accept his second choice,
w2, even when w1 is still in the market. For a market that satisfies Condition 1.5.8,
in contrast, if m (assumedly male) is a top player for the initial market and forms a
top pair with w, then even if w marries someone else, in the remaining market m still
forms a top pair with w′ whom he likes just next to w. Loosely speaking, the search
prospect of m would only experience a gradual drop if w marries someone else. This
ensures that m will wait for w if she is still in the market, preventing self-confirmation
of mutual doubt present in Example 3 from arising.
An acyclicity condition under which a marriage market has a unique stable matching
is proposed in Romero-Medina and Triossi (2013),11 which requires that the pref-
erences of the players on one side over acceptable players on the other side do not
display cycles. It can be shown that the acyclicity condition implies Condition 1.5.8.
Condition 1.5.8 is weaker, most importantly because it allows preference cycles. For
instance, the market with preference lists
P (m1) = w1, w2, P (w1) = m1,m2,
P (m2) = w2, w1, P (w2) = m2,m1
displays preference cycles on both sides but satisfies Condition 1.5.8.12 It is worth-
11I am indebted to a referee for referring me to this paper.
12A weaker condition, the absence of simultaneous cycles, is proposed in Romero-Medina and
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while noting that Condition 1.5.8 is an implication of the commonly seen preference
structure such that players on at least one side of the market share the same preference
ordering over those on the other side.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper studies a search and matching game with a marriage market embedded,
and analyzes whether matchings that arise in equilibria are stable when search fric-
tions are small. It is found that this is not the case in general. Unstable matchings
may arise for many reasons and under restrictive conditions. Moreover, significant
loss of efficiency due to delay may be incurred in equilibria even if search frictions
are small. A condition that implies preference alignment in a strong sense ensures
equilibrium uniqueness, restoring stability and efficiency.
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Triossi (2013) that also guarantees the stable matching is unique. Condition 1.5.8 is neither nec-
essary nor sufficient for that weaker condition. The initial market from Example 3 satisfies the
absence of simultaneous cycles but violates Condition 1.5.8. An example that violates the absence
of simultaneous cycles but satisfies Condition 1.5.8 is given in Appendix A.4.
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CHAPTER II
A Simple Model of Competition Between Teams,
jointly with Kfir Eliaz
2.1 Introduction
Many economic, political and social activities are performed by groups or organi-
zations rather than individuals. When firms compete, the strategic interaction is
really between collectives of individuals that make up the firms. Electoral competi-
tion between candidates involves strategic interaction between teams consisting of the
candidates themselves, their consultants and the activists that support them. Lob-
bying efforts are carried out by interest groups who need to coordinate the actions of
their members in response to the actions of other interest groups. Likewise, ethnic
conflicts involve different peoples who are united by a common background such as
religion, origin or economic status.
Despite the ubiquity of strategic interactions between groups, the majority of eco-
nomic analysis treats players in game theoretic models as individual entities. While
this may be a helpful simplification it ignores the interplay between intra-group strate-
gizing (how each member of a group reasons about the actions of other members of
the same group) and inter -group strategizing (how each member of a group reasons
about the actions of the members of the opposing groups), which may have important
implications for the outcome of the interaction. Furthermore, by explicitly modeling
each participating unit as a collective of decision-makers, one may be able to gain
insights on how different group attributes (such as size, for instance) can affect the
outcome.
In light of this we propose and analyze a model of competition between groups. We
focus on the case of two competing groups, or teams, of possibly different sizes. Fol-
lowing the literature on group contests (see below) we model the interaction between
teams as a generalized all-pay auction with incomplete information. Individual mem-
bers of each team exert effort to increase the performance of one’s own team via an
additively separable aggregation function. The team with a higher performance wins,
and its members enjoy the prize as a public good. The value of the prize is identi-
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cal to members of the same team but is unknown to the other team. Each player
individually bears the cost of his own effort regardless of winning or not.
We consider three cases: That the aggregation function is concave, convex, or linear.
We show that if the aggregation function is strictly concave or convex then there is
a unique monotone equilibrium in which every player actively participates, that is,
everyone makes positive effort in expectation. If the aggregation function is linear
then all monotone equilibria are equivalent at the team level. Subsequent analysis
focuses on equilibria with active participation. Our main interest is in understanding
the implication of team size on the probability of winning and on the members’
payoffs. The main finding is that these implications are determined by the curvature
of the aggregation function. We first show that the bigger team is more likely to win
if the aggregation function is concave, less likely if convex, or equally likely if linear.
The underlying intuition is that the curvature of the aggregation function determines
whether in equilibrium additional members augment or reduce the productivity of
existent members. Second, we show that when the aggregation function is concave
or linear, then the expected payoff for a player in the bigger team is higher than that
in the smaller team. Moreover, there also exist convex aggregation functions under
which the same result holds, despite that the bigger team is less likely to win, because
a member in the bigger team is also responsible for less work.
Since group size can have important implications, we investigate how teams might
form. We consider a two stage game such that in the first stage players split into
teams, and in the second stage the teams compete. Our main result is that team
formation depends on how each member’s payoff changes with the sizes of the two
teams. If a member’s payoff increases with his own team size and decreases with the
size of the opponent team, then there exists a unique nontrivial equilibrium in the
first stage in which the teams are stochastically formed. While this is true for a linear
aggregation rule, it remains an open question how more general aggregation functions
affect team formation.
2.2 Literature
Our analysis is closely related to the literature on contest theory. Most papers in
this literature can be classifed according to how their models fit the following binary
categorizations:
1. Who are competing: individuals or teams?
2. How is the winner chosen: stochastically or deterministically?
3. Information structure: complete or incomplete?
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By now there is a vast literature that fills the cells in the “Individuals” table. Some of
the prominent works in the complete information column include Hillman and Riley
(1989), Michael R. Baye (1996) and Siegel (2009) for the “deterministic” case and
Siegel (2009) and Cornes and Hartley (2005) for the “stochastic” case . The incom-
plete information column includes Amann and Leininger (1996), Lizzeri and Persico
(2000), Kirkegaard (2013) and Siegel (2014) for the “deterministic” case, and Ryvkin
(2010), Ewerhart and Quartieri (2013) and Ewerhart (2014) for the “stochastic” case.
There is also an extensive literature on team contests with complete information. This
literature includes Skaperdas (1998), Nitzan (1991), Esteban and Ray (2001, 2008),
Nitzan and Ueda (2009, 2011), Mu¨nster (2007, 2009), Konrad and Leininger (2007),
and Konrad and Kovenock (2009), among many others. In particular, our modeling
approach of assuming that the value of winning is a public good among team members
follows that of Baik, Kim, and Na (2001), Topolyan (2013) Chowdhury and Topolyan
(2015) and Chowdhury, Lee, and Topolyan (2016). These studies assume that the
group bid is either the minimum or the maximum of the individual bids, whereas we
assume that a possible non-linear function aggregates the individual bids into a total
group bid.
Our work falls into the “incomplete information column, which has only been filled
recently by Fu, Lu, and Pan (2015) and Barbieri and Malueg (2015). The first paper
analyzes a general model that accomodates each of the cells in the “Teams” table.
However, their work differs from ours in that they study a multi-battle contest: Players
from two equal-size teams form pairwise matches to compete in distinct two-player
all-pay auctions, and a team wins if and only if its players win a majority of the
auctions. In contrast, we analyze a contest in which the members of both teams
participate simultaneously in one big all-pay auction.
The second paper by Barbieri and Malueg (2015) is more closely related to our work
since it also analyzes a static incomplete information (static) all-pay auction between
teams that may differ in size. In contrast to us, they assume that the value of winning
is an independent private value of each team member, and that the team’s bid is equal
to the maximal bid among its members. Under this specification they show that in
the case of two teams with different cdfs, a team’s probability of winning increases
(decreases) with size if its cdf is inelastic (elastic). We assume that all members of
a team have the same commonly known value of winning, but this value is unknown
to the opponent team. As stated above, we link the size advantage/disadvantage
to the curvature of the bid-aggregation function. In addition, we also analyze the
implication of group size on individual welfare, and show that this also depends on
the curvature of the aggregation function.
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The implication of group size on the probability of winning address the well-known
“group size paradox”, which argues that free-riding makes a bigger team weaker. The
paradox fails in many of the teams-stochastic-complete models (e.g., Esteban and
Ray (2001) and Nitzan and Ueda (2011)), but is satisfied in the teams-deterministic-
complete model of Barbieri, Malueg, and Topolyan (2013).1
2.3 The Model
Two teams, B and S, compete for a prize. Team B has nB players and team S has
nS players where nB ≥ nS. Thus B stands for “big” and S “small”. Sometimes we
use X to denote a generic team and Y the other team. Given any player i let i ∈ X
denote that i is a member of team X.
Competition takes the following form: All players simultaneously choose some action
from R+. Player i’s chosen action ei is interpreted as the amount of of effort that
player i exerts in the contest. Team X’s overall performance, measured by the score,






i∈X h(ei) where h is some real
valued function. Assume that h is strictly increasing, twice differentiable, and nor-
malize h(0) = 0. Clearly H is convex, concave or linear if and only if h is respectively
convex, concave or linear.
The higher scoring team wins the prize. A tie is broken by a fair coin. Every member
in team X receives a payoff of vX ∈ [0, 1] from winning the prize. vX is known to
members in team X before the contest starts, but is unknown to members of the
other team. It is common knowledge that the ex ante distribution of vB and vS are
both F , where F admits a strictly positive density function f . Regardless of winning
the prize or not, each player pays a cost equal to the amount of effort he has exerted.
Thus the net payoff to player i in team X who has exerted effort ei is 1XvX−ei where
1X is equal to 1 if team X has won or 0 otherwise.
2.4 Analysis
In the paper we focus on pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria (BNE).2 A BNE can
be characterized by a vector of effort functions (ei) such that ei(v) is the amount of
1The papers demonstrating the failure of the group-size paradox do so by assuming diminishing
marginal team performance to the cost born by each individual. However, since these papers analyze
a very different framework than ours, our result does not follow from theirs.
2One of the reasons we study the incomplete information model, instead of the complete infor-
mation counterpart, is that pure strategy equilibrium typically does not exist in the latter. On the
other hand, since we impose no additional assumption on the valuation distribution F , all results in
the paper hold for a model with “almost complete” information in which F is arbitrarily close to a
degenerate distribution.
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effort player i exerts if the value of the prize is v. Given any BNE there are associated
equilibrium score functions PB and PS such that PX(v) :=
∑
i∈X h(ei(v)) is the score
of team X if the value of the prize is v. A BNE is monotone if every player’s effort is
weakly increasing in his valuation of the prize. For the rest of the paper we focus on
monotone BNE. It is straightforward that in a monotone BNE PB and PS are weakly
increasing as well. Let GX denote the ex ante distribution of PX .
The following lemma extends Lemmas 1-3 and 5 of Amann and Leininger (1996) to
the present setting.
Lemma 2.4.1. For any monotone BNE:
1. GB and GS have common support.
2. GX is continuous on [0, PX(1)].
3. The support of GX is [0, PX(1)].
4. PB(1) = PS(1).
5. min{GB(0), GS(0)} = 0.
Proof: The proofs of Properties 1, 2, 3, 5 are respectively similar to those of Lemmas
1, 2, 4, 5 of Amann and Leininger (1996). That in the current setting the contest is
between teams instead of individuals, and that a team’s aggregation function is not
linear, do not fundamentally change the original proofs apart from some superficial
technical difference. Property 4 is an implication of Properties 1 and 3. 
Given a monotone BNE, for any team X, player i ∈ X and value v ∈ [0, 1], ei(v) is














h′(ei(v)) = 1 (1)
holds if GY is differentiable at PX(v) and ei(v) > 0.
We say that a BNE satisfies the active-participation property if there does not exist a
player who always exerts zero effort. The following proposition characterizes the set of
all monotone BNE for each of the three cases: (1) h is strictly concave, (2) h is strictly
convex, (3) h is linear. Moreover it establishes the uniqueness of active-participation
BNE in the first two cases, and shows that this BNE is in-team symmetric.
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Proposition 2.4.2. 1. If h is strictly concave then there is a unique monotone
BNE; this BNE satisfies active-participation and is in-team symmetric.
2. If h is strictly convex then there is a unique active-participation monotone BNE;
this BNE is in-team symmetric.
3. If h is linear then there is a continuum of monotone BNE, among which there is
a unique in-team symmetric monotone BNE. Moreover, every monotone BNE
of every contest (characterized by the team size configurations (nB, nS)) has the
same equilibrium team score functions (PB, PS).
Proof:
Suppose h is strictly concave or convex. Pick any two players i and j in team X. If
ei(v) > 0 and ej(v) > 0 then equation (1) implies h
′(ei(v)) = h′(ej(v)), which in turn
implies ei(v) = ej(v) because h
′ is strictly monotone. We have established the fact
that in any monotone BNE, if h is strictly concave or convex then given any v if two
players in the same team are not shirking then they exert the same effort.
Now we show Part 1. Suppose h is strictly concave. For team X pick any v such that
ei(v) > 0 for some i ∈ X. Thus first order condition (1) holds for i. If there is some






implying that player j can profit by increasing his effort, a contradiction. Thus there
does not exist such v such that some players work and some players shirk. Hence if
h is strictly concave then any monotone BNE is in-team symmetric.
Clearly for any t > 0, GY (t) = Pr(PY (v) ≤ t) = Pr(v ≤ P−1(t)) = F (P−1Y (t)). Thus





′(PX(v)). In-team symmetry implies equation (1)










v = 1. (2)
For any v such that PX(v) > 0, equation (2) can be simplied by a change of variable












Given Lemma 2.4.1 it is straightforward to verify that (PB, PS) determines a monotone
BNE if and only if PB = max(β, 0) and PS = max(σ, 0) where (β, σ) solves the
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β(1) = σ(1) (5)
max{β(0), σ(0)} = 0. (6)
The boundary value problem is exactly the same boundary value problem that char-
acterizes the monotone BNE of an all-pay contest between two players B and S whose
valuations are independently distributed according to F , such that the score of player
X is the same as his chosen amount of effort, and the cost function of exerting effort







) . By Proposition 1 of Kirkegaard (2013) the
auxiliary two-player game has a unique monotone BNE. 3 Part 1 immediately follows.
Now show Part 2. Suppose h is strictly convex. That an in-team symmetric monotone
BNE is unique is established exactly as above. Clearly that BNE satisfies active-
participation. Now we show that an active-participation monotone BNE must be
in-team symmetric. Pick any active-participation monotone BNE. Suppose in team
X there are players i and j whose effort functions are different. Thus there exists
some v such that ei(v) 6= ej(v). Without loss of generality assume ei(v) > ej(v).
It follows that ej(v) = 0. Since ej is weakly increasing and is not constant, there
is some v ≥ v such that ej(v − ) = 0 and ej(v + ) > 0 for any  > 0 if v < 1,
or ej(v − ) = 0 and ej(v) = 1 for any  > 0 if v = 1. Suppose v < 1. We have














However this is a contradiction because GX is continuous at v by Lemma 2.4.1.
Similarly v = 1 also leads to a contradiction. Thus ei(v) = ej(v) for any v. This
establishes Part 2.
Now show Part 3. If h is linear then h′ is some constant γ > 0. It is easy to verify
3Kirkegaard (2013) imposes additional constraints on cX , but those constraints are irrelevant for
the existence and uniqueness of the solution to the boundary value problem.
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that (PB, PS) are monotone BNE team score functions if and only if PB = max(β, 0)
and PS = max(σ, 0) where (β, σ) solves boundary value problem given by (3)-(6),
where h′(h−1(t/nX)) = γ. Since the BVP has a unique solution, any two monotone
BNE have the same team score functions. Moreover since the BVP does not depend
on (nB, nS), neither does its solution. 
In the rest of the paper we focus on active-participation BNE because we are interested
in the implication of team size on performance. If a player is passive, then he has no
impact on the contest and is essentially absent from his team. Hence, the “effective”
team size should not take him into account. Proposition 2.4.2 implies that restricting
attention to active-partitipation BNE is without loss of generality if h is concave
because in this case it is the unique monotone BNE, and is without loss of “much”
generality if h is linear because all monotone BNE are equivalent at the team level.
However, it is worth noting that if h is convex, then there are additional monotone
BNE. It is easy to verify each of those non-active-participation BNE looks exactly
like the unique active-participation BNE of the smaller contest with all the passive
members removed.
2.4.1 Team Size and Performance
Since a team in our model is characterized by its size, a natural question that arises
is whether a bigger team is also more likely to win. Recall that if members of both
teams exert the same amount of effort, then the bigger team has a higher score and
wins. Therefore, a bigger team has a size advantage. However, because the prize is a
pure public good, free-riding may be more serious in the bigger team and hence may
undermine its performance. It is therefore not apriori clear which of the two forces is
stronger, the size advantage or the free-riding problem.
Our next result establishes that a bigger team is more (less) likely to win if there
are diminishing (increasing) returns to effort. Formally, the effect of team size on
the probability of winning is determined by the curvature of h. This means that a
bigger team has an advantage in situations where greater expertise (which increases
the rate of return) requires higher effort. On the other hand, in tasks where the
biggest contribution to effort occurs early on, a smaller team will have an advantage.
Proposition 2.4.3. In an active-participation monotone BNE:
1. If h is strictly concave then PB(v) ≥ PS(v) and team B is more likely to win.
2. If h is strictly convex then PB(v) ≤ PS(v) and team S is more likely to win.
3. If h is linear then PB(v) = PS(v) and both teams win with the same probability.
Proof: Fix an active-participation monotone BNE. Suppose h is strictly concave and
33


















Since h is strictly increasing, nB ≥ nS implies h−1(v/nB) < h−1(v/nS), which in
turn implies h′(h−1(v/nB)) > h′(h−1(v/nS)). Thus (P−1S )
′(t) < (P−1B )
′(t), which
implies that P ′S(v) > P
′
B(v). Since PB(1) = PS(1) by Lemma 2.4.1(4), it follows
that v = 1. Given Lemma 2.4.1(5), that P ′S(1) > P
′
B(1) then implies PB(v) > PS(v)
for any v ∈ (0, 1). Part 1 of the present proposition immediately follows. Part 2 is
established with the symmetric argument.
To show Part 3, notice that if h is linear then the boundary value problem given by
equations (3)-(6) are symmetric in (β, σ). Thus uniqueness of the solution implies
that β = σ, in turn implying Part 3. 
Proposition 2.4.3 implies that the existence of the “group-size paradox” depends on
whether a player’s mariginal return to effort is diminishing or increasing. To give
some intuition for this result consider the case of a strictly concave h.
1. If a team with n members incurs a total cost of C, then the team score will
be nh(C/n). Taking the team as a whole, the marginal productivity is thus
d
dC
nh(C/n) = h′(C/n). Since h is strictly concave, it follows that for a given C,
the marginal productivity of a team increases with team size. Thus given the
same total cost C we have nBh(C/nB) > nSh(C/nS), implying that the score
of the bigger team is higher. In other words, the bigger team is more efficient
in generating score than a smaller team if h is concave.
2. For an n member team to achieve a total score of T , each member’s effort must
be h−1(T/n), and therefore each member’s individual mariginal productivity is
h′−1(T/n)). This individual marginal productivity is also increasing in n. In
other words, additional members make existent members more “productive”:
To achieve the same team score everyone on the bigger team can now decrease
his effort, which simultaneously increases his marginal productivity. This effect
is to some extent similar to that of strategic complementarity.
2.4.2 Team Size and Individual Welfare
Would a player would prefer to be in the bigger team or in the smaller team? We
cannot answer this question by merely comparing the winning probabilities because
a higher winning probability may require a higher level of individual effort, which
may offset the gain from a higher winning probability. Suppose h is either concave,
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convex or linear, and that the players coordinate on the unique in-team symmetric4
monotone BNE. It is clear that the ex ante equilibrium expected payoff for a player in
team X depends only on the number of players in each team. Let u(nX , nY ) denote
this expected payoff for a player in team X. The following proposition shows that if
h is weakly concave, then a player in the bigger team is better off than a player in the
smaller team. Thus, diminishing marginal returns to effort imply that in equilibrium,
the members of the bigger team are better off than the member of the smaller team.
Proposition 2.4.4. If h is weakly concave, then u(nB, nS) > u(nS, nB) if nB > nS.
Proof: Let eX denote the effort function of a player in team X in the symmetric
monotone BNE. Define P−1X (0) = 0. Thus











First suppose h is strictly concave. Thus by Proposition 2.4.3(1), PB(v) ≥ PS(v) with
the inequality being strict for a set of values with positive measure under F . Suppose





PS(v)− (nB − 1)h(eB(v))
)}
,
that is, the player shirks as much as he can to ensure that for any v the resulting
team score PˆB(v) is as high as PS(v). That PB(v) ≥ PS(v) implies eˆ(v) ≤ eB(v). It
follows from PB(v) ≥ PˆB(v) ≥ PS(v) that
P−1S (PˆB(v)) ≥ Pˆ−1B (PS(v)) ≥ P−1B (PS(v))
with at least one of the two above inequalities being strict for any v such that PB(v) ≥
PS(v).
Now we show that eˆ(v) ≤ eS(v). This is clearly true for any v such that eB(v) ≤
eS(v). For any v such that eB(v) ≥ eS(v) we have (nB − 1)h(eB(v)) ≥ nSh(eB(v)) ≥
nSh(eS(v)) = PS(v), implying h
−1
(
PS(v)− (nB−1)h(eB(v)) < 0
)
< 0, which in turn
implies eˆ(v) = 0 ≤ eS(v).
















































If h is linear then PB = PS by Proposition 2.4.3. Thus v = P
−1
S (PB(v)) = P
−1
B (PS(v))

















If h is convex, then the argument used in the proof of Proposition 2.4.4 does not
work, and the welfare comparison in general is unclear. However, we can establish
that for some convex h, it is still the case that each member of the bigger team
receives a higher expected payoff than each member of the smaller team, even though
the smaller team is more likely to win.
Proposition 2.4.5. For any nB > nS there exists some convex h such that u(nB, nS) >
u(nS, nB).
Proof: Pick any nB and nS where nB > nS. Define hα(x) = x
α. Let v(α|nX , nY ) be
equal to u(nX , nY ) for the game with h = h
α. Clearly v(α|nX , nY ) is continuous in α.
Since v(1|nB, nS) > v(1|nS, nB) by Proposition 2.4.4, there exists some α > 1 such
that v(α|nB, nS) > v(α|nS, nB). Clearly hα is convex if α > 1. 
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2.4.3 Endogenous Team Formation
So far we assumed that the competing teams are exogenously given. In this section
we investigate how teams come into being. To do this, we consider the following
two-stage game.
1. In the first stage, an even number of N > 2 players simultaneously choose a
letter R or L, interpreted as choosing to join team R or L.
2. In the second stage, players who chose the same letter form a team that com-
petes with the players who chose the other letter, where the competition takes
the contest format described in Section 2.
Assume that the value of the prize is realized only after the teams are formed. Also,
if all players choose the same team, then there is no contest and the prize is awarded
to that single team.
Obviously, there is always a trivial equilibrium in which everyone chooses the same
team. However, this equilibrium is uninteresting, and also demands a lot of coordina-
tion from the players. We therefore explore other equilibria. To do this, assume that
h is concave, convex or linear, and that in the second stage the teams coordinate on
the unique symmetric monotone BNE. It turns out that team formation depends on
how a player’s ex-ante equilibrium expected payoff u changes with the teams’ sizes.
Proposition 2.4.6. If u(nX , nY ) is weakly increasing in nX and weakly decreasing
in nY (but is not constant), then in every nontrivial equilibrium each player chooses
either team with equal probability.
Proof:
Pick any nontrivial equilibrium. We first show that every player is indifferent between
writing down either letter. Suppose there is some player i who strictly prefers writing
down R. Pick another player j and denote the probability that he writes down R
as p. Let r(n) denote the probability that n players other than i and j write down

































n+ 1, N − n− 1
)
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n+ 2, N −n− 2
)
−u(n+ 1, N −n− 1) > 0 for each n = 0 : N − 2.
Thus vR(p) is increasing in p and vL(p) is decreasing in p.
It is easy to verify that player j’s expected payoff from writing down R is vR(1) and
that from writing down L is vL(1), because player i writes down R with certainty.
That player i strictly prefers R to L implies vR(p) > vL(p), which in turn implies that
vR(1) > vL(1). Therefore player j also writes down R with certainty. It follows that
every player writes down R with certainty, a contradiction because we have arrived
at a trivial equilibrium.
Suppose player j chooses R with probability p and player i with probability q. In-
heriting the notation from the previous paragraph, we have vR(p) = vL(p) and
vR(q) = vL(q) because by the previous paragraph both i and j are indifferent between
writing down either letter. Thus p = q since vR is increasing and vL is decreasing.















(1− p)npN−1−nu(n+ 1, N − 1− n).
That u is increasing in its first argument and decreasing in its second argument implies
the left hand side is increasing in p and the right hand side is decreasing in p. Thus
the only solution to this equation is p = 0.5. 
Propositions 2.4.1 and 2.4.3 imply that if h is linear then regardless of the number of
players in each team, the unique symmetric monotone BNE has the same team score
functions (PB, PS) and moreover PB = PS =: P . Thus








u(nX , nY ) is strictly in increasing in nX because h is increasing, and is invariant with
respect to nY . Thus we have the following corollary of Proposition 2.4.6:
Corollary 2.4.7. If h is linear, then in any non-trivial equilibrium each player choses
either team with the same probability.
We were not able to establish how u changes with the teams’ sizes for more general
h functions. Numerical simulations suggest that u is increasing in nX and decreasing
in nY also when h is strictly convex and strictly concave.
5
2.5 Conclusion
We proposed to model competition between teams as a contest between two groups
of players, where each single player incurs the cost of his own effort and the team’s
overall effort is some aggregation of the individual efforts of its members. What makes
a collection of individuals a “team” is the fact that the award from winning is a pure
public good among them, and the value of this public good is common knowledge
among the members. In contrast, the value of the award to the opposing team is not
observed and is treated as a random variable.
This model allowed us to analyze whether a bigger team has an advantage, and
whether the members of a bigger team are better off. Our results shed new light
on the ”group-size paradox” by showing that the strategic effect of size depends on
whether the marginal effect of individual effort is diminishing or not. We interpret
this to mean that size advantage may depend on the particular task at hand, which
determines how the marginal contribution of effort changes with the level of effort.
Future work should try and explore how other characteristics of teams - such as
the composition of heterogenous teams, or the communication protocols among their
members - affect the outcome of competition. The ultimate goal is to try and in-
corporate into standard models of strategic interaction the idea that the players are
actually groups of individuals who have to consider the actions of their peers as well
as those of the competing group.
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5An alternative model of group formation i sone where team members sequentially decide which
team to join. Although this model can be solved via backwards induction, it does require to put
more structure on the function u. For the linear case, sequential participation would necessarily lead
to the trivial equilibrium in which everyone joins the same team.
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CHAPTER III
Coarse Communication and Institution Design
3.1 Introduction
This paper studies information-aggregating institutions in which precise internal com-
munication is not possible.
It is often very difficult for an informed person to convey his information precisely
to an uninformed person. In the first place, the communication instrument available
to the informed person, such as words, gestures, or some other medium, may not be
sufficient to express the complexity of his information. In addition, upon receiving
the message that carries the information, the uninformed person may fail to digest
the message to its utmost precision. For example, imagine an expert who wishes to
report an important number to a manager. The decimal expansion of this number is
very long. To save time, the expert reports this number only to its fourth decimal
place. To save memory, the manager memorizes the report only to its second decimal
place. In this example, time and memory impose constraints on communication and
render it coarse.
Many institutions are established to aggregate information coarsely from a group of
people working on a common objective when precise communication within the group
is impossible or costly due to restrictions on time, memory, or other resources. For
example, a voting system is established to aggregate information coarsely from the
public via votes, because gathering each individual’s precise opinion about the can-
didates is costly. Similar institutions include surveys, polls and ratings. As another
example, a firm’s hierarchical briefing system is established to aggregate information
coarsely from different divisions of the firm via briefs, because collecting and process-
ing detailed reports in a centralized fashion is costly. As a third example, when it is
difficult for a person to meticulously remember everything he has in mind, he often
uses the “mnemonic institution” of taking short notes or forming crude impressions
to remind his future self of what he knows in the present.
The infeasibility of precise communication within institutions gives rise to interesting
design problems that would otherwise be trivial. Indeed, given common interest
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induced by the common objective, first-best information aggregation can be easily
achieved in equilibrium by an institution permitting precise communication. It is
plain to see that, regardless of institutional details, every such institution is reducible
to the direct mechanism that implements the efficient outcome. On the other hand, an
institution that does not permit precise communication cannot be reduced to a direct
mechanism, and consequently institutional details become important to determine its
performance.
To elaborate on the design problem regarding institutions not permitting precise com-
munication, this paper first analyzes the optimal binary voting system in a common
values environment. In this problem, which is known as the Condorcet Jury Problem,
a group of privately informed jurors have to arrive at a verdict to find a defendant
guilty or innocent. The jury must use a binary voting system to solve the problem.
A binary voting system requires that each juror is given one opportunity to cast a
vote of either “guilty” or “innocent”. Every binary voting system is characterized by
two institutional components: the procedure and the rule. The procedure specifies
the number of stages the voting has and who votes in each stage. The procedure may
imply simultaneous voting, sequential voting, or a mixture of both. The rule specifies
the verdict for each vote profile. The rule may correspond to a simple majority rule,
a unanimous rule, or even some non-standard rule.
Three design problems are considered. In the first problem, given that there is no
restriction on the number of stages of voting, among the optimal binary voting systems
there is a system that has a sequential procedure and a rule under which the last voter
serves as a dictator. In the second problem, given that voting has to finish in one
stage, among the optimal one-stage systems there is a system that has a weighted
majority rule. In the third problem, given that the procedure is fixed and has two
stages, it turns out that the optimal system may have a counterintuitive rule: If
a voter unilaterally changes his vote from “guilty” to “innocent”, the verdict may
change from “innocent” to “guilty”.
The paper then proposes a framework for modeling a general class of information-
aggregating institutions including typical voting systems, hierarchical organizations,
and institutions of other sorts. An institution within this class is built on a com-
munication infrastructure which provides each participant with (1) a set of messages
for him to convey information to other participants, and (2) a set of units called
perceptions for him to receive and process messages from other participants. Com-
munication constraints on the sending side are captured by the fact that the set of
messages available to a participant may be smaller than the set of all pieces of infor-
mation he may wish to convey. Communication constraints on the receiving side are
captured by the fact that a participant may be unable to distinguish between distinct
message profiles if they correspond to the same perception.
A robust Pareto order is introduced to compare institutions within this class: Insti-
tution A is said to dominate institution B if, for any common objective, the best
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equilibrium under A generates a weakly higher common expected payoff than the
best equilibrium under B. The purpose of focusing on the dominance order is three-
fold. First, for a more specific design problem, the designer can use the dominance
order to eliminate dominated institutions without having to know the environment
parameters that determine the common objective. Second, understanding why an
institution dominates another provides insight to understanding the advantages or
disadvantages of specific institutional details. Third, from a theoretical perspective,
the comparison of institutions in terms of dominance is parallel to the comparison
of experiments analyzed in Blackwell (1951). This parallelism is discussed in more
detail in Section 3.2.
The paper provides two characterizations of the dominance order. First, institution
A dominates institution B if and only if A can induce weakly more social choice
functions in pure strategies than B. Therefore, “better” and “more versatile” turn out
to be equivalent regarding institutions. Second, if the set of all pieces of information
each player may have is sufficiently rich, then institution A dominates institution
B if and only if the underlying communication infrastructure of A can be obtained
from that of B by a sequence of operations, each operation either removes redundant
messages or perceptions from B, or introduces effective messages or perceptions to
B. The sufficiency part is relatively straightforward, although identifying redundant
messages and perceptions calls for care, in particular if the institution is complicated.
Necessity is more difficult to establish. The argument is based on the observation that
there is a social choice function inducible by institution B in pure strategies such
that any other institution that can induce the same social choice function in pure
strategies must embed the effective part of B, that is, the underlying communication
infrastructure of B with redundant messages and perceptions removed. Thus it is
possible to construct a sequence of redundancy-reducing operations that transforms
B to its effective part, and then there is a sequence of complementing operations that
transforms the effective part of B to A
The general analysis is applied to two specific problems. The first application inves-
tigates the design problem regarding generalized voting systems. It is shown that
among the optimal generalized voting systems there is one that has a sequential
procedure, a full disclosure policy, and a rule under which the last voter is always
pivotal. The second application analyzes the marginal benefit of perceptions and
messages within a hierarchical organization. It is shown that under mild conditions
the marginal benefit of either perceptions or messages is always strictly positive. In
particular, the result implies that even if an organization has very limited message-
processing capacity, it will still strictly benefit from having more available messages.
In the rest of the paper, Section 3.2 discusses the relevant literature. Section 3.3
analyzes the Condorcet Jury Problem. Section 3.4 introduces the general model.
Section 3.5 presents analysis of the dominance order. Section 3.6 applies the general
analysis to two problems. Section 3.7 concludes. The Appendices include the proofs
and some technical details.
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3.2 Literature
Two literatures within the field of mechanism design and implementation have ex-
plicitly considered communication constraints. One of them investigates the minimal
amount of communication necessary to implement a given social choice function.
Within this literature, Nisan and Segal (2006) and Segal (2007) show that for a class
of social choice functions the minimal communication mechanisms are generalized
price mechanisms, assuming sincere players. Fadel and Segal (2009) and Segal (2010)
consider similar implementation questions with strategic players. In spirit this liter-
ature may be seen as solving the dual problem to the problem studied in the present
paper. The present paper asks for the efficiency maximizing mechanism subject to
communication constraints, whereas papers in the above literature ask for the com-
munication minimizing mechanism that achieves certain efficiency level.
The other literature considers mechanism design problems subject to given commu-
nication constraints. Recent papers in this literature include Blumrosen et al. (2007),
Van Zandt (2007), Kos (2012), Blumrosen and Feldman (2013), Kos (2014), and
Mookherjee and Tsumagari (2014). All of the papers assume the presence of conflicts
of interest among the players, and a main emphasis of the literature is the interplay
between communication constraints and incentive constraints. The present paper,
by considering an environment with common interest, removes the tension between
information aggregation and preference aggregation, and thus allows a sharper focus
on implications of communication constraints alone.
The quest for the optimal voting system for the Condorcet Jury Problem may be
viewed as a specific mechanism design exercise regarding institutions subject to com-
munication constraints. The formulation of the Condorcet Jury Problem is histori-
cally attributed to Condorcet (1785). Papers discussing information aggregation effi-
ciency of various voting systems include Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998), McLen-
nan (1998), and Duggan and Martinelli (2001), all of which emphasize asymptotic
efficiency as the jury size grows large. For a fixed jury, Costinot and Kartik (2007)
show that the optimal voting system is invariant to the possibility of boundedly ra-
tional voters. Dekel and Piccione (2000) show that in a symmetric environment, any
equilibrium under simultaneous voting stays an equilibrium under sequential voting.
They conclude with a note that sequentiality does not bring improvement in terms
of information aggregation. The present paper shows that, if a voting system is eval-
uated by its best equilibrium, instead of by its worst one as is implicitly assumed in
Dekel and Piccione (2000), then sequentiality may bring improvement.
As mentioned in the Introduction, the comparison of institutions studied in the
present paper is analogous to the comparison of experiments studied in Blackwell
(1951). Indeed, similar to an experiment a` la Blackwell, an institution may be viewed
as a device that generates signals (messages) to facilitate decision-making based on
the true state (the dispersed information). On the other hand, unlike an experi-
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ment, an institution has a multi-player dynamic structure and the signals (messages)
are generated endogenously by strategic players. In Blackwell (1951), an experiment
dominates another if and only the former can be obtained from the latter by a well-
defined transformation. This corresponds in spirit to the finding of the present paper
that an institution dominates another if and only if the former can be obtained from
the latter by a sequence of well-defined operations.
Chapter 8 of Marschak and Radner (1972) extends Blackwell’s single-player model
to multiple players. In their model, players move sequentially, and later players
make decisions based on their own information and noisy realization of messages from
earlier players. The model in the present paper has a similar sequential procedure.
In two important aspects the two models are different. First, in the present model
players are strategic, whereas they are non-strategic in the model of Marschak and
Radner (1972). Second, imperfection of communication in the present model is due
to coarseness, whereas it is due to noise in the model of Marschak and Radner (1972).
The analysis of Marschak and Radner (1972) is restricted to specific examples and
has a different focus.
3.3 The Condorcet Jury Problem
In this section we view the classical Condorcet Jury Problem from an institution
design perspective.
A jury J = {1, ..., n} has to reach a verdict on a defendant. The verdict is either
“guilty” (G) or “innocent” (I). Let ω = G denote the event that the defendant is in
fact guilty, and ω = I that the defendant is in fact innocent. ω = G with probability
pi where 0 < pi < 1, and ω = I with probability 1 − pi. Every juror receives a payoff
of 1 if the verdict matches the fact ω, or 0 otherwise.
Each juror i has a private signal xi that carries some information about ω. Specifically,
xi is independently drawn from a finite, but possibly very large, subset Xi of R with
probability f iω(xi) > 0 conditional on ω.











if xi > x
′
i.
Assumption MLRP implies that a higher signal carries a stronger evidence for ω = G.
Suppose that, due to a shortage of resources necessary for precise communication
among the jurors to fully reveal their information, the jury has to use a binary
voting system to reach the verdict. In a binary voting system, each juror can send
a message once, and the set of messages available to him is {G, I}. The messages
1The finiteness assumption is to simplify analysis. See also Footnote 3.
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may be interpreted as votes, and the action of sending a message may be interpreted
as voting.
Each binary voting system is characterized by two institutional components. The first
is the procedure that specifies the order in which the jurors vote. The procedure is
formulated as a function r : J → N, with the interpretation that r(i) > r(j) means
i votes after j, and r(i) = r(j) means i and j vote simultaneously. Assume that a
juror can see all previously casted votes. 2 The second institutional component is
the rule that specifies a verdict for each vote profile. The rule is formulated as a
function d : {G, I}n → {G, I} such that d(z1, ..., zn) is the verdict given vote profile
(z1, ..., zn). A binary voting system with procedure r and rule d is denoted as (r, d).
Let ΣV (r) denote the set of all strategy profiles of the game induced by voting system
(r, d). (Note that ΣV (r) does not depend on d.) Given the common payoff function
and the common prior, all voters’ ex ante preferences over ΣV (r) can be represented
by the same expected payoff function u(·|r, d). The value of (r, d) is defined as the
highest common expected payoff achieved by any perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the
game induced by (r, d). Let U(r, d) denote the value of (r, d). We can Pareto-rank
voting systems by their values, and say that the optimal system is the one with the
highest value.
Calculating the value of a voting system from definition can be computationally heavy,
because it is often tedious to determine the set of equilibria of a game. Fortunately,
as asserted by the following lemma, the common interest environment allows us to
simplify the calculation by circumventing that step. The lemma, which follows im-
mediately from the proof of Proposition 3.5.1 to appear later, generalizes Theorem 1
in McLennan (1998).
Lemma 3.3.1. U(r, d) = maxσ∈ΣV (r) u(σ|r, d).
Voting takes place in multiple stages under a sequential or partially sequential pro-
cedure, and may require a long time to finish if there are many stages. It is thus
reasonable to consider situations in which the jury can only use a voting system
whose procedure has a limited number of stages. Below we study the optimal voting
systems in three cases. In the first case, there is no restriction on the number of stages
of voting. In the second case, voting has to take place in one stage. In the third case,
a particular procedure with two stages is used.
3.3.1 Unlimited Number of Stages
When there is no restriction on the number of stages, the following proposition as-
serts that, to find an optimal voting system, it suffices to focus on ones that have a
2Here, to keep the example simple, we do not consider partial disclosure of previously casted
votes. Partial disclosure policies are discussed in Section 3.6.
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sequential procedure and a rule that depends only on the last voter’s vote.
Proposition 3.3.2. Among the optimal binary voting systems there is (r∗, d∗) such
that:
1. r∗ is a sequential procedure.
2. d∗ depends only on the last voter’s vote.
The proof is based on the observation that any pure strategy profile under (r, d)
can be “replicated” by an outcome-equivalent pure strategy profile under (r∗, d∗). It
follows that the best strategy profile under (r∗, d∗) must be no worse than the best
strategy profile under (r, d), which then implies that the value of (r∗, d∗) must be no
less than that of (r, d) by Lemma 3.3.1.
Section B.1 in the Appendices gives a direct proof of this proposition. It will become
clear that the proposition can also be derived as a corollary of Proposition 3.6.3,
which is proved using the machinery to be introduced in Section 3.5. Moreover,
the proof of Proposition 3.6.3 gives an alternative explanation for the superiority of
(r∗, d∗): The system with a sequential procedure and a dictatorial rule makes full
use of the communication instruments allowed by binary voting, whereas any other
binary voting system does not.
3.3.2 One Stage
Suppose that voting must take place in a single stage, that is, the procedure must be
simultaneous. Finding an optimal voting system in this case is equivalent to finding an
optimal rule for simultaneous voting. The following proposition asserts that, for this
quest, it suffices to focus on weighted majority rules. Rule d is a weighted majority
rule if there is a vector of nonnegative weights (w1, ..., wn) and a threshold k such
that d(z1, ..., zn) = G if and only if
∑
i∈J wi1(zi) ≥ k, where 1(zi) = 1 if zi = G or
1(zi) = 0 otherwise.
Proposition 3.3.3. Among the optimal rules for simultaneous voting there is a
weighted majority rule.
The proof is built on the observation that, given any vote profile (z1, ..., zn), an optimal
rule d∗ produces verdict G if and only if ω = G is more likely than ω = I conditional
on players following the best strategy profile s∗ under d∗ and the realized vote profile
being (z1, ..., zn). In other words, if the rule is replaced with an uninformed decision
maker whose interest is aligned with those of the players, the decision maker would
also choose verdict G given (z1, ..., zn) based on Bayesian updating. Proposition 3.3.3
then follows from the fact that the probability of ω = G conditional on s∗ and
(z1, ..., zn) is log-linear in the number of G-votes contained in (z1, ..., zn).
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3.3.3 Two Stages: Non-Monotonicity
In this subsection we present an example showing that, if the procedure is partially
sequential, the optimal voting systems may display counterintuitive properties.
There are three jurors. Suppose the procedure is fixed: Juror 1 votes in the first
stage, Jurors 2 and 3 vote simultaneously in the second stage. Again we look for
the optimal rule for this particular procedure. The environment parameters are as
follows. pi = 1 − pi = 0.5. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 respectively show the conditional
probabilities of x1 and x2. The conditional probabilities of x3 are the same as x2.





x1 = 1 0.6 0.4
x1 = 0 0.4 0.6





x1 = 1 0.4 0.1
x1 = 1/2 0.5 0.5
x1 = 0 0.1 0.4
Using Lemma 3.3.1 we find multiple optimal rules. The unique best equilibrium
under each optimal rule is in cutoff strategies. There is only one optimal rule d∗
under which the best equilibrium is “truthful”, in the sense that each juror votes G
if and only if his signal is above the cutoff. Recall that Assumption MLRP implies
higher signals are more indicative of ω = G. Thus in a truthful equilibrium jurors
always use a G-vote to express a stronger evidence supporting ω = G, whereas in
an equilibrium that is not truthful, a juror sometimes uses an I-vote to express a
stronger evidence supporting ω = G. It is reasonable to consider d∗ as superior to
the other optimal rules, because presumably the jurors can more easily coordinate on
a truthful equilibrium.
However, d∗ displays a counterintuitive property: It is not monotone in the vote
profile. In particular, it is the case that
d∗(G,G, I) = I, d∗(I,G, I) = G,
that is, if Juror 1 unilaterally changes his vote from G to I, the verdict changes in
the opposite direction from I to G. This property is unexpected because a G vote
from Juror 1 carries stronger evidence supporting ω = G than an I vote.
To explain the phenomenon, notice that in the best equilibrium under d∗, the aggre-
gate evidence contained in the (G, I) vote combination from Jurors 2 and 3 depends
on the vote from Juror 1. If Juror 1’s vote is G then Juror 2 votes G if x2 ∈ {1/2, 1},
whereas if Juror 1’s vote is I then Juror 2 votes G if x2 = 1. Juror 3’s strategy is the
same as Juror 2’s. It is easy to verify that the aggregate evidence contained in the
47
(G, I) vote combination from Jurors 2 and 3 is against, and overrules, the evidence
contained in the vote from Juror 1.
3.4 The Model
In this section we introduce a framework for modeling a general class of institutions
that is broad enough to capture many specific real life institutions, including binary
voting systems analyzed in the previous section.
3.4.1 The Common Objective
A group N = {1, ..., N} of players work on a common objective. Each player i ∈ N
contributes by choosing an action ai ∈ Ai where Ai is the set of actions available to
i. Ai can be a singleton. The vector of actions a = (a1, ..., aN) is called an outcome.
Let A = A1 × ...× AN denote the set of all outcomes.
The value of an outcome depends on the state, which is an N−tuple x = (x1, ..., xN).
Every player receives the same payoff of φ(a,x) if the outcome is a and the state is
x. F (x) denotes the ex ante probability that the state is x.
Each player i privately observes the ith component xi of the state. xi may take any
value from a set Xi. Let X = X1 × ... × XN denote the set of all possible states.
Assume |A| <∞ and |X| <∞. 3
Assume that the set of states X and the set of outcomes A are the same for ev-
ery common objective the group may face. A common objective is denoted by the
objective-specific parameters (φ, F ).
3.4.2 The Institution
Within the model, an institution refers to the indirect mechanism described as
follows. Players move sequentially according to their indices: Player 1 moves first,
Player 2 moves second, etc. Every player moves only once. When it is player i’s turn
to move, he chooses action ai from Ai, and he also chooses a message mi from some
set Mi to send to players who have not moved yet. Mi is the set of messages provided
to player i by the institution. Player N does not send any message. For Player N to
have a non-trivial role in the institution, we assume that |AN | > 1.
3 This assumption is made for simplicity, with which we may avoid some minor technical com-
plications. The analysis should not change significantly if |A| and |X| are infinite.
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Players do not observe actions chosen by the other players. A player imperfectly
observes the messages he has received. Let Ti = M1 × ... ×Mi−1 denote the set of
message profiles that player i may receive. i’s observation of received messages is
determined by a partition Pi of Ti. Each element p of Pi is called a perception of
i. i can distinguish between two message profiles if and only if they are in different
perceptions of his. Therefore it can be said that player i perceives all message profiles
in the same perception p ∈ Pi as if they are the same.
Define T = ∪i∈N Ti, P = ∪i∈N Pi, and M = ∪i<NMi. The institution is denoted by
the tuple (T, P,M).
Below we show various real life institutions that the general model captures.
Example 1. Voting
Consider a voting system that generalizes the binary voting system analyzed in Sec-
tion 3.3. A group J of voters have to collectively choose from a set Y of candidates.
Each voter i ∈ J receives a private signal xi. The value of each candidate is the same
to all voters and depends on the vector of private signals (xi)i∈J .
Each voter has to cast one vote from the set of votes Z. 4 To avoid trivial cases assume
|Y | > 1 and |Z| > 1. The voting system consists of three institutional components:
the procedure r : J → N that assigns each voter i to the r(i)th stage of the voting,
the rule d : Z |J | → Y that elects candidate d(z) given vote profile z, and a disclosure
policy t which specifies how past votes are disclosed to those who have not voted yet.
Examples of disclosure policies include full disclosure, disclosing the votes but not
the voters’ indices (anonymous voting), etc.
To capture voting system (r, d, t) using the general institution model introduced
above, index the voters as 1, ..., |J | such that i > j if r(i) > r(j). Let N =
{1, ..., |J |, |J | + 1} where player |J | + 1 represents the rule d. The action set Ai
is the singleton {a} for every i ≤ |J |, whereas A|J |+1 = Y . Note that only player
|J | + 1 has a non-singleton action set, because he represents d and thus him alone
determines the real outcome, that is, the chosen candidate from Y .
For each player i ≤ |J |, Xi is the set of private signals that voter i may observe.
X|J |+1 = {x}, implying that the voter representing the rule always receives the unin-
formative signal x.
For any outcome a = (a, ..., a, y) and vector of private signals x = (x1, ..., x|J |, x),
φ(a,x) is the expected value of candidate y conditional on each voter i observing
private signal xi.
Voting system (r, d, t) is represented by institution (T, P,M) as follows:
4Typically Z = Y . The present formulation allows other voting protocols, for example the
inclusion of blank votes or abstention.
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1. For each i ≤ |J |, Mi is equal to Z, that is, a vote is interpreted as a message
provided by the institution.
2. For each i ≤ |J |, Pi is consistent with voter i’s observation of votes from voters
1, ..., i − 1 under procedure r and disclosure policy t. For example, if two vote
profiles (z1, ..., zi−1) and (z′1, ..., z
′
i−1) differ only at votes from those who vote
simultaneously with i, that is, if zj = z
′
j for every j where r(j) < r(i), then
the two vote profiles are in the same perception of i. As another example, if
according to the disclosure policy voter i may only observe the number of votes
already casted for one particular candidate y, then (z1, ..., zi−1) and (z′1, ..., z
′
i−1)
are in the same perception of i if the number of votes for y from those who
voted before i are the same in both vote profiles.
3. For player |J | + 1, vote profiles (z1, ..., z|J |) and (z′1, ..., z′|J |) are in the same
perception if and only if d(z1, ..., z|J |) = d(z′1, ..., z
′
|j|).
It is plain to see that the game induced by voting system (r, d, t) is essentially the same
game as that induced by institution (T, P,M) in which player |J | + 1 is committed
to choose d(z1, ..., z|J |) given his perception that contains vote profile (z1, ..., z|J |). 5
Example 2. Reporting
If we replace the rule in the voting model with an uninformative decision maker, the
consequent model captures the situation in which a group of consultants advise an
uninformed boss on choosing a project from the set of alternatives Y . The voters are
reinterpreted as consultants, Player |J |+ 1 as the boss, the votes as internal reports,
the procedure and the disclosure policy as a protocol that organizes reporting.
Example 3. Organization
An organization has N levels. The official of level i gathers intelligence xi ∈ Xi, and
has to take immediate action ai ∈ Ai in response. Moreover, he also sends a message
mi ∈ Mi to inform the officials of levels above him. The organization is modeled by
institution (T, P,M). Mi is interpreted as internal codes available to the official of
level i. Pi can either be used to describe how the official of level i interprets the codes
he has received, or the code-processing protocol of the organization.
Example 4. Memory
Institution (T, P,M) can also model the dynamic optimization problem of a single
person with imperfect recall. There is only one man, who on each day i learns
something xi ∈ Xi, and does something ai ∈ Ai. Moreover, to remind himself of
what he has learnt or done, he takes down a note, or forms a crude impression, in
the form of mi ∈ Mi. Pi represents how the person digests past notes or recalls past
5Apart from the modeling artifact that, in the game induced by institution (T, P,M), the voters
take the dummy action a along the way, and player |J |+ 1 receives an uninformative signal x.
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impressions. For example, if distinct (m1, ...,mi−1) and (m′1, ...,m
′
i−1) belong to the
same p ∈ Pi, it may reflect the fact that on the ith day impressions (m1, ...,mi−1)
and (m′1, ...,m
′
i−1) strike the person as the same, or the fact that the person does
not read his notes very carefully. The decision maker with limited memory studied
in Wilson (2014), for example, can be reformulated, with small modifications, as an
infinite-horizon extension of the present model in which the decision maker can only
recall the note he took down in the previous period. 
Institution (T, P,M) can be schematically depicted as a rooted tree equipped with a
partition. Each node of the tree represents a message profile, and each edge represents
a message. The root of the tree is the empty message profile. Two nodes are linked
if one is extended from the other by one message, and the message is the edge that
links the two nodes. The partitioning of the nodes at level i, which are i− 1 degrees
from the root, agrees with the partitioning of Ti by Pi. Figure ?? shows the graph
representing the voting system with two voters, the simultaneous procedure, and the
rule that chooses verdict G only if both votes are G.
The graph of an institution visually resembles that of an extensive form game in
which histories correspond to message profiles and information sets correspond to
perceptions. It should be noted that the graph of an institution does not fully depict
the game induced by the institution, because for each player i the choice of action ai
and the acquisition of information xi are not reflected in the graph.
3.5 Comparing Institutions
The common interest environment provides us with a natural measure to evaluate an
institution.
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Definition. The value of institution (T, P,M) for common objective (φ, F ) is the
highest common expected payoff achievable by any perfect Bayesian equilibrium of
the game induced by (T, P,M) and (φ, F ). 6
For a given common objective, all institutions are totally Pareto-ordered by their
values. Finding an optimal institution among a set of alternatives becomes a standard
optimization problem. However, it is often the case that when an institution is to be
established, the objective-specific parameters are unknown to the designer. Moreover,
the same institution may be used repeatedly for variable common objectives. Due
to these concerns, we would like to Pareto-order institutions without knowledge of
the objective-specific parameters. It is thus natural to consider the parameter-free
dominance order defined as follows.
Definition. Institution (T ′, P ′,M ′) dominates another institution (T, P,M) if the
value of (T ′, P ′,M ′) is weakly higher than the value of (T, P,M) for any (φ, F ) where
φ is a real valued function on A×X and F is a probability function on X.
Clearly the dominance order is reflexive and transitive. It may not be complete,
though.
Remark: When an institution is defined, it is assumed that players move sequentially
according to their indices. Hence when comparing (T ′, P ′,M ′) and (T, P,M) we
implicitly assume that players move in the same order under both institutions. A
natural question that follows is whether it is possible to compare two mechanisms,
both describable by the general model if players are indexed appropriately, but under
which the players de facto move in different orders. This indeed is possible, because,
after all, if the common objective is the same, then any two mechanisms can be
compared by their values. Thus, the dominance order can naturally be extended to
the set of all mechanisms without restriction on the order of moves. In this paper, as
a first step of the research agenda, we focus only on institutions with the same order
of moves.
A pure strategy profile s under institution (T, P,M) induces a social choice func-
tion α(·|s) : X → A, such that if the players follow s, then in state x the outcome
is α(x|s). Let C(T, P,M) denote the set of all social choice functions inducible by
a pure strategy profile under (T, P,M). The following proposition gives a simple
characterization of the dominance order.
Proposition 3.5.1. Institution (T ′, P ′,M ′) dominates another institution (T, P,M)
if and only if C(T, P,M) ⊂ C(T ′, P ′,M ′).
The proposition is a corollary of a more general result, Proposition B.4.2 in Section
B.4, that asserts an analogous statement for any two finite mechanisms. Within the
present context, the proof is based on the observation that among the strategy pro-
files that maximize the common expected payoff there is a pure strategy equilibrium.
6The value exists because the induced game is a finite.
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Therefore (T ′, P ′,M ′) must have a (weakly) higher value than (T, P,M) for any com-
mon objective because it can induce more social choice functions in pure strategies.
On the other hand, for any pure strategy profile s under (T, P,M) there is a common
objective for which α(·|s) is efficient, therefore if (T ′, P ′,M ′) has a weakly higher
value for this common objective, (T ′, P ′,M ′) must also be able to induce α(·|s) in
pure strategies.
The reader is reminded of the main message of Blackwell (1951) that an experiment is
more valuable if and only if it is more informative. The more informative experiment
a` la Blackwell allows more state-to-action mappings for the concerned single-player
decision problem. Proposition 3.5.1 thus strikes a similar note. Indeed, because of
common interest, the institution can be interpreted as a dynamic decision situation
that a single player faces, as Example 4 in Section 3.4 suggests. It should be noted,
however, that the information structure induced by an institution is endogenously
generated via messages, whereas that induced by an experiment is exogenously gen-
erated via noisy signals.
In Blackwell (1951) the “more informative” order of experiments has a very simple
structural characterization, which can be verified by examining the distribution func-
tions representing the experiments. The rest of the section is dedicated towards a
goal in the same spirit, and gives us a method to compare institutions by examining
their structures.
To preview, the structural characterization of the dominance order takes the fol-
lowing form: Institution (T ′, P ′,M ′) dominates institution (T, P,M) if and only if
(T ′, P ′,M ′) can be obtained from (T, P,M) by a sequence of operations, each be-
ing of one of the following five types: (1) expanding, (2) refining, (3) trimming, (4)
relabeling, and (5) merging. Each type of operation involves adding or removing
messages, perceptions, or both. Before elaborating on the operations, we first intro-
duce a useful auxiliary concept, the improper institution, which is the “intermediate
product” produced in the process of obtaining one institution from another using the
operations.
Improper Institutions
An improper institutions has a similar message-perception backbone as a (proper)
institution introduced in Section 3.4. The only difference is that the set of messages
available to a player in an improper institution may depend on which message profile
he has received. Note that the improper institution is a generalization of the (proper)
institution. We extend the system of notation denoting components of a (proper)
institution to denote the components of an improper institution: For each i ∈ N , Ti
is the set of message profiles player i may receive. Pi is a partition of Ti that represents
i’s perception. If i < N then for each h ∈ Ti, M(h) is the set of messages available
to i if the message profile he receives is h. Denote T = ∪i∈N Ti and P = ∪i∈N Pi.
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The tuple (T, P,M), where M now denotes the correspondence that determines the
set of available messages for each received message profile, is now used to represent
an improper institution. Clearly, if (T, P,M) is a proper institution then M(h) = Mi
for each h ∈ Ti.
For a generic message profile h, let hj denote the jth component of h, let h(j) denote
the first j components of h, and let |h| denote the length of h. Thus for any h ∈ Ti
we have h = (h1, ..., hi−1), h(j) = (h1, ..., hj), and |h| = i− 1.
Given h ∈ Ti, message profile g ∈ T is said to be a descendant of h, and h is said
to be an ancestor of g, if g is an extension of h. Clearly, if g is a descendant of h
then h = g(|h|). Moreover, if g is a one-component extension of h, then h is said to
be the parent of g, and g is said to be a child of h. Clearly, if h is the parent of
g then h = g(|g| − 1). If h is the parent of g and the last component of g is m, we
sometimes denote g as h×m.
If distinct g and g′ are descendants of h such that (1) |g| = |g′|, and (2) gj = g′j for
any j 6= |h| + 1, then g and g′ are said to be h−cousins. Note that two h−cousins
only differ at the |h|th component. 7
Let P (h) denote the perception p ∈ P that contains message profile h.
We require that an improper institution (T, P,M) must satisfy the following regularity
conditions:
C1 Ti is nonempty for any i ∈ N .
C2 If h ∈ T then every ancestor of h is in T .
C3 If h ∈ T then h×m ∈ T if and only if m ∈M(h).
C4 If P (h) = P (h′) then M(h) = M(h′).
C1 and C2 imply that the graph representing (T, P,M) is a rooted tree with N levels.
C3 implies that the tree is generated by M . C4 implies that the sets of available
messages given different message profiles in the same perception are the same.
Note that given C4, conditional on perception p ∈ Pi, player i cannot acquire addi-
tional information on which particular message profile in p is the one he has received
by examining the set of currently available messages. Therefore it causes no ambiguity
to define M(p) as the set of messages available to player i conditional on p.
Figure 3.1 shows the graph of an improper institution.
Given C1-C4, an improper institution induces a well-defined dynamic game in which
7Two message profiles with the same parent are also cousins by this definition.
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Figure 3.1
players sequentially take actions and send messages where the set of available messages
might be perception-dependent. The concepts of value and dominance are naturally
extended to improper institutions. Proposition 3.5.1 extends to improper institutions
as well.
Proposition 3.5.2. Improper institution (T ′, P ′,M ′) dominates another improper
institution (T, P,M) if and only if C(T, P,M) ⊂ C(T ′, P ′,M ′).
For the rest of the section we will stop distinguishing between improper institutions
and (proper) institutions, as all results apply to improper institutions and thus to
proper institutions as special cases. The word “institution” will be used to refer to
either.
Expanding
Expanding is the operation of creating a new institution (T ′, P ′,M ′) by adding more
messages to an existing institution (T, P,M), while maintaining the perceptibility of
the existing message profiles, that is, for any two message profiles h and g in T , they
are in the same perception under P ′ if and only if they are in the same perception
under P . The operation is defined formally as follows.
Definition. (T ′, P ′,M ′) is obtained from (T, P,M) by expanding if:
E1 T ⊂ T ′.
E2 For any h, g ∈ T , P (h) = P (g) if and only if P ′(h) = P ′(g).
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We say that (T, P,M) is a sub-institution of (T ′, P ′,M ′) if the latter is obtained
from the former by expanding. For example, the institution depicted in Figure 3.3 is
obtained from that depicted in Figure 3.2 by expanding, in particular, by making the
additional message I available to Player 2.
Figure 3.2 Figure 3.3
The following lemma states that expansion creates a better institution.
Lemma 3.5.3. If (T ′, P ′,M ′) is obtained from (T, P,M) by expanding then (T ′, P ′,M ′)
dominates (T, P,M).
Refining
Refining is the operation that improves the players’ observation of received messages.
Refining is formally defined as follows.
Definition. (T ′, P ′,M ′) is obtained from (T, P,M) by refining if T ′ = T , M ′ = M ,
and P ′i is a weak refinement of Pi for each i ∈ N .
Thus under (T ′, P ′,M ′) a player perceives received messages (weakly) more accurately
than he does under (T, P,M). For example, the institution depicted in Figure 3.5
is obtained from that depicted in Figure 3.4 by refining, in particular Player 2’s
observation of received messages is strictly improved.
It is plain to see that any strategy profile of (T, P,M) can be “replicated” in (T ′, P ′,M ′)
to produce the same outcome. Therefore (T ′, P ′,M ′) dominates (T, P,M) by Propo-
sition 3.5.2. This observation is formally asserted in the following lemma. The proof
is omitted.
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Figure 3.4 Figure 3.5
Lemma 3.5.4. If (T ′, P ′,M ′) is obtained from (T, P,M) by refining then (T ′, P ′,M ′)
dominates (T, P,M).
Trimming
In real life, two words have the same communicative function if they are synonymous.
Therefore one of the synonymous words may be viewed as functionally redundant.
Excluding the redundant word from the vocabulary does not compromise communi-
cation. Trimming is the analogous operation of excluding a redundant message from
an institution.
Before elaborating on trimming, it is helpful to first understand synonymity and
redundancy within an institution. Whether two words in real life are synonymous or
not often depends on the context. In one context they are synonymous; in another
they have different meanings. Within an institution (T, P,M), whether two messages
available to player i are synonymous or not also depends on the context, and the
context is the message profile h ∈ Ti that player i has received. Given h ∈ Ti,
messages mi ∈M(h) and m′i ∈M(h) are considered to be synonymous if:
• Player i+ 1 cannot distinguish between h×mi and h×m′i.
• Regardless of what message mi+1 that player i + 1 sends, player i + 2 cannot
distinguish between h×mi ×mi+1 and h×m′i ×mi+1.
• Regardless of what message mi+2 that player i + 2 sends, player i + 3 cannot
distinguish between h×mi ×mi+1 ×mi+2 and h×m′i ×mi+1 ×mi+2.
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• And so on for every player who moves after.
Therefore, keeping the messages from everyone else fixed, if player i unilaterally de-
viates from sending mi to sending m
′
i, no other player would perceive the difference.
The formal definition is given as follows.
Definition. Fix institution (T, P,M). For any h ∈ Ti where i < N , messages mi ∈
M(h) and m′i ∈ M(h) are synonymous given h within (T, P,M) if P (g) = P (g′)
for any h−cousins g and g′ where g, g′ ∈ T , gi = mi and g′i = m′i.
Within the institution depicted in Figure 3.6, Player 2’s messages G and I are synony-
mous given message profile (G), because Player 3 cannot distinguish between (G,G)
and (G, I). Similarly G and I are synonymous given message profile (L) as well.
If mi and m
′
i are synonymous given every h ∈ p within (T, P,M) for some p ∈ Pi
then we say mi and m
′
i are synonymous given p within (T, P,M). Message mi
may be considered as redundant given p. Trimming is the operation that excludes
the redundant message mi from the set of available messages given p. The formal
definition is as follows.
Definition. (T ′, P ′,M ′) is obtained from (T, P,M) by trimming if there exist i <
N , p ∈ Pi and mi ∈M(p) such that:
T1 (T ′, P ′,M ′) is a sub-institution of (T, P,M). Moreover h ∈ T\T ′ implies h(i−
1) ∈ p and hi = mi.
T2 mi is synonymous to some m
′
i ∈M(p) given p within (T, P,M).
By T1, (T ′, P ′,M ′) is the institution corresponding to player i not provided with
message mi given perception p. T2 emphasizes that mi is indeed redundant given p.
The institution depicted in Figure 3.7 is obtained from that depicted in Figure 3.6 by
trimming off message I, which is synonymous to G and is therefore redundant given
Player 2’s only perception.
The following lemma asserts that trimming does not change an institution function-
ally.
Lemma 3.5.5. If (T ′, P ′,M ′) is obtained from (T, P,M) by trimming then (T ′, P ′,M ′)
and (T, P,M) dominate each other.
The proof is based on the observation that given perception p, player i cannot use
synonymous messages mi and m
′
i to effectively communicate different pieces of infor-
mation, because if i unilaterally changes from sending mi to sending m
′
i other players
cannot perceive the change and hence will not react differently. Therefore, excluding
the redundant message mi from M(p) does not compromise communication.
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Figure 3.6 Figure 3.7
Relabeling
Relabeling is the operation of changing the message labels of an institution without
changing its essential structure. Intuitively, as along as distinct messages have distinct
labels, what those labels are should not matter to the use of the messages. In the
jury voting case, for example, changing the vote labels from Guilty and Innocent to
G and I only changes the institution superficially.
For an institution, the operation of relabeling changes message labels on a perception-
by-perception basis. The operation can be thought of as the following process: First
relabel the messages available to Player 1 given his only perception. Then relabel the
messages available to Player 2 given each of his perceptions. The process continues
until Player N − 1’s messages are relabeled. The following is a formal definition.
Definition. (T ′, P ′,M ′) is obtained from (T, P,M) by relabeling if there is a rela-
beling function γ : T → T ′ such that:
R1 γ is a bijection.
R2 γ preserves parent-child relation.
R3 P (h) = P (g) if and only if P ′(γ(h)) = P ′(γ(g)).
R4 For any i < N , p ∈ Pi and mi ∈ M(p) there is a message κ(mi, p) such that
γ(h×mi) = γ(h)× κ(mi, p) for any h ∈ p.
The definition is given in terms of the final product instead of the construction. To
link the definition to the construction, note that R1, R2 and R3 imply that the graphs
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of (T, P,M) and (T ′, P ′,M ′) are isomorphic if the edges are label-less. h ∈ T and
γ(h) ∈ T ′ are “essentially the same” message profile except that the labels of the
messages they contain are different. R2 implies that if after relabeling the message




i), then for any message profile h whose first
i components are (m1, ...,mi), the first i components of the relabeled counterpart
γ(h) are (m′1, ...,m
′
i). R4 is related to the perception-by-perception basis on which
relabeling is conducted: Every edge with label mi issued from perception p is given
the same new label κ(mi, p).
Intuitively, relabeling should be invertible, that is, we should be able to retrieve
(T, P,M) from (T ′, P ′,M ′) by “labelling back”, where “labelling back” itself an op-
eration of relabeling. The following lemma confirms this intuition.
Lemma 3.5.6. If (T ′, P ′,M ′) is obtained from (T, P,M) by relabeling with relabeling
function γ then (T, P,M) is obtained from (T ′, P ′,M ′) by relabeling with relabeling
function γ−1.
Figure 3.8 shows an example of relabeling. The institution depicted in Panel (c) is
obtained from that depicted in Panel (a) by relabeling, where Panel (b) shows the
implied κ described in R4. Note that both edges with the label H issuing from the
only perception of Player 2 are relabeled to L, and both edges with label L issuing
from the same perception are relabeled to H, as R4 requires that edges with the same
label issuing from the same perception are relabeled identically.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 3.8
The following lemma asserts that relabeling does not change an institution function-
ally.
Lemma 3.5.7. If (T ′, P ′,M ′) is obtained from (T, P,M) by relabeling then (T ′, P ′,M ′)
and (T, P,M) dominate each other.
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Merging
Given institution (T, P,M), the purpose of merging is to produce a new institution
in which two perceptions p ∈ Pi and q ∈ Pi of some player i < N where |Ai| = 1
are combined into one perception p ∪ q, where the new institution is functionally
equivalent to the old institution.
It is useful to first motivate the idea of merging. Suppose a speaker wishes to convey
his private information x to a listener using one of the two messages L and R. There
are two possible contexts, A and B, which are relevant to the listener’s decision
problem. If the speaker knows the context, he can use a communication strategy
that depends on the context and x. Suppose instead the speaker cannot observe the
context but has four available messages {m1,m2,m3,m4}. In this situation, by using
the following communication strategy the speaker can convey x as precisely as if he
knew the context but only had two available messages:
1. Send m1 if given x he would send L in context A and L in context B.
2. Send m2 if given x he would send R in context A and R in context B.
3. Send m3 if given x he would send L in context A and R in context B.
4. Send m4 if given x he would send R in context A and L in context B.
Merging is based on the same idea. On one hand we make the observation of player i
less accurate by combining his perceptions p and q into one perception p∪ q. On the
other hand we compensate the possible loss of communicative capacity by providing
player i with more messages given the combined perception p ∪ q.
In practice, merging involves the following four steps:
Step 1 If |M(p)| < |M(q)| then the institution is expanded by making more messages
available to player i given p, so that the new sets of available messages Mˆ(p)
and Mˆ(q) are equal in size. Each of the new messages is set to be synonymous
to some existing message given p.
Step 2 Relabel the messages in Mˆ(p) and Mˆ(q) so that the new sets of messages M˜(p)
and M˜(q) are the same, not only in terms of size but also in terms of labels.
Step 3 For each pair of distinct messages (mi,m
′
i) ∈ M˜(p)× M˜(p), expand the institu-
tion by making a new message n(mi,m
′
i) available to player i given both p and
q. n(mi,m
′
i) is set to be synonymous to mi given p, and to m
′
i given q.
Step 4 Combine p and q into one perception p ∪ q.
Steps 1 and 2 make the technical preparation so that after combining p and q the
61
resulting structure is an institution. Step 3 introduces redundant messages. However,
some of the redundant messages will no longer be redundant after the merge of p and q.
Given the less accurate perception p∪q, player i can use message n(mi,m′i) to convey
the private information that he would use mi to convey if he knew the perception was
p and would use m′i to convey if he knew the perception was q.
The formal definition of merging is complicated, and is thus relegated to Section B.9
in the Appendices.
Figure 3.9 shows merging in those steps. Panel (a) depicts the original institution.
The two perceptions {H} and {L} of Player 2 are to be merged. Panel (b) depicts
the end product of Step 1, that is, an additional message A, set to be synonymous
to B given perception {L}, is introduced so that the number of messages available to
Player 2 given both perceptions are the same. Panel (c) depicts the end product of
Step 2, that is, after relabeling, messages available to Player 2 given both perceptions
have the same labels. Panel (d) depicts the end product of Step 3, that is, introducing
additional redundant messages to both perceptions, where, for example, n(H,L) is
set to be synonymous to H given perception {H}, and to L given perception {L}.




Steps 1, 2 and 3 involve either relabeling or introducing redundant messages (the
inverse operation of trimming), and therefore by Lemmas 3.5.7 and 3.5.5 do not
change the institution functionally. Following the intuition of the earlier example,
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going from Step 3 to Step 4 should not change the institution functionally either.
The following lemma confirms the intuition.
Lemma 3.5.8. If (T ′, P ′,M ′) is obtained from (T, P,M) by merging then (T ′, P ′,M ′)
and (T, P,M) dominate each other.
Now we are ready to state the structural characterization of dominance.
Theorem 3.5.9. Given two institutions (T, P,M) and (T ′, P ′,M ′):
1. (T ′, P ′,M ′) dominates (T, P,M) if (T ′, P ′,M ′) is obtained from (T, P,M) by a
sequence of operations of expanding, refining, trimming, relabeling or merging.
2. For any i ∈ N there is ti ∈ N such that if |Xi| ≥ ti then (T ′, P ′,M ′) dominates
(T, P,M) only if (T ′, P ′,M ′) can be obtained from (T, P,M) by a sequence of
operations of expanding, refining, trimming, relabeling or merging.
Part 1, the “if” direction, of the theorem is an immediate consequence of Lemmas
3.5.3, 3.5.4, 3.5.5, 3.5.7 and 3.5.8.
The proof of Part 2, the “only if” direction, can be broken into the following steps.
First, it is clear that after applying merging operations to (T, P,M) for finitely many
times we can obtain some (Tˆ , Pˆ , Mˆ) such that |Tˆi| = 1 for any i < N where |Ai| = 1.
If |Xi| is sufficiently large for each i, there is a strategy profile sˆ ∈ S(Tˆ , Pˆ , Mˆ) such
that every non-redundant message in (Tˆ , Pˆ , Mˆ) is utilized. Moreover, any institu-
tion (T ′, P ′,M ′) that can induce α(·|sˆ) in pure strategies must embed the relabeled
version of (Tˆ , Pˆ , Mˆ)’s non-redundant backbone (T ∗, P ∗,M∗) as its sub-institution.
(T ∗, P ∗,M∗) is shown to be obtained from (Tˆ , Pˆ , Mˆ) by refining and trimming. Since
the relabeled version of (T ∗, P ∗,M∗) is embedded in (T ′, P ′,M ′), (T ′, P ′,M ′) can be
obtained from (T ∗, P ∗,M∗) by relabeling and expanding.
If the state space is not rich enough, that is, if |Xi| < ti for some i ∈ N , then Part
2 of Theorem 3.5.9 need not be true. Indeed, if |Xi| is sufficiently small for every i ∈
N then (T, P,M) and (T ′, P ′,M ′) may both accommodate precise communication,
despite that one may not be obtainable from the other by a sequence of the five
types of operations. It is worth noting that the value of ti depends on the dominated
institution (T, P,M) only.
3.6 Applications
3.6.1 Voting Revisited
In Example 1 of Section 3.4 we have described how to model voting system (r, d, t) in
terms of an institution. Because voting systems are finite mechanisms for a common
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objective, the definition of value extends to them, and the dominance order can also
be extended to compare them. Let CV (r, d, t) denote the set of all mappings from
X1× ...×X|J | to Y inducible in pure strategies under voting system (r, d, t). A result
analogous to Proposition 3.5.1 holds for voting systems.
Lemma 3.6.1. Voting system (r′, d′, t′) dominates another voting system (r, d, t) if
and only if CV (r, d, t) ⊂ CV (r′, d′, t′).
Like Proposition 3.5.1, Lemma 3.6.1 is also a corollary of Proposition B.4.2, because
Proposition B.4.2 applies to any pair of finite mechanisms.
Let (T, P,M) be the institution representing (r, d, t). Recall that player |J | + 1 rep-
resents the rule and P (z) = P (z′) if and only if d(z) = d(z′) for any z, z′ ∈ T|J |+1,
where T|J |+1 is the set of all complete vote profiles. Let S(T, P,M |d) denote the set
of pure strategy profiles of (T, P,M) satisfying the following condition:
V1 For any z ∈ T|J |+1, player |J |+ 1 chooses the action d(z) given perception P (z).
V1 requires player |J | + 1 to exactly follow the choice rule determined by d. It is
straightforward to see that for any pure strategy profile s under voting system (r, d, t)
there is a corresponding strategy profile s′ ∈ S(T, P,M |d) under institution (T, P,M)
such that s and s′ lead to the same choice of y ∈ Y given any vector of private signals
(x1, ..., x|J |), and vice versa, because, as discussed in Example 1 in Section 3.4, the
game induced by (r, d, t) and the game induced by (T, P,M) are essentially the same
if player |J |+ 1 has to choose according to d.
Let C(T, P,M |d) denote the set of all social choice functions inducible by any s ∈
S(T, P,M |d). The following lemma results immediately from the observation in the
previous paragraph. The proof is omitted.
Lemma 3.6.2. Voting system (r′, d′, t′) dominates another voting system (r, d, t) if
and only if C(T, P,M |d) ⊂ C(T ′, P ′,M ′|d′) where (T, P,M) and (T ′, P ′,M ′) are
institutions respectively representing (r, d, t) and (r′, d′, t′).
It is possible to compare voting systems by analyzing the institutions representing
them. However, it should be noted that one institution dominating another institution
is usually not sufficient for the voting system that one represents to dominate the
voting system that the other represents, due to the additional constraint imposed on
the strategy of player |J |+1. Despite this caveat, the machinery developed in Section
3.5 still provides tools for us to conclude the following results.
Proposition 3.6.3. For any voting system (r, d, t):
1. (r, d, t) is dominated by voting system (r, d, t′) where t′ is the full disclosure
policy.
2. If t is the full disclosure policy, then (r, d, t) is dominated by voting system
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(r′, d, t) where r′ is a sequential procedure.
3. If t is the full disclosure policy, then (r, d, t) is dominated by voting system
(r, d′, t) where d′ is a rule under which the collective choice is not determined
before voting in the last stage (according to r) has taken place.
Parts 1 and 2 are based on the observation that allowing full disclosure or making
the procedure sequential corresponds to refining the institution that represents the
voting system. Moreover, since these modifications do not change player |J | + 1’s
perception, player |J |+ 1 can still choose according to the rule d.
Part 3 is based on the observation that, if the collective choice is determined be-
fore voting in the last stage has taken place, then votes in the last stage become
redundant, because they cannot effectively carry private information from those who
vote in the last stage to affect the collective choice. Changing the rule to one that
allows consideration of those last stage votes renders them useful and thus leads to
improvement.
An immediate implication of Proposition 3.6.3 is that, to find the optimal voting
system for any collective choice problem, it is sufficient to focus on ones that have a
sequential procedure, full disclosure policy, and a rule under which the last voter is
always pivotal.
It should be noted, however, that the last voter being always pivotal does not mean
that the rule depends entirely on his vote. For example, earlier votes may effectively
determine the set of candidates that the last voter can choose from.
3.6.2 The Benefit of Complexity
An institution offers two kinds of instruments that facilitate communication: mes-
sages and perceptions. A more complex institution has more messages and percep-
tions. Lemmas 3.5.3 and 3.5.4 imply that complex institutions weakly outperform
less complex ones. In this section we investigate whether the benefit of additional
complexity is always strictly positive.
The complexity of institution (T, P,M) has two dimensions, one that concerns the
messages and the other the perceptions. The message-complexity of (T, P,M) is
measured by the vector (|M1|, ..., |MN−1|). The perception-complexity of (T, P,M) is
measured by the vector (|P1|, ..., |PN |).
We ask two questions:
1. Whether increasing the perception-complexity of an institution while keeping
the message-complexity fixed leads to a strictly better institution in terms of
dominance.
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2. Whether increasing the message-complexity of an institution while keeping the
perception-complexity fixed leads to a strictly better institution in terms of
dominance.
The first question can be thought of as concerning the situation in which messages are
costly to provide, whereas perceptions are relatively cheap, so that it is worthwhile to
increase the number of perceptions as long as it strictly improves the institution. The
second question can be thought of as concerning the situation in which perceptions
are costly but messages are cheap.
For the rest of the subsection we assume that |Xi| is very large for each i ∈ N ,
that is, it is arbitrarily close to ∞, so that the lower bound requirement on |Xi|
in Part 2 of Theorem 3.5.9 is satisfied for any institution we are going to consider.
Moreover, assume that every player has a non-singleton action set. The assumptions
are important to the results of the present subsection.
The answer to the first question is affirmative.
Proposition 3.6.4. Any institution (T, P,M) where |Pi| < |Ti| for some i ∈ N is
strictly dominated by some institution (T ′, P ′,M ′) where
1. |M ′j| = |Mj| for any j < N .
2. |P ′j| ≥ |Pj| for any j ∈ N .
The proof is based on the observation that if |P ′i | > |Pi| for some i then (T, P ′,M) is
not dominated by (T, P,M), because no operation of expanding, refining, trimming,
relabeling or merging can decrease the number of perceptions of i (merging does not,
because it only merges perceptions of players with singleton action sets). If player i’s
observation of received message profiles is not perfect under Pi (implied by |Pi| < |Ti|),
then refining (T, P,M) by strictly refining Pi strictly improves the institution.
The answer to the second question is also affirmative if the institution is “mildly”
complex.
Proposition 3.6.5. Suppose N ≥ 3. Any institution (T, P,M) where |Pi+1| ≥ 2 for
some i ≥ 2 is strictly dominated by some institution (T ′, P ′,M ′) where
1. |P ′j| = |Pj| for any j ∈ N .
2. |M ′j| ≥ |Mj| for any j < N .
The result may not seem surprising at first sight, but let us illustrate a concern
which would suggest that additional messages might be of no additional value at all.
Suppose there are only two players: the speaker and the listener. The listener has
two perceptions. Clearly, if there are already two messages available to the speaker,
any additional message is going to be redundant because it will be synonymous to
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one of the existing messages. This example, which shows that the decision maker (the
listener) is not able to make use of more data (messages) because of the constraints
on his data-processing capacity (the number of perceptions), reflects a prominent
phenomenon, termed as data overload, in many real life situations.
Since an institution may face stringent message-processing constraints due to lim-
ited perceptions, it is natural to expect that data overload will eventually occur,
in particular when the existing message-complexity is already very high. However,
Proposition 3.6.5 implies that even if there is only one player that has multiple per-
ceptions, data overload can still be avoided regardless of the message-complexity of
the existing institution. That there are more than two players within the institution
is crucial for this result. Indeed, if there are only two players then data overload
will eventually occur, as in the speaker-listener example. However, if there are more
than two players, it is possible to simultaneously enlarge the message sets for multiple
players and carefully arrange how other players perceive message profiles containing
these newly introduced messages, so that no additional redundancy is created by the
modification.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper proposes a framework for modeling a general class of information-aggregating
institutions, introduces a robust Pareto order on institutions thus modeled, and de-
rives two characterizations of this order.
It is not difficult to extend the model to capture more complex institutions, for exam-
ple, those in which the players engage in conversation-like interactive communication,
those in which actions are observable to certain degree, or those in which the play-
ers take actions after the communication phase is over. In fact, any mechanism that
tackles a common objective by information aggregation can be captured by a straight-
forward extension of the present model, because the essential part of the model is no
more than a partial structure of the extensive form game induced by the correspond-
ing mechanism. As a generalization of Proposition 3.5.1, Proposition B.4.2 in the
Appendices provides a characterization of the dominance order on all finite mecha-
nisms. It is natural to ask if Theorem 3.5.9 can also be generalized so that other
mechanisms can be compared structurally in a similar way. As a first step in this
direction, it is worthwhile investigating whether institutions that only differ in the
order in which players move may be compared structurally.
To extend the analysis in a different direction, we can consider mildly relaxing the
common interest assumption to the extent that institutions can still be Pareto-ordered
in a non-trivial way. One possibility, for example, is that every player’s payoff only
depends on his own action. Along with some extension to the model, we may compare
pure information sharing systems, for example social networks, in which there is no
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need to coordinate actions.
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Additional Proofs and Examples in Chapter 1
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1.5.7
Proposition 1.5.7 is proved with the assistance of Lemma A.1.1.
Lemma A.1.1. For any game (M,W, u, v, C, δ) there exist τ ∈ N+, q ∈ (0, 1) and
(m,w) ∈M ×W such that for any subgame perfect equilibrium the following is true:
If a meeting between (m,w) ends in separation with positive probability, then the
probability that no player marries during the first τ days of the subgame resulting
from that meeting having ended in separation is less than q.
Proof: Let SI denote the initial market. There exists a pair (m,w) such that m =
αSI (w) because SI is nontrivial. Let w and w respectively denote m’s first and last
choices in ASI (m) and define pi := u(m,w) and pi := u(m,w). Thus pi ≥ u(m,w) ≥
pi > 0 and therefore we can pick τ ∈ N+ and q ∈ (0, 1) such that δ[(1−q)pi+qδτpi] < pi.
Fix a subgame perfect equilibrium σ. Suppose (m,w) meet on a day. Lemma 1.5.1(d)
implies w accepts m if she has been accepted since m = αSI (w). Thus if the meeting
ends in separation with positive probability then it must be that m rejects w with
positive probability. Let q denote the equilibrium probability that no player marries
during the first τ days in the subgame resulting from m having rejected w. By Lemma
1.5.1(d), m’s expected payoff from rejecting w is no more than δ[(1−q)pi+qδτpi]. If m
rejects w with positive probability in equilibrium then δ[(1−q)pi+qδτpi] ≥ u(m,w) ≥ pi
because m’s expected payoff from accepting w is u(m,w) as he will be accepted. Thus
q < q by the choice of q. 
Proof of Proposition 1.5.7: Fix a game (M,W, u, v, C, δ) and denote the initial market
as SI . Prove by induction. Suppose |M | = 1. Let m be the only man and w :=
αSI (m). Thus (m,w) is a top pair for SI . In any subgame perfect equilibrium the
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game ends with certainty after (m,w) meet because they marry each other upon first
meeting by Lemma 1.5.5. The proposition then follows.
Suppose the proposition is true if |M | < n for some n. Consider |M | = n. Fix
a subgame perfect equilibrium σ. By Lemma A.1.1 there exist τ ∈ N+, q ∈ (0, 1)
and (m,w) ∈ SI such that if (m,w) meet and in equilibrium the meeting ends in
separation with positive probability, then the probability that no one marries during
the first τ days of the subgame resulting from that meeting having ended in separation
is less than q. For any h ∈ Hˆ such that S(h) = SI let β(h) denote the equilibrium
probability that no one marries in the first τ + 1 days of Γ(h); let φ(h) denote the
equilibrium probability that (m,w) marry on the first day of Γ(h) conditional on
them meeting on that day. Then by Lemma A.1.1, for any h ∈ Hˆ
β(h) ≤ 
(
φ(h)× 0 + (1− φ(h))× q
)
+ (1− ) ≤ q + (1− ). (I1)
Let h0 denote the initial (empty) history. For any k ∈ N+ let Hˆk denote the set of all
histories h in Hˆ such that the first day of Γ(h) is the k(τ + 1) + 1st day of the initial
game and S(h) = SI . Thus h ∈ Hˆk being reached implies no player has married
during the first k(τ + 1) days of the initial game. Let Ek denote the event that any
h ∈ Hˆk is reached. Inequality I1 implies Prσ(E1) ≤ q¯ + (1 − ) because h0 ∈ Hˆ. I1
also implies Prσ(Ek|Ek−1) ≤ q¯ + (1− ) for any k > 1. By the inductive hypothesis
the probability Q that the game does not end at all is equal to the probability that
every player remains in the market into the infinite future. Hence for any k > 1 we
have Q ≤ Pr σ(Ek) = Prσ(E1)
∏k
j=2 Prσ(Ej|Ej−1). The present proposition follows as
Q ≤ limk→∞[q + (1− )]k = 0. 
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1.5.8
Introduce additional terminology for the proof. Let Σ(δ) denote the set of all sub-
game perfect equilibria of the game with discount factor δ in the environment E :=
(M,W, u, v, C). A (possibly empty) set P of disjoint pairs of a man and a woman
from the initial market SI := (M,W, u, v) is a settled set for E if there exists some
d < 1 such for any σ ∈ Σ(δ) where δ > d, σ implies any (m,w) ∈ P marry almost
surely and upon first meeting in Γ(h) if h ∈ Hˆ, (m,w) ∈ S(h), and moreover S(h)
can be derived from SI as a result of a (possibly empty) sequence of pairs having left,
among which each pair (m′, w′) is either in P or is a woman-acceptable pair from
SI\P , where SI\P denotes the submarket that complements P in SI . d is called a
settling discount factor for P . Note that any d′ > d is also a settling discount
factor for P .
Proposition 1.5.8 is proved with the assistance of Lemma A.2.1.
Lemma A.2.1. For any settled set P for the environment E, if m is a top player for
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SI\P and w := αSI\P (m), or w is a top player for SI\P and m := αSI\P (w), then
P ∪ {(m,w)} is also a settled set for E.
Proof: Prove by induction on |M |. Suppose |M | = 1. Let m be the only man and
w := αSI (m). For δ sufficiently close to 1, it is easy to see that in any subgame perfect
equilibrium, (m,w) marry almost surely and upon first meeting. Thus there are two
settled sets, the empty set P1 and P2 := {(m,w)}. The lemma is true for P1 because
m is a top player in SI = SI\P1 and as is concluded {(m,w)} is a settled set. The
lemma is true for P2 vacuously.
Suppose the lemma is true if |M | < n for some n. Consider |M | = n. Pick a
settled set P for E and let d < 1 be a settling discount factor for P . Suppose w is
a top player for S := SI\P . Let m := αS(w) and denote m as w’s second choice in
AS(w) ∪ {s}. By definition of the top player we have w = αS(m). Notice that m
may be s. Define HˆI := {h ∈ Hˆ : S(h) = SI}. Thus Γ(h) is isomorphic to the initial
game for h ∈ HˆI . Consider σ ∈ Σ(δ) for δ > d. It is helpful to bear in mind that the
choice of σ depends on δ. In σ, by assumption w may only marry a man from S in
the subgame Γ(h) where h ∈ HˆI , thus her expected payoff in Γ(h) is no higher than
v(m,w) by an argument similar to the proof for Lemma 1.5.1(d). It follows that w
always accepts m when the remaining market is SI . Given that, m always accepts
w when the remaining market is SI by a similar argument. Thus in σ, (m,w) marry
upon first meeting in Γ(h) for any h ∈ HˆI .
Suppose w deviates to the strategy under which she only accepts m when the re-
maining market is SI , and switches back to following σ if the remaining market
is no longer SI . Let σ
′ denote the strategy profile due to w’s unilateral devia-
tion. For each h ∈ HˆI let K(h, δ, σ) denote w’s expected payoff in Γ(h) under σ′.
Define K(δ, σ) := infh∈HˆI K(h, δ, σ). Let p(h, σ,m,w) denote the probability that
(m,w) ∈ SI meet and marry on the first day of Γ(h) under σ′. Let h′(h,m,w) ∈ Hˆ
denote the immediate history resulting from (m,w) having married on the first day
of Γ(h). For w 6= w let U(h, δ, σ,m,w) denote w’s expected payoff in Γ(h′(h,m,w))
under σ′. σ instead of σ′ appears as an argument for K, p and U because σ′ is de-
termined by σ. By the definition of K, for any η1 > 0 there exists hη1 ∈ HˆI such
that
K(δ, σ) + η1 > K(hη1 , δ, σ)






p(hη1 , σ,m,w)δU(hη1 , δ, σ,m,w) (I2)
+
(








p(hη1 , σ,m,w) >  because (m,w) accept each other in Γ(hη1). Fix (m,w) such
that w 6= w and p(hη1 , σ,m,w) > 0. Because players other than w follow σ,
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(m,w) ∈ P or (m,w) is a woman-acceptable pair from S. Let P ′ := P\{(m,w)}
if (m,w) ∈ P or P ′ := P otherwise. Let S ′ denote the submarket complementing P ′
in S(h′(h,m,w)) = (M\{m},W\{w}, u, v). If (m,w) ∈ P then S ′ = S and thus w




(w) = m. If instead (m,w) is a woman-acceptable pair
from S then S
′
= S\(m,w) and one of the following is true:
1. m 6= m: w is a top player for S ′ and αS′(w) = m.
2. m = m, m 6= s: w is a top player for S ′ and αS′(w) = m.
3. m = m, m = s: αS
′
(w) = s.
It is easy to verify from definition that P being a settled set for E implies P ′ is a
settled set for the sub-environment E ′ := (M\{m},W\{w}, u, v, C). Note that σ′
restricted to Γ(h′(hη1 ,m,w)) is a subgame perfect equilibrium of it because w has
switched back to following σ. If (m,w) ∈ P , or if case 1 above is true, then since
the number of men in S(h′(h,m,w)) is less than n, the inductive hypothesis applies,
implying P ′ ∪ {(m,w)} is a settled set for E ′, thus for δ sufficiently close to 1, σ ∈
Σ(δ) implies (m,w) marry almost surely and upon first meeting in Γ(h′(hη1 ,m,w)),
and thus δU(hη1 , δ, σ,m,w) → v(m,w) as δ → 1. Likewise if case 2 is true then
δU(hη1 , δ, σ,m,w)→ v(m,w) as δ → 1. If case 3 is true then by the assumption that
P ′ is a settled set for E ′ and Lemma 1.5.1(a), δU(hη1 , δ, σ,m,w) = 0 = v(m,w). In
general, for any η2 > 0 there exists dη2 < 1 such that if δ > dη2 then for w 6= w,
p(hη1 , σ,m,w) > 0 implies
v(m,w) > δU(hη1 , δ, σ,m,w) > v(m,w)− η2. (I3)
Substituting I3 along with p(hη1 , σ,m,w) > , K(δ, σ) ≤ v(m,w) and R(hη1 , σ) :=∑
m∈M
∑
w 6=w p(hη1 , σ,m,w) back to I2, we have
K(δ, σ) >
v(m,w) +R(hη1 , σ)(v(m,w)− η2)− η1
1− δ(1− −R(hη1 , σ))
(I4)
for η2 sufficiently small and δ > dη2 . The right hand side of I4 is decreasing in
R(hη1 , σ) for δ close 1 and η1, η2 close to 0. For such extreme values, R(hη1 , σ) < 1− 
implies for δ > dη2 ,
K(δ, σ) > v(m,w) + (1− )v(m,w)− (1− )η2 − η1.





K(δ, σ) ≥ v(m,w) + (1− )v(m,w) > v(m,w). (I5)
Inequality I5 implies w’s expected payoff under σ in Γ(h) where h ∈ HˆI is strictly
greater than v(m,w) for δ sufficiently close to 1. For such δ, σ ∈ Σ(δ) implies w
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rejects any m such that m w m when the remaining market is SI .
Now consider m. Suppose other players (including w) follow σ and m deviates to
the strategy under which he only accepts w when the remaining market is SI , and
switches back to following σ if the remaining market is no longer SI . Let σ
′′ denote
the strategy profile due to m’s unilateral deviation.
Claim A.2.2. For δ sufficiently close to 1, σ ∈ Σ(δ) implies under σ′′, (m,w) marry
almost surely and upon first meeting in Γ(h) for any h ∈ HˆI .
Proof: Observe that for δ sufficiently close to 1, almost surely one of the following
scenarios occur under σ′′:
1. (m,w) meet when the remaining market is SI .
2. The first marriage is between (m,w) where m 6= m, w 6= w, (m,w) ∈ P or
(m,w) is a woman-acceptable pair from S.
That w will not marry with m 6= m as the first married couple is due to the assump-
tion that she may not marry a man from a pair in P , plus the conclusion from the
above that she rejects every man worse than m when the remaining market is SI .
If scenario 1 occurs then (m,w) marry immediately. If scenario 2 occurs, then the
inductive hypothesis1 implies (m,w) marry almost surely and upon first meeting in
the subsequent subgame. 
By Claim A.2.2, m’s expected payoff under σ′′ in Γ(h) where h ∈ HˆI tends to u(m,w)
as δ → 1, implying m’s expected payoff under σ in Γ(h) also tends to u(m,w). Thus
for δ sufficiently close to 1, σ ∈ Σ(δ) implies when the remaining market is SI , m
rejects any w such that w m w if w would accept m with positive probability. Then
an analogous claim to Claim A.2.2 is true for σ with an analogous proof.
Now consider any h ∈ Hˆ such that S(h) 6= SI , (m,w) ∈ S(h), and moreover S(h) can
be derived from SI as a result of a sequence of pairs having left, among which each
pair (m,w) is either in P or is a woman-acceptable pair from S. Let P (h) denote the
set of pairs in P which are present in S(h), and let E(h) denote the sub-environment
with initial market S(h). It is easy to verify from definition that P (h) is a settled
set for E(h), w is a top player for S(h) := S(h)\P (h), and m = αS(h)(w). Thus the
inductive hypothesis implies P (h) ∪ {(m,w)} is a settled set for E(h). Therefore for
δ sufficiently close to 1, σ ∈ Σ(δ) implies (m,w) marry almost surely and upon first
meeting in Γ(h). It follows that P ∪ {(m,w)} is a settled set for E.
The proof for the case that a male player is a top player for S is similar. 
Proof of Proposition 1.5.8: Denote E := (M,W, u, v, C). To prove the present propo-
1The argument for the applicability of the inductive hypothesis, and its actual application, are
the same as those used above for w’s case.
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sition it suffices to show there exists some d < 1 such that for any σ ∈ Σ(δ) where
δ > d, (mi, wi) marry almost surely and upon first meeting if i ≤ k, and mi or wi
stays single if i > k.
Since the empty set is a settled set for E and m1 or w1 is a top player for the
initial market S1, Lemma A.2.1 implies P1 := ({m1, w1}) is a settled set for E. Let
Pi := {(mj, wj) : j ≤ i}. Suppose Pi is a settled set for E if i < n for some n ≤ k.
Since mn or wn is a top player for Sn = S1\Pn−1, Lemma A.2.1 implies that Pn is a
settled set for E. Thus Pk is a settled set for E. Let d be a settling discount factor
for Pk. Pick σ ∈ Σ(δ) where δ > d. Pk being a settled set for E implies (mi, wi)
marry almost surely and upon first meeting under σ if i ≤ k. Pick a man m ∈ Sk+1.
(m,w) marry with positive probability in σ only if w ∈ Sk+1 and m is acceptable to
w. Since Sk+1 is trivial, if m is acceptable to w ∈ Sk+1 then w is unacceptable to
m. Thus if m marries at all with positive probability, his expected payoff would be
negative. Lemma 1.5.1(a) then implies m stays single in σ. It follows that a woman
in Sk+1 stays single in σ as well. 
A.3 Example: A man might marry an unacceptable woman
The following example demonstrates that a man may marry an unacceptable woman
with positive probability in equilibrium.
The initial market is described by the following lists:
P (m1) = w1, w2, P (w1) = m2,m1,
P (m2) = w2, w1, P (w2) = m1,m2,
P (m3) = w3, P (w3) = m3,m1.
Each of the players m1, m2, w1, w2 receives a payoff of 16 from marrying the first
choice, 1 the second choice, and -1 the unacceptable choice; m3 receives a payoff of 16
from marrying w3; w3 receives a payoff of 16 from marrying m3 and 4 from marrying
m1. Set δ = 0.5. The contact function satisfies C(m,w, S) = C(mˆ, wˆ, S) for any pairs
(m,w) ∈ S and (mˆ, wˆ) ∈ S for any S ∈ S .
Consider strategy profile σ given as follows:
• If (m1, w3) do not meet on the first day, the players follow the µm strategy
profile where µm is the men-optimal matching for the initial market.
• If (m1, w3) meet on the first day, m1 accepts w3 with certainty and w3 accepts
m1 with probability 0.5.
– If m1 accepts w3 on the first day, then regardless of whether m1 is accepted,
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after the first day the players follow the µˆm-strategy profile where µˆm is
the men-optimal matching for the remaining market.
– If m1 rejects w3 on the first day, then after the first day the players follow
the µw strategy profile where µw is the women-optimal matching for the
initial market.
It is straightforward to verify that σ is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game.
Notably, if (m1, w3) meet on the first day, m1 accepts w3 with positive probability
despite the latter being unacceptable, because by doing so there is a probability of
0.5 that w3 will reject m1 and in the subsequent subgame m1 will marry his first
choice w1 eventually, whereas if he rejects w3 he will have to marry his second choice
w2 eventually. Meanwhile, because of discounting, w3 is indifferent between marrying
m1 today and marrying her first choice m3 in the future, justifying her randomizing
between accepting and rejecting m1. Under σ there is a positive probability of 1/9×
0.5 = 1/18 that m1 marries the unacceptable w3.
A.4 Example: A market that satisfies Condition 1.5.8 but
violates the absence of simultaneous cycles
It is easy to verify that the marriage market described by the following lists of pref-
erences satisfies Condition 1.5.8 but violates the absence of simultaneous cycles given
in Romero-Medina and Triossi (2013).
P (m1) = w1, w3, w4, P (w1) = m1,
P (m2) = w2, w4, w3, P (w2) = m2,
P (m3) = w3, P (w3) = m3,m2,m1,
P (m4) = w4, P (w4) = m4,m1,m2.
Observe that there are two preference cycles: w3 m1 w4 m2 w3 and m2 w3 m1 w4
m2, implying the simultaneous cycle (w4,m1, w3,m2, w4) in the notation of Romero-
Medina and Triossi (2013).
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APPENDIX B
Additional Proofs and Notation in Chapter 3
B.1 Proof of Proposition 3.3.2
Proof. Choose any voting system (r, d) and s ∈ ΣV (r). There is a sequential procedure
r∗ such that r∗(i) > r∗(j) for any i, j ∈ J such that r(i) ≥ r(j). Thus if j’s vote is
observable to i under r then it is also observable to i under r∗. Let si(xi, (zj)r(j)<r(i))
denote i’s strategy given past votes (zj)r(j)<r(i) and signal xi. Construct s
′ ∈ ΣV (r∗)
such that for every i ∈ J , s′i(xi, (z′j)r∗(j)<r∗(i)) = si(xi, (zj)r(j)<r(i)) if z′j = zj for
any j such that r(j) < r(i). Obviously s and s′ are outcome equivalent, implying
u(s|r, d) = u(s′|r∗, d). Thus maxσ∈ΣV (r) u(σ|r, d) ≤ maxσ∈ΣV (r∗) u(σ|r∗, d).
Let k be the last voter according to r∗. Construct d∗ such that d∗(z1, ..., zn) = zk.
Choose any sˆ ∈ ΣV (r∗). Construct s˜ ∈ ΣV (r∗) such that s˜ and sˆ agree for every
player i 6= k, and for any signal xk and past votes z−k,
s˜k(xk, z−k) =
{
d(z−k, G) if d(z−k, G) = d(z−k, I)
sˆk(xi, z−k) if d(z−k, G) 6= d(z−k, I) .
It is straightforward to verify that s˜ and sˆ are outcome equivalent, implying u(sˆ|r∗, d) =
u(s˜|r∗, d∗). Thus maxσ∈ΣV (r∗) u(σ|r∗, d) ≤ maxσ∈ΣV (r∗) u(σ|r∗, d∗). It follows that
maxσ∈ΣV (r) u(σ|r, d) ≤ maxσ∈ΣV (r∗) u(σ|r∗, d∗), implying U(r, d) ≤ U(r∗, d∗) by Lemma
3.3.1. 
B.2 Proof of Proposition 3.3.3
For any procedure r and s ∈ ΣV (r), let Pr(G|z, s) denote the probability that ω = G
conditional on the jurors following s and the realized votes are z. The proof is assisted
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by the following lemma.
Lemma B.2.1. For any procedure r, if d∗ ∈ argmaxdU(r, d) then for any s∗ ∈ ΣV (r)
such that u(s∗|r, d∗) = U(r, d∗) and vote profile z ∈ {G, I}n,
d∗(z) =
{
G if Pr(G|z, s∗) > 0.5,
I if Pr(G|z, s∗) < 0.5.
Proof. Fix procedure r. Suppose there is d∗ ∈ argmaxdU(r, d) and s∗ ∈ ΣV (r)
where u(s∗|r, d∗) = U(r, d∗) such that d∗ does not satisfy the condition in the lemma.
Define K =
{




z ∈ {G, I}n :
d∗(z) = G and Pr(G|z, s∗) < 0.5
}
. By assumption K ∪ L 6= ø. Let qω(z) be the
probability that the realized vote profile is z conditional on ω and the jurors following
s∗. Construct rule d′ such that for any z ∈ {G, I}n,
d′(z) =

G if Pr(G|z, s∗) > 0.5,
I if Pr(G|z, s∗) < 0.5,
d∗(z) if Pr(G|z, s∗) = 0.5.
It follows that d′(z) = d∗(z) if z /∈ K ∪ L. We have













If z ∈ K then Pr(G|z, s∗) = piqG(z)
piqG(z)+(1−pi)qI(z) > 0.5, implying piqG(z)−(1−pi)qI(z) > 0.
Similarly if z ∈ L then (1 − pi)qI(z) − piqG(z) > 0. It follows that u(s∗|r, d′) −
u(s∗|r, d∗) > 0 because K ∪ L 6= ø. Therefore U(r, d′) > U(r, d∗), contradicting the
assumption that d∗ ∈ argmaxdU(r, d). 
Proof of Proposition 3.3.3
Fix the simultaneous procedure r. Choose any d′ ∈ argmaxdU(r, d) and s′ ∈ ΣV (r)




G if Pr(G|z, s′) > 0.5,
I if Pr(G|z, s′) < 0.5.
For each i ∈ J let piω denote the probability that juror i votes G conditional on ω and
s′. Note that since f iω(xi) > 0 for any i ∈ J , xi ∈ Xi and ω ∈ {G, I}, piI = 0 if and
only if piG = 0. Construct s
∗ that satisfies the following for any i ∈ J :
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• If piG /∈ {0, 1}:
– If piG/p
i
I ≥ 1 then s∗ prescribes the same strategy for i as s′.
– If piG/p
i
I < 1 then given any signal xi, i votes G with the same probability
that he votes I given xi under s
′.
• If piG ∈ {0, 1} then i votes G with probability 0.5 regardless of xi.
Construct d∗ such that d∗(z) = G if and only if Pr(G|z, s∗) ≥ 0.5. It is straightforward
to verify that u(s′|r, d′) = u(s∗|r, d∗). Let tiω denote the probability that juror i votesG
conditional on ω and s∗. Clearly 0 < tiω < 1 for ω ∈ {G, I}. Moreover tiG/tiI = piG/piI
if piG/p
i
I ≥ 1, tiG/tiI = (1 − piG)/(1 − piI) if piG/piI < 1, and tiG/tiI = 1 if piG ∈ {0, 1}.
Consequently tiG/t
i
I ≥ 1 for any i ∈ J . Recall that for any vote profile z = (z1, ..., zn),
1(zi) = 1 if zi = G or 0 otherwise. We have
































































































Thus d∗(z) = G if and only if
∑
i∈J wi1(zi) ≥ k. 
B.3 Notation for Proofs of Results in Section 3.5
Introduce the following notation for the game induced by (T, P,M), where (T, P,M)
can either be an institution or an improper institution. The notation will be used
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throughout the Appendices for the proofs of results in Section 3.5.
• S(T, P,M): the set of all pure strategy profiles of the game induced by (T, P,M).
• (xi, p): a typical information set of player i, where xi is to his private informa-
tion about the state, and p is his perception that contains the message he has
received.
• For s ∈ S(T, P,M), i ∈ N and x = (x1, ..., xN) ∈ X,
ai(xi, p|s): i’s choice of action under s given (xi, p).
mi(xi, p|s): (if i < N) i’s choice of message under s given (xi, p).
ρi(x|s) : the message profile i receives conditional on x and s.
αi(x|s) : the action i takes conditional on x and s.
µi(x|s) : the message i sends conditional on x and s.
ρj(x|s, i, h,mi): the message profile that player j > i receives conditional
on (1) every player after i follows s, (2) player i receives h ∈ Ti, (3) player
i sends message mi ∈M(h).
The following equalities hold by definition:
αi(x|s) = ai(xi, P t(ρi(x|s))|s),
µi(x|s) = mi(xi, P (ρi(x|s))|s),
ρi+1(x|s) = ρi(x|s)× µi(x|s).
B.4 Proof of Proposition 3.5.1
We will prove a more general result which implies Proposition 3.5.1 as a corollary.
It is straightforward to extend the definition of value to any mechanism Γ whose set
of outcomes is a subset of A. Then we can also extend the definition of dominance:
Mechanism Γ′ dominates mechanism Γ if the value of Γ′ is weakly higher than the
value of Γ for any common objective.
Fix a mechanism Γ. Let S(Γ) denote the set of all pure strategy profiles of Γ. Let
C(Γ) denote the set of all social choice functions inducible by a pure strategy profile
of Γ. For s ∈ S(Γ) let v(s|Γ, φ, F ) denote the common expected payoff achieved by s
in the game induced by Γ and (φ, F ). Let V (Γ, φ, F ) denote the value of Γ for (φ, F ).
First we show a lemma.
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Lemma B.4.1. V (Γ, φ, F ) = maxs∈S(Γ) v(s|Γ, φ, F ) for any finite mechanism Γ and
common objective (φ, F ).
Proof: Fix Γ and (φ, F ). Let Σ(Γ) denote the set of all strategy profiles of Γ. For
 ∈ (0, ) where  is sufficiently small let Γ() denote the perturbed version of Γ such
whenever a player chooses a generic action (to be distinguished from the action ai
that player i contributes to the common objective) as a realization of a possibly mixed
strategy, his chosen action will realize with probability 1 − (n − 1) where n is the
total number of generic actions available at this point, and each of the other n − 1
generic actions will realize with probability .
For any σ ∈ Σ(Γ) let w(σ, ) denote the common expected payoff achieved by σ in
Γ(). Fix  ∈ (0, ). argmaxσ∈Σ(Γ)w(σ, ) is nonempty because Σ(Γ) is compact and
w(·, ) is continuous in its first argument. Choose σˆ ∈ argmaxσ∈Σw(σ, ). Let βˆ
denote the belief system derived from σˆ using Bayes’ rule in Γ(). Suppose there is
an information set K of player i such that under σˆ player i is not best responding.
Thus i would find it profitable to deviate to some strategy σ′i in K. Let σ
′ denote the
strategy profile under which i unilaterally deviates to σ′i in K. Clearly i’s expected
payoff under σ′ in Γ() is strictly higher than that under σˆ because K is reached with
strictly positive probability, implying w(σ′, ) > w(σˆ, ), contradicting the choice of
σˆ. We have thus established that (σˆ, βˆ) is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of Γ().
Construct pure strategy profile sˆ such that for each player i, sˆ prescribes a pure
strategy that is in the support of the (possibly mixed) strategy taken by i under σˆ.
That σˆ being a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of Γ() implies w(sˆ, ) = w(σˆ, ). Thus
w(sˆ, ) = maxσ∈Σ(Γ)w(σ, ), implying maxs∈S(Γ)w(s, ) = maxσ∈Σ(Γ)w(σ, ).
Note that, for any fixed σ, w(σ, ) is a polynomial function of  of finite degrees. Since
S(Γ) is finite, for some η > 0 there is s∗ ∈ S(Γ) such that w(s∗, ) = maxs∈S(Γ)w(s, )
for any  < η. It follows that s∗ ∈ argmaxσ∈Σ(Γ)w(σ, ) if  < η. Let β∗() be the
belief system derived from s∗ using Bayes’ rule in Γ(). s∗ ∈ argmaxσ∈Σ(Γ)w(σ, )
implies (s∗, β∗()) is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of Γ() by the argument in
the second paragraph of the proof. Note that β∗() is continuous in  and thus
β∗ = lim→0 β∗() exists. Clearly (s∗, β∗) is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the
unperturbed game. Suppose there is σ˜ ∈ Σ(Γ) such that v(σ˜|Γ, φ, F ) > v(s∗|Γ, φ, F ).
Since lim→0w(σ, ) = v(σ|Γ, φ, F ) for any σ, there is some η˜ > 0 such that w(σ˜, ) >
w(s∗, ) for any  < η˜, contradicting that s∗ ∈ argmaxσ∈Σ(Γ)w(σ, ) for any  < η.
Hence s∗ ∈ argmaxs∈Σ(Γ)v(s|Γ, φ, F ). It follows that V (Γ, φ, F ) = v(s∗|Γ, φ, F ) =
maxs∈S(Γ) v(s|Γ, φ, F ). 
Proposition B.4.2. If Γ′ and Γ are finite mechanisms then Γ′ dominates Γ if and
only if C(Γ) ⊂ C(Γ′).
Proof: (The “if” direction.) Suppose C(Γ) ⊂ C(Γ′). Fix (φ, F ) and choose s ∈
argmaxS(Γ)v(s|Γ, φ, F ). By assumption there is s′ ∈ S(Γ′) such that α(·|s′) = α(·|s).
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It follows that







F (x)φ(α(x|s),x) = v(s|Γ, φ, F ).
By Lemma B.4.1, V (Γ′, φ, F ) ≥ v(s′|Γ′, φ, F ) = v(s|Γ, φ, F ) = V (Γ, φ, F ), implying
that Γ′ dominates Γ because (φ, F ) is arbitrarily chosen.
(The “only if” direction.) Suppose Γ′ dominates Γ. Choose any s ∈ S(Γ). Construct
φ such that φ(a,x) = 1 if a = α(x|s) and φ(a,x) = 0 otherwise. Choose F that is




v(s|Γ′, φ, F ) ≥ max
s∈S(Γ)
v(s|Γ, φ, F ) = 1,
which in turn implies there is s′ ∈ S(Γ′) such that v(s′|Γ′, φ, F ) ≥ 1. If α(y|s′) 6=
α(y|s) for some y ∈ X then
v(s′|Γ′, φ, F ) =
∑
x∈X
F (x)φ(α(x|s′),x) ≤ 1− F (y) < 1,
a contradiction. Thus α(x|s′) = α(x|s) for any x ∈ X, implying C(Γ) ⊂ C(Γ′)
because s is arbitrarily chosen. 
B.5 Proof of Lemma 3.5.3
Proof. Suppose (T ′, P ′,M ′) is obtained from (T, P,M) by expanding. E2 implies that
for any p ∈ P ′ where p ∩ T 6= ø there is τ(p) ∈ P such that τ(p) = p ∩ T . E1 implies
M(τ(p)) ⊂ M ′(p). Choose s ∈ S(T, P,M). Construct s′ ∈ S(T ′, P ′,M ′) such that
for any i ∈ N , xi ∈ Xi and p ∈ P ′i where p ∩ T 6= ø,
ai(xi, p|s′) = ai(xi, τ(p)|s),
(if i < N) mi(xi, p|s′) = mi(xi, τ(p)|s).
To verify that s′ is properly defined, observe that for any p ∈ P ′i where p ∩ T 6= ø we
have mi(xi, p|s′) = mi(xi, τ(p)|s) ∈M(τ(p)) ⊂M ′(p). Choose any x = (x1, ..., xN) ∈
X. Clearly ρ1(x|s′) = ρ1(x|s). Suppose ρi(x|s′) = ρi(x|s) for any i ≤ k for some
k ≥ 1. Thus
µk(x|s′) = mk(xk, P ′(ρk(x|s′))|s′) = mk(xk, τ(P ′(ρk(x|s′)))|s)
= mk(xk, P (ρk(x|s′))|s) = mk(xk, P (ρk(x|s))|s) = µk(x|s).
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It follows that
ρk+1(x|s′) = ρk(x|s′)× µk(x|s′) = ρk(x|s)× µk(x|s) = ρk+1(x|s).
Thus ρi(x|s′) = ρi(x|s) for any i ∈ N , implying
αi(x|s′) = ai(xi, P ′(ρi(x|s′))|s′) = ai(xi, τ(P ′(ρi(x|s′)))|s)
= ai(xi, P (ρi(x|s′))|s) = ai(xi, P (ρi(x|s))|s) = αi(x|s).
Thus α(·|s′) = α(·|s), implying C(T, P,M) ⊂ C(T ′, P ′,M ′) since s is arbitrarily
chosen. The lemma then follows immediately from Proposition 3.5.2. 
B.6 Proof of Lemma 3.5.5
Two lemmas are used to assist the proof.
Lemma B.6.1. Fix (T, P,M). For any i < N and h ∈ Ti, if mi,m′i ∈ M(h) are
synonymous given h within (T, P,M) then P (ρj(x|s, i, h,mi)) = P (ρj(x|s, i, h,m′i))
for any j > i, x ∈ X and s ∈ S(T, P,M).
Proof. Choose any x = (x1, ..., xN) ∈ X, s ∈ S(T, P,M), i < N , h ∈ Ti and
mi,m
′
i ∈ M(h) such that mi and m′i are synonymous given h within (T, P,M). For
any j > i denote gj = ρj(x|s, i, h,mi) and f j = ρj(x|s, i, h,m′i).
Clearly gi+1 = h ×mi and f i+1 = h ×m′i. Thus gi+1 and f i+1 are h-cousins where




i. It follows by synonymity that P (g
i+1) = P (f i+1). Suppose




i, for any j ≤ k for some k ≥ i+1.
P (gk) = P (fk) by synonymity. Note that gk+1 = gk ×mk(xk, P (gk)|s) and fk+1 =
fk ×mk(xk, P (fk)|s). P (gk) = P (fk) implies the last components of gk+1 and fk+1





by the inductive hypothesis. Hence P (gk+1) = P (fk+1) by synonymity. The present
lemma follows by the principle of induction.
Lemma B.6.2. If (T ′, P ′,M ′) is obtained from (T, P,M) by trimming such that there
exist i < N , p ∈ Pi and mi,m′i ∈ M(p) satisfying T1 and T2, then for any j < N
and p′ ∈ P ′j:
1. There is ζ(p′) ∈ Pj such that p′ ⊂ ζ(p′).
2. If ζ(p′) 6= p then M ′(p′) = M(ζ(p′)).
3. If ζ(p′) = p then M ′(p′) = M(p)\{mi}.
Moreover, |P ′j| = |Pj| for any j ∈ N .
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Proof. Part 1 follows from T1 immediately.
To show Parts 2 and 3, choose any j < N and p′ ∈ P ′j . Note that M ′(p′) ⊂M(ζ(p′))
by T1. If ζ(p′) 6= p then for any h ∈ p′ and mˆj ∈ M(h) we have h× mˆj ∈ T ′ by T1,
implying Part 2. If ζ(p′) = p then j = i. Note that for any h ∈ p′ and mˆi ∈M(h) we
have h× mˆi ∈ T ′ if and only if mˆi 6= mi by T1, implying Part 3.
Pick any j ∈ N . If j ≤ i then Tj = T ′j and thus P ′j = Pj by T1. If j > i then
|P ′j| ≤ |Pj| by T1. If |P ′j| < |Pj| then there is some pˆ ∈ Pj such that h /∈ T ′ for any
h ∈ pˆ. Choose any h ∈ pˆ. It follows by T1 that h(i − 1) ∈ p and hi = mi. It then
follows by T2 that there exists some h′ ∈ pˆ such that h′(i − 1) ∈ p and h′i = m′i.
Hence h′ ∈ T ′ by T1, a contradiction. Therefore |P ′j| = |Pj| for any j ∈ N .
Proof of Lemma 3.5.5. Suppose (T ′, P ′,M ′) is obtained from (T, P,M) by trimming
such that there exist i < N , p ∈ Pi and mi,m′i ∈ M(p) satisfying T1 and T2.
Since (T ′, P ′,M ′) is a sub-institution of (T, P,M), Lemma 3.5.3 implies (T, P,M)
dominates (T ′, P ′,M ′).
Now show that (T ′, P ′,M ′) dominates (T, P,M). By assumption there are i < N ,
h ∈ Ti, p ∈ Pi and mi,m′i ∈M(p) such that mi and m′i are synonymous given p within
(T, P,M). Choose any s ∈ S(T, P,M). Construct sˆ ∈ S(T, P,M) that agrees with s
except in the following: mi(xi, p|sˆ) = m′i for any xi ∈ Xi such that mi(xi, p|s) = mi.
Choose any x = (x1, ..., xN) ∈ X. If ρi(x|s) /∈ p or mi(xi, p|s) 6= mi then clearly
ρj(x|sˆ) = ρj(x|s) for any j ∈ N . Suppose ρi(x|s) ∈ p and mi(xi, p|s) = mi. Ob-
viously ρj(x|sˆ) = ρj(x|s) for any j ≤ i. Denote h = ρi(x|s). For any j > i we
have
P (ρj(x|sˆ)) = P (ρj(x|sˆ, i, h,m′i))
= P (ρj(x|sˆ, i, h,mi))
= P (ρj(x|s, i, h,mi))
= P (ρj(x|s))
where the first line is due to h = ρi(x|sˆ) and mi(xi, p|sˆ) = m′i, the second line is due
to Lemma B.6.1 because mi and m
′
i are synonymous given h within (T, P,M), the
third line is due to the fact that sˆ and s agree for every player after i, and the fourth
line is due to ρi(x|s) = h and mi(xi, p|s) = mi. By induction P (ρj(x|sˆ)) = P (ρj(x|s))
for any j ∈ N . Therefore
αj(x|sˆ) = aj(xj, P (ρj(x|sˆ))|sˆ) = aj(xj, P (ρj(x|s))|sˆ) = aj(xj, P (ρj(x|s))|s)
for any j ∈ N . Hence α(·|sˆ) = α(·|s).
By Part 1 of Lemma B.6.2, for each j ∈ N and p′ ∈ P ′j there is ζ(p′) ∈ Pj such
that p′ ⊂ ζ(p′). Construct s′ ∈ S(T ′, P ′,M ′) such that for any j ∈ N , xj ∈ Xj and
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p′ ∈ P ′j ,
aj(xj, p
′|s′) = aj(xj, ζ(p′)|sˆ),
(if j < N) mj(xj, p
′|s′) = mj(xj, ζ(p′)|sˆ).
s′ is properly defined if and only if mj(xj, p′|s′) ∈M ′(p′) for any j < N , xj ∈ Xj and
p′ ∈ P ′j . To verify it, observe that if ζ(p′) 6= p then mj(xj, p′|s′) = mj(xj, ζ(p′)|sˆ) ∈
M(ζ(p′)) = M ′(p′) by Part 2 of Lemma B.6.2; whereas if ζ(p′) = p then we have j = i
and moreover mi(xi, p
′|s′) = mi(xi, p|sˆ) ∈ M(p)\{mi} = M ′(p′) by Part 3 of Lemma
B.6.2 because by construction mi(xi, p|sˆ) 6= mi.
Choose any x = (x1, ..., xN) ∈ X. Clearly ρ1(x|s′) = ρ1(x|sˆ). Suppose ρj(x|s′) =
ρj(x|sˆ) for any j ≤ k for some k ≥ 1. Thus
µk(x|s′) = mk(xk, P ′(ρk(x|s′))|s′) = mk(xk, ζ(P ′(ρk(x|s′)))|sˆ)
= mk(xk, P (ρk(x|s′))|sˆ) = mk(xk, P (ρk(x|sˆ))|sˆ) = µk(x|sˆ).
It follows that
ρk+1(x|s′) = ρk(x|s′)× µk(x|s′) = ρk(x|sˆ)× µk(x|sˆ) = ρk+1(x|sˆ).
Thus ρj(x|s′) = ρi(x|sˆ) for any j ∈ N , implying
αj(x|s′) = aj(xi, P ′(ρj(x|s′))|s′) = aj(xj, ζ(P ′(ρj(x|s′)))|sˆ)
= aj(xj, P (ρj(x|s′))|sˆ) = aj(xj, P (ρj(x|sˆ))|sˆ) = αj(x|sˆ).
It follows that α(·|s′) = α(·|sˆ), implying α(·|s′) = α(·|s). Thus C(T, P,M) ⊂
C(T ′, P ′,M ′) because s is arbitrarily chosen from S(T, P,M). The present lemma
then follows from Proposition 3.5.2. 
B.7 Proof of Lemma 3.5.6
Proof. Suppose (T ′, P ′,M ′) is obtained from (T, P,M) by relabeling with relabeling
function γ satisfying R1-R4. R3 implies that for any p ∈ P ′ there is τ(p) ∈ P such
that h ∈ τ(p) if and only if γ(h) ∈ p. Let γ−1 be the inverse mapping of γ. Clearly
γ−1 satisfies R1-R3.
Now show that γ−1 satisfies R4. Define κ′(mi, p) where p ∈ P ′i and mi ∈ M ′(p) such
that κ′(mi, p) ∈ M(τ(p)) and κ(κ′(mi, p), τ(p)) = mi. First verify that κ′ is defined
for every p ∈ P ′i and mi ∈M ′(p). Choose any p ∈ P ′i , mi ∈M ′(p) and h ∈ τ(p). That
γ−1 satisfies R1 and R3 implies γ−1(γ(h)×mi) = h× mˆi for some mˆi ∈M(τ(p)). By
definition of κ we have κ(mˆi, τ(p)) = mi, confirming that indeed κ
′(mi, p) exists.
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Choose any p ∈ P ′i , mi ∈ M ′(p) and h ∈ p. γ−1(h) ∈ τ(p) by R3. By construction





= γ(γ−1(h))× κ(κ′(mi, p), τ(p))
= h× κ(κ′(mi, p), τ(p)) = h×mi.
Applying γ−1 to both sides we have γ−1(h) × κ′(mi, p) = γ−1(h × mi). Thus γ−1
satisfies R4. It follows that (T, P,M) is obtained from (T ′, P ′,M ′) by relabeling with
relabeling function γ−1. 
B.8 Proof of Lemma 3.5.7
Proof. Suppose (T ′, P ′,M ′) is obtained from (T, P,M) by relabeling with relabeling
function γ satisfying R1-R4. R3 implies that for any p ∈ P ′ there is τ(p) ∈ P such
that h ∈ τ(p) if and only if γ(h) ∈ p.
Choose any s ∈ S(T, P,M). Construct s′ ∈ S(T ′, P ′,M ′) such that for any i ∈ N ,
xi ∈ Xi and p ∈ P ′i ,
ai(xi, p|s′) = ai(xi, τ(p)|s),
(if i < N) mi(xi, p|s′) = κ(mi(xi, τ(p)|s), τ(p)),
where κ is defined in R4. To verify that s′ is properly defined, choose any h ∈ τ(p)
where p ∈ P ′i for some i < N . Thus γ(h) ∈ p. R4 and R1 implies
γ(h×mi(xi, τ(p)|s)) = γ(h)× κ(mi(xi, τ(p)|s), τ(p)) = γ(h)×mi(xi, p|s′) ∈ T ′.
Since γ(h) ∈ p, it follows that mi(xi, p|s′) ∈ M ′(γ(h)), implying mi(xi, p|s′) ∈ M ′(p)
because γ(h) ∈ p.
Choose any x = (x1, ..., xN) ∈ X. Clearly ρ1(x|s′) = γ(ρ1(x|s)). Suppose ρi(x|s′) =
γ(ρi(x|s)) for any i ≤ k for some k ≥ 1. Denote h = ρk(x|s), h′ = ρk(x|s′), p = P (h)
and p′ = P ′(h′). By the inductive hypothesis h′ = γ(h) and thus p = τ(p′). We have
ρk+1(x|s′) = h′ ×mk(xk, p′|s′) = γ(h)× κ(mk(xk, τ(p′)|s), τ(p′))
= γ(h)× κ(mk(xk, p|s), p) = γ(h×mk(xk, p|s)) = γ(ρk+1(x|s)).
Thus ρi(x|s′) = γ(ρi(x|s)) for any i ∈ N , implying P (ρi(x|s)) = τ(P ′(ρi(x|s′))).
Therefore
αi(x|s′) = ai(xi, P ′(ρi(x|s′))|s′) = ai(xi, τ(P ′(ρi(x|s′)))|s)
= ai(xi, P (ρi(x|s))|s) = αi(x|s).
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Thus α(·|s′) = α(·|s), implying C(T, P,M) ⊂ C(T ′, P ′,M ′) since s is arbitrarily
chosen from S(T, P,M).
Lemma 3.5.6 implies (T, P,M) is obtained from (T ′, P ′,M ′) by relabeling. Thus by
an analogous argument as above we have C(T ′, P ′,M ′) ⊂ C(T, P,M). The present
lemma then follows by Proposition 3.5.2.

B.9 The Formal Definition of Merging
To introduce merging formally, it is useful to first define a special kind of expanding.
Fix institution (T, P,M). Consider the following construction: Pick any i < N ,
p ∈ Pi and mi ∈ M(p). Let Tmi denote the set of all h ∈ T such that h(i − 1) ∈ p
and hi = mi. Let T
m′i denote the set of all message profiles derived from changing
the ith component of some h ∈ Tmi from mi to m′i /∈ M(p). Thus for each h ∈ Tm′i
there is fh ∈ Tmi such that h and fh differ only at the ith component. Observe that
T and Tm
′
i are disjoint, for if h ∈ T ∩ Tm′i then h(i − 1) ∈ p and hi = m′i, implying
m′i ∈M(p), a contradiction. Let T ′ = T ∪ Tm′i . Let P ′ be a partition of T ′ such that
D1 P ′(h) = P ′(g) if and only if P (h) = P (g) for any h, g ∈ T .
D2 P ′(h) = P ′(fh) for any h ∈ Tm′i .
It is plain to see that T ′ equipped with partition P ′ is derived from T equipped with
P by putting each additional h ∈ Tm′i in the same partition cell as fh. Define M ′
such that
D3 M ′(h) = M(h) if h ∈ T\p.
D4 M ′(h) = M(h) ∪ {m′i} if h ∈ p.
D5 M ′(h) = M(fh) if h ∈ Tm′i .
Observe that (T ′, P ′,M ′) is an improper institution. To verify it, the only non-obvious
part is to show that M ′(h) = M ′(g) for any h, g ∈ T ′ such that P ′(h) = P ′(g). If
h, g ∈ T then P ′(h) = P ′(g) implies P (h) = P (g) and consequently M ′(h) = M(h) =
M(g) = M ′(g) if h, g /∈ p, or M ′(h) = M(h)∪{m′i} = M(g)∪{m′i} = M ′(g) if h, g ∈ p.
If h ∈ T and g ∈ Tm′i then P ′(h) = P ′(g) implies by D2 that P ′(h) = P ′(f g), and it
follows from f g ∈ T and D5 that M ′(h) = M ′(f g) = M ′(g). If h ∈ Tm′i and g ∈ Tm′i
then P ′(h) = P ′(g) implies P ′(fh) = P ′(f g) and it follows by D5 that M ′(h) =
M ′(fh) = M ′(f g) = M ′(g). Thus (T ′, P ′,M ′) is indeed an improper institution. We
say that (T ′, P ′,M ′) is obtained from (T, P,M) by (i, p,mi,m′i)−duplication.
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The following lemma suggests that (i, p,mi,m
′
i)−duplication does no more than
expanding (T, P,M) by duplicating message mi for p and giving the cloned message
the label m′i.
Lemma B.9.1. If (T ′, P ′,M ′) is obtained from (T, P,M) by (i, p,mi,m′i)−duplication
then:
1. T ′j = Tj and P
′
j = Pj for any j ≤ i.
2. mi and m
′
i are synonymous given p within (T
′, P ′,M ′).
3. (T, P,M) can be obtained from (T ′, P ′,M ′) by trimming.
4. (T, P,M) and (T ′, P ′,M ′) dominate each other.
Proof. Inherit the notation Tm
′
i and fh from the introduction of duplication.
Tj = T
′
j for any j ≤ i because Tm′i only contains message profiles of length at least i.
Thus D1 implies P ′j = Pj, establishing Part 1.
Now show Part 2. Choose any h ∈ p. D4 implies mi,m′i ∈ M ′(h). Part 1 implies
P ′(h) = p. Thus mi,m′i ∈ M ′(p). Let g, g′ ∈ T ′ be h−cousins such that gi = mi and
g′i = m
′
i. Clearly g = f
g′ . It follows from D2 that P ′(g) = P ′(g′), implying mi and
m′i are synonymous given h within (T
′, P ′,M ′). Part 2 follows immediately because
h is arbitrarily chosen from p.
Now show Part 3. Clearly (T, P,M) is a sub-institution of (T ′, P ′,M ′). If h ∈ T ′\T
then h ∈ Tm′i and it follows by the construction of Tm′i that h(i−1) ∈ p and hi = m′i,
establishing T1. T2 follows from Part 2.
Part 4 follows from Part 3 by Lemma 3.5.5. 
Now we introduce merging. The definition is given in terms of the construction. Each
step is explained by the accompanying remark.
Definition. (T ′, P ′,M ′) is obtained from (T, P,M) by merging if there is i < N
where |Ai| = 1 , p ∈ Pi and q ∈ Pi (without loss of generality assume |M(p)| < |M(q)|)
such that (T ′, P,M ′) is the product of the following algorithm:
Step 1 Fix mi ∈ M(p). Set (T 0, P 0,M0) = (T, P,M). Produce (T k, P k,Mk) from
(T k−1, P k−1,Mk−1) by (i, p,mi,mki )−duplication 1 where mki is an arbitrary
message not in Mk−1(p). Stop if |Mk(p)| = |Mk(q)| = |M(q)|. 2 Denote the
terminal product of this step as (T˜ , P˜ , M˜).
1Part 1 of Lemma B.9.1 implies p ∈ P k−1.
2Part 1 of Lemma B.9.1 implies q ∈ P k−1. D3 implies Mk(q) = M(q).
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Remark: This step equalizes the number of messages available to player i given
p and that given q.
Step 2 Choose any bijections λ : M˜(p)→ M˜(q). Construct mapping γ on Tˆ such that
(a) If g is not a descendant of some h ∈ p then γ(h) = h.
(b) If g is a descendant of some h ∈ p then γ(g) = eg where eg is derived from
g by replacing the ith component of g from gi to λ(gi).
Denote the end product of this step as (Tˆ , Pˆ , Mˆ).
Remark: It is easy to verify that γ is a relabeling function satisfying R1-R4.
This step relabels the messages available to player i given p, so that now Mˆ(p) =
Mˆ(q).
Step 3 Arbitrarily index messages in Mˆ(p) as m1, ...,mK where K = |Mˆ(p)|. For
each j 6= k, abritrarily choose a unique message nj,k where nj,k /∈ Mˆ(p). Let
nj,j = mj.
Set (Tˆ 1,1, Pˆ 1,1, Mˆ1,1) = (Tˆ , Pˆ , Mˆ). Iterate through k = 1 : K as follows: For
each j and k 6= j − 1 produce (T j,k+1, P j,k+1,M j,k+1) from (T j,k, P j,k,M j,k) by
the following two substeps:




p ) from (T
j,k, P j,k,M j,k) by (i, p,mj, nj,k)-
duplication.




p ) by (i, q,m
k, nj,k+1)-
duplication.
In the case that k = j − 1, set (T j,j, P j,j,M j,j) = (T j,j−1, P j,j−1,M j,j−1).
When (T j,K , P j,K ,M j,K) is reached, produce (T j+1,1, P j+1,1,M j+1,1) from (T j,K , P j,K ,M j,K)
by the following two substeps:




p ) from (T
j,K , P j,K ,M j,K) by (i, p,mj+1, nj+1,1)-
duplication.




p ) by (i, q,m
1, nj+1,1)-
duplication.
Stop when (TK,K , PK,K ,MK,K) is reached. Denote (TK,K , PK,K ,MK,K) as
(T ∗, P ∗,M∗).
Remark: It is straightforward to verify that M∗(p) = M∗(q) = {nj,k : (j, k) ∈
{1, ..., K}2}. This step expands (Tˆ , Pˆ , Mˆ) in a particular way, so that for each
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pair j, k where j 6= k, the message nj,k is introduced to p and q, where it is
synonymous to mj given p, and to mk given q.
Step 4 Produce (T ′, P ′,M ′) from (T ∗, P ∗,M∗) such that T ′ = T ∗ and P ∗ satisfies
(a) P ′(h) = P ′(g) if and only if P ∗(h) = P ∗(g) for any h, g /∈ p ∪ q.
(b) P ′(h) = P ′(g) for any h, g ∈ p ∪ q.
Remark: This step combines separate perceptions p and q into one single per-
ception p ∪ q.
B.10 Proof of Lemma 3.5.8
Proof. Inherit the notation introduced the formal definition of merging in Section B.9.
(T ∗, P ∗,M∗) is obtained from (T, P,M) by a sequence of duplication and relabeling
operations. Thus (T ∗, P ∗,M∗) and (T, P,M) dominate each other by Lemmas 3.5.7
and B.9.1. Clearly (T ∗, P ∗,M∗) can be obtained from (T ′, P ′,M ′) by refining. Thus
(T ∗,M∗, P ∗) dominates (T ′, P ′,M ′) by Lemma 3.5.4 and hence (T, P,M) dominates
(T ′, P ′,M ′).
To establish that (T ′, P ′,M ′) dominates (T, P,M) it suffices to show that (T ′, P ′,M ′)
dominates (T ∗,M∗, P ∗). It is straightforward to verify that M∗(p) = M∗(q) = {nj,k :
(j, k) ∈ {1, ..., K}2}. Recall that nj,j = mj. Choose any nj,k where j 6= k. Since




p ) is obtained from (T
j,k−1, P j,k−1,M j,k−1) (or (T j−1,K , P j−1,K ,M j−1,K)
in the case k = 1) by (i, p,mj, nj,k)-duplication, it follows by Lemma B.9.1 thatmj and




p ). Choose any h ∈ p and h−cousins
g, g′ ∈ T ∗ such that gi = mj and g′i = nj,k. Clearly g, g′ ∈ (T j,k, P j,k,M j,k). It follows




p ) is a sub-institution of
(T ∗,M∗, P ∗), we have P ∗(g) = P ∗(g′). Moreover since for any l > i we have P ′l = P
∗
l ,
it follows that P ′(g) = P ′(g′). Therefore mj and nj,k are synonymous given any h ∈ p
within (T ∗, P ∗,M∗) and within (T ′, P ′,M ′). Similarly mk and nj,k are synonymous
given any h ∈ q within (T ∗, P ∗,M∗) and within (T ′, P ′,M ′).
Choose any s ∈ S(T ∗, P ∗,M∗). Construct sˆ such that sˆ agrees with s except in the
following:
mi(xi, p|sˆ) = mj for any xi such that mi(xi, p|s) = nj,k,
mi(xi, q|sˆ) = mk for any xi such that mi(xi, q|s) = nj,k.
Clearly ρl(x|sˆ) = ρl(x|s) for any l ∈ N if ρi(x|s) /∈ p ∪ q. Fix x = (x1, ..., xN) ∈ X
such that ρi(x|s) ∈ p. P ∗(ρl(x|sˆ)) = P ∗(ρl(x|s)) for any l ≤ i because ρl(x|sˆ) =
ρl(x|s)). Denote h = ρi(x|sˆ). Note that mi(xi, p|sˆ) = mj and mi(xi, p|s) = nj,k for
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some (j, k) ∈ {1, ..., K}2. For any l > i observe that
P ∗(ρl(x|sˆ)) = P ∗(ρl(x|sˆ, i, h,mj))
= P ∗(ρl(x|sˆ, i, h, nj,k))
= P ∗(ρl(x|s, i, h, nj,k))
= P ∗(ρl(x|s)).
The first line is due to h = ρi(x|sˆ) and mi(xi, p|sˆ) = mj. The second line is due
to Lemma B.6.1 because mj and nj,k are synonymous given h within (T ∗, P ∗,M∗) if
j 6= k, or mj = nj,k if j = k. The third line is due to the fact that sˆ and s agree for
every player after i, and the fourth line is due to ρi(x|s) = h and mi(xi, p|s) = nj,k.
Similarly P ∗(ρl(x|sˆ)) = P ∗(ρl(x|s)) for any x such that ρi(x|s) ∈ q. By induction
P ∗(ρl(x|sˆ)) = P ∗(ρl(x|s)) for any l ∈ N and x ∈ X.
Note that P ′ = (P ∗\{p, q}) ∪ {p ∪ q}. Choose s′ ∈ S(T ′, P ′,M ′) such that
• For any l 6= i, xl ∈ Xl and r ∈ P ′l :
al(xl, r|s′) = al(xl, r|sˆ).
• For any l < N , xl ∈ Xl and r ∈ P ′l where r 6= p ∪ q:
ml(xl, r|s′) = ml(xl, r|sˆ).
• For any xi ∈ Xi such that mi(xi, p|sˆ) = mj and mi(xi, p|sˆ) = mk:
mi(xi, p ∪ q|s′) = nj,k.
We have ρl(x|s′) = ρl(x|sˆ) for any x such that ρi(x|s′) /∈ p ∪ q. Fix x = (x1, ..., xN)
such that ρi(x|s′) ∈ p. Obviously ρi(x|s′) = ρi(x|sˆ). Denote h = ρi(x|s′). By
construction of sˆ we have mi(xi, p|sˆ) = mj and mi(xi, q|sˆ) = mk for some (j, k) ∈
{1, ..., K}2. Thus for any l > i,
P ′(ρl(x|s′)) = P ′(ρl(x|s′, i, h, nj,k))
= P ′(ρl(x|s′, i, h,mj))
= P ∗(ρl(x|sˆ, i, h,mj))
= P ∗(ρl(x|sˆ)).
Similarly for any x such that ρi(x|s′) ∈ q we have P ′(ρl(x|s′)) = P ∗(ρl(x|sˆ)) for any
l > i. Thus P ′(ρl(x|s′)) = P ∗(ρl(x|sˆ)) for any l 6= i and x ∈ X by induction. For any
l ∈ N where |Al| > 1 (and hence l 6= i because |Ai| = 1) and x = (x1, ..., xN) ∈ X
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we have
αl(x|s′) = al(xl, P ′(ρl(x|s′))|s′) = al(xl, P ∗(ρl(x|sˆ))|s′) = al(xl, P ∗(ρl(x|s))|s′)
= al(xl, P
∗(ρl(x|s))|sˆ) = αl(xl, P ∗(ρl(x|s))|s) = αl(x|s).
It follows that α(·|s′) = α(·|s), implying C(T ∗, P ∗,M∗) ⊂ C(T ′, P ′,M ′) because s is
arbitrarily chosen from S(T ∗, P ∗,M∗). Thus (T ′, P ′,M ′) dominates (T ∗, P ∗,M∗) by
Proposition 3.5.2, establishing the present lemma. 
B.11 Proof of Theorem 3.5.9
Proof. Part 1 is an immediate consequence of Lemmas 3.5.3, 3.5.4, 3.5.5, 3.5.7 and
3.5.8.
Now we prove Part 2, the “only if” direction. Suppose (T ′, P ′,M ′) dominates (T, P,M).
The proofs is broken into several steps.
(Step 1. “Merging”.) It is plain to see that an institution (Tˆ , Pˆ , Mˆ), where
|Pˆi| = 1 for every player i whose action set is a singleton, can be obtained from
(T, P,M) by a sequence of merging operations. It follows from Lemma 3.5.8 that
(T, P,M) dominates (Tˆ , Pˆ , Mˆ). Thus (T ′, P ′,M ′) dominates (Tˆ , Pˆ , Mˆ).
(Step 2. “Refining”.) For any i < N define ti = max{maxp∈Pˆi Mˆ(p), log |Pˆi|log |Ai|}. Sup-
pose |Xi| ≥ ti. Since |Xi| ≥ maxp∈Pˆi Mˆ(p), there is a mapping yi : Pˆi×∪p∈PˆiMˆ(p)→
Xi such that yi(p,mi) 6= yi(p,m′i) for any mi,m′i ∈ Mˆ(p) where mi 6= m′i. If |Ai| > 1
then for each p ∈ Pˆi there is a mapping sp : Xi → Ai such that sp 6= sp′ if p 6= p′.
To see that, first observe that the total number of mappings from Xi to Ai is |Ai||Xi|.
By assumption |Xi| ≥ log |Pˆi|log |Ai| or equivalently |Ai||Xi| ≥ |Pˆi|. Thus each p ∈ Pˆi can be
assigned with a unique sp.
Note that for each p, p′ ∈ Pˆi where p 6= p′ there is zi(p, p′) ∈ Xi such that sp(zi(p, p′)) 6=
sp′(zi(p, p
′)). Choose any s ∈ S(Tˆ , Pˆ , Mˆ) such that
• For any i ∈ N where |Ai| > 1, xi ∈ Xi and p ∈ Pˆi:
ai(xi, p|s) = sp(xi).
• For any i < N , p ∈ Pˆi and mi ∈ Mˆ(p):
mi(yi(p,mi), p|s) = mi.
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By Proposition 3.5.2 there is s′ ∈ S(T ′, P ′,M ′) such that α(·|s′) = α(·|s). For each
h ∈ Tˆ construct xh = (xh1 , ..., xhN) ∈ X such that xhi = yi(Pˆ (h(i − 1)), hi) for any
i ≤ |h|. It is straightforward to verify that h = ρ|h|+1(xh|s). Define the following
objects:
• γ(h) = ρ|h|+1(xh|s′) for any h ∈ Tˆ .
• τ(p) = {h ∈ Pˆi : γ(h) ∈ p} for any p ∈ P ′i .
• P˜i = {τ(p) : p ∈ P ′i and τ(p) 6= ø} for any i ∈ N .
P˜i is a partition of Tˆi because: (1) for any h ∈ Tˆi, γ(h) ∈ p for some p ∈ P ′i , and (2)
if h ∈ τ(p) and h ∈ τ(p′) then p = P ′(γ(h)) = p′.
Note that for any i where |Ai| = 1, we have |Pˆi| = 1 by construction and hence P˜i
is a refinement of Pˆi. Fix any i where |Ai| > 1. Suppose there exist h, g ∈ Tˆi such
that Pˆ (h) 6= Pˆ (g) yet P˜ (h) = P˜ (g). Denote h′ = γ(h) and g′ = γ(g). P˜ (h) = P˜ (g)
implies P ′(h′) = P ′(g′). Choose x = (x1, ..., xN) ∈ X such that xj = xhj for any j < i
and xi = zi(Pˆ (h), Pˆ (g)). Choose xˆ = (xˆ1, ..., xˆN) ∈ X such that xˆj = xgj for any j < i
and xˆi = zi(Pˆ (h), Pˆ (g)). Obviously ρi(x|s) = ρi(xh|s) = h. Similarly ρi(xˆ|s) = g.
Therefore we have
αi(x|s) = ai(zi(Pˆ (h), Pˆ (g)), Pˆ (h)|s) = sPˆ (h)(zi(Pˆ (h), Pˆ (g)))
6= sPˆ (g)(zi(Pˆ (h), Pˆ (g))) = ai(zi(Pˆ (h), Pˆ (g)), Pˆ (g)|s) = αi(xˆ|s).
It follows from h′ = ρi(xh|s′) that h′ = ρi(x|s′) because xh and x agree for the first
i− 1 components. Similarly g′ = ρi(xˆ|s′). Thus
αi(x|s′) = ai(zi(Pˆ (h), Pˆ (g)), P ′(h′)|s′) = ai(zi(Pˆ (h), Pˆ (g)), P ′(g′)|s′) = αi(xˆ|s′)
because P ′(h′) = P ′(g′). It follows that
αi(x|s′) = αi(x|s) 6= αi(xˆ|s) = αi(xˆ|s′) = αi(x|s′),
a contradiction. Thus Pˆ (h) 6= Pˆ (g) implies P˜ (h) 6= P˜ (g), in turn implying P˜i is a
refinement of Pˆi. Let P˜ = ∪i∈N P˜i. It then follows that (Tˆ , P˜ , Mˆ) is obtained from
(Tˆ , Pˆ , Mˆ) by refining.
(Step 3. “Trimming”.) Apply a sequence of trimming operations to (Tˆ , P˜ , Mˆ)
to obtain (T ∗, P ∗,M∗) such that for any i < N and p ∈ P ∗i there do not exist
mi,m
′
i ∈M∗(p) that are synonymous given p within (T ∗, P ∗,M∗).
(Step 4. “Relabeling”.) Clearly (T ∗, P ∗,M∗) is a sub-institution of (Tˆ , P˜ , Mˆ).
Therefore P ∗(h) = P ∗(g) if and only if P˜ (h) = P˜ (g) for any h, g ∈ T ∗. Let T ′′ denote
the range of γ with domain restricted to T ∗. Let P ′′ denote P ′ restricted to T ′′, that
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is, P ′′(h) = P ′′(g) if and only if P ′(h) = P ′(g) for any h, g ∈ T ′′. For any i < N and
h ∈ T ′′i define M ′′(h) = {mi : h × mi ∈ T ′′}. We want to show that (T ′′, P ′′,M ′′)
is obtained from (T ∗, P ∗,M∗) by relabeling with relabeling function γ. This will be
achieved below by establishing that γ with domain restricted to T ∗ satisfies R1-R4.3
Observe that for any h, g ∈ T ∗, if h is the parent of g then the first |h| components
of xh and xg are the same. It follows that ρ|h|+1(xg|s′) = ρ|h|+1(xh|s′), implying γ(h)
is the parent of γ(g). Thus γ satisfies R2.
Observe that for any h, g ∈ T ∗, P ∗(h) = P ∗(g) if and only if P˜ (h) = P˜ (g) if and only
if P ′(h) = P ′(g) if and only if P ′′(h) = P ′′(g). Thus γ satisfies R3.
To establish that γ is a bijection between T ∗ and T ′′ it is sufficient to verify that γ
restricted to T ∗ is one-to-one. Suppose γ is not one-to-one, then there are g, g′ ∈ T ∗
such that γ(g) = γ(g′). Let i denote the largest index such that g(i− 1) = g′(i− 1).
Denote f = g(i− 1), h = g(i), h′ = g′(i), mi = gi and m′i = g′i. Thus h = f ×mi and
h′ = f ×m′i. Since f is the parent of h and h′ it follows that γ(f) is the parent of
γ(h) and γ(h′). That γ(g) = γ(g′) then implies γ(h) = γ(h′). Denote p = Pˆ (f) and
p′ = P ′(γ(f)). By construction of γ, γ(h) = γ(h′) implies ρi(xh|s′) = ρi(xh′|s′) and
µi(x




′|s′) = µi(xh|s′) = µi(xh′|s′) = mi(xh′i , p′|s′).
Thus mi(yi(p,mi), p





i). Choose any l ∈ P ∗(f) and l−cousins u, u′ ∈ T ∗ where











∗(f) = P ∗(l) implies P ′(γ(f)) = P ′(γ(l)) = p′. Since γ
satisfies R2, l being the ancestor of u and u′ implies γ(l) is the ancestor of γ(u) and
γ(u′), then implying γ(l) = ρi(xu|s′) = ρi(xu′ |s′). Moreover we have
ρi+1(x
u|s′) = ρi(xu|s′)×mi(xui , P ′(ρi(xu|s′))|s′)
= γ(l)×mi(yi(p,mi), p′|s′) = γ(l)×mi(yi(p,m′i), p′|s′)
= ρi(x
u′|s′)×mi(xu′i , P ′(ρi(xu
′ |s′))|s′) = ρi+1(xu′ |s′)
where mi(yi(p,mi), p
′|s′) = mi(yi(p,m′i), p′|s′) has been established above. Suppose
ρj(x
u|s′) = ρj(xu′|s′) for any j ≤ k for some k ≥ i + 1. The inductive hypothesis
implies P ′(ρk(xu|s′)) = P ′(ρk(xu′|s′)). Since xu(k−1) agrees with xu for the first k −
1 components, it follows that γ(u(k − 1)) = ρk(xu(k−1)|s′) = ρk(xu|s′). Similary
γ(u′(k − 1)) = ρk(xu′ |s′). Thus P ′(ρk(xu|s′)) = P ′(ρk(xu′ |s′)) implies P ′(γ(u(k −
1))) = P ′(γ(u′(k − 1))). It follows that P˜ (u(k − 1)) = P˜ (u′(k − 1)) by construction
of P˜ , which in turn implies Pˆ (u(k − 1)) = Pˆ (u′(k − 1)) because P˜k is a refinement
of Pˆk. Since u and u
′ are cousins, we have uk = u′k. Thus yk(Pˆ (u(k − 1)), uk) =
3(T ′′,M ′′, P ′′) will be shown to be an improper institution shortly.
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where the first line is due to xuk = yk(Pˆ (u(k − 1)), uk). Therefore ρ|u|+1(xu|s′) =
ρ|u|+1(xu
′|s′) by induction, or equivalently γ(u) = γ(u′). It follows from P ′(γ(u)) =
P ′(γ(u′)) that P˜ (u) = P˜ (u′), in turn implying P ∗(u) = P ∗(u′). Hence mi and
m′i are synonymous given l within (T
∗, P ∗,M∗). Since l is arbitrarily chosen from
P ∗(f), it follows that mi and m′i are synonymous given P
∗(f) within (T ∗, P ∗,M∗), a
contradiction, because by construction (T ∗, P ∗,M∗) admits no synonymous messages
given any perception in P ∗. Therefore γ restricted to T ∗ is one-to-one, establishing
R1.
Now show that γ satisfies R4. Choose any i < N , p ∈ P ∗i and mi ∈ M∗(p). There
exists pˆ ∈ Pˆ such that p ⊂ pˆ. There also exists p′ ∈ P ′ such that γ(h) ∈ p′ for any
h ∈ p. For any h ∈ p we have








where the second line is due to xh×mii = yi(pˆ,mi) since Pˆ (h) = pˆ. Note that
mi(yi(pˆ,mi), p
′|s′) does not depend on the choice of h, thus implying R4.
Now we show that (T ′′, P ′′,M ′′) is indeed an improper institution. The only non-
obvious part is that M ′′(h) = M ′′(g) if P ′′(h) = P ′′(g). Suppose P ′′(h) = P ′′(g) yet
M ′′(h) 6= M ′′(g) for some h, g ∈ T ′′. Without loss of generality suppose for some
i < N there is mi ∈ M ′′(h) such that mi /∈ M ′′(g). R2 implies γ−1(h × mi) =
γ−1(h)× mˆi for some mˆi ∈M∗(γ−1(h)). R3 implies P ∗(γ−1(h)) = P ∗(γ−1(g)). Thus
mˆi ∈ M∗(γ−1(g)). R4 then implies γ(γ−1(g)× mˆi) = γ(γ−1(g))×mi = g ×mi since
P ∗(γ−1(h)) = P ∗(γ−1(g)), contradicting the supposition that mi /∈M ′′(g). Therefore
(T ′′, P ′′,M ′′) is indeed an improper institution and is obtained from (T ∗, P ∗,M∗) by
relabeling with relabeling function γ.
(Step 5. Expanding) Since (T ′′, P ′′,M ′′) is a sub-institution of (T ′, P ′,M ′), (T ′, P ′,M ′)
is obtained from (T ′′, P ′′,M ′′) by expanding. 
B.12 Proof of Proposition 3.6.3
The proof is assisted with the following lemma.
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Lemma B.12.1. For institutions (T, P,M) and (T, P ′,M) respectively representing
voting systems (r, d, t) and (r′, d, t′), if P ′i is a refinement of Pi for every i ≤ |J | and
P ′|J |+1 = P|J |+1 then (r
′, d, t′) dominates (r, d, t) for any rule d.
Proof: Suppose P ′i is a refinement of Pi for every i ≤ |J |, and P ′|J |+1 = P|J |+1.
For every i ≤ |J | and p ∈ P ′i there is τ(p) ∈ Pi such that p ⊂ τ(p). Choose any
s ∈ S(T, P,M |d). Construct s′ ∈ S(T, P ′,M |d) such that mi(xi, p|s′) = mi(xi, τ(p)|s)
for every i ≤ |J |, xi ∈ Xi and p ∈ P ′i . Clearly ρ1(x|s′) = ρ1(x|s) for any x =
(x1, ..., x|J |, x) ∈ X. Suppose ρi(x|s′) = ρi(x|s) for every i ≤ k for some k ≥ 1. Thus
τ(P ′(ρk(x|s′))) = P (ρk(x|s′)) = P (ρk(x|s)). Therefore
ρk+1(x|s′) = ρk(x|s′)×mk(xk, P ′(ρk(x|s′))|s′)
= ρk(x|s)×mk(xk, P (ρk(x|s))|s) = ρk+1(x|s).
Hence α|J |+1(x|s′) = d(ρ|J |+1(x|s′)) = d(ρ|J |+1(x|s)) = α|J |+1(x|s). It follows that
α(·|s′) = α(·|s), implying C(T, P,M |d) ⊂ C(T, P ′,M |d). The lemma follows from
Lemma 3.6.2. 
Proof of Proposition 3.6.3. (Proof of Part 1.) Let (T, P,M) be the institution rep-
resenting (r, d, t). Let t′ be the full disclosure policy. Let (T, P ′,M) be the insti-
tution representing (r, d, t′). Therefore P ′i is a refinement of Pi for every i ≤ |J |,
and P ′|J |+1 = P|J |+1. Thus (r, d, t
′) dominates (r, d, t) by Lemma B.12.1. Part 1 is
established.
(Proof of Part 2.) Suppose t is the full disclosure policy, let r′ be the sequential
procedure such that r′(i) > r′(j) is r(i) > r(j). Using the same argument as in the
previous paragraph we conclude that (r′, d, t) dominates (r, d, t), establishing Part 2.
(Proof of Part 3.) Suppose t is the full disclosure policy. Let i denote the player
with the largest index among those who vote before the last stage (according to
r). It follows that each p ∈ P|J | can be uniquely identified as p(z1,...,zi) such that
P (h) = P (h′) = p if and only if h(i) = h′(i) = (z1, ..., zi).
Let Zˆ denote the set of vote profiles (z1, ..., zi) from voters voting before the last
stage such that d(z1, ..., zi, zi+1, ..., z|J |) = d(z1, ..., zi, z′i+1, ..., z
′
|J |) for any vote profiles
(zi+1, ..., z|J |) and (z′i+1, ..., z
′
|J |) from voters voting in the last stage. The collective
choice is not determined before voting in the last stage takes place if and only if Zˆ is
empty. It follows that for any (z1, ..., zi) ∈ Zˆ, every pair of votes (messages) z, z′ ∈ Z
are synonymous given p(z1,...,zi) within (T, P,M).
Choose any s ∈ S(T, P,M |d). Construct sˆ ∈ S(T, P,M |d) such that
1. For any i < |J |, xi ∈ Xi and p ∈ Pi: mi(xi, p|sˆ) = mi(xi, p|s) .
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2. For any x|J | ∈ X|J | and (z1, ..., zi) /∈ Zˆ:
m|J |(x|J |, p(z1,...,zi)|sˆ) = m|J |(x|J |, p(z1,...,zi)|s).
3. For any x|J | ∈ X|J | and (z1, ..., zi) ∈ Zˆ:
m|J |(x|J |, p(z1,...,zi)|sˆ) = z
for some fixed z ∈ Z.
Fix any x = (x1, ..., x|J |, x) ∈ X. Clearly ρ|J |(x|sˆ) = ρ|J |(x|s). Denote h = ρ|J |(x|sˆ).
If P (h) = p(z1,...,zi) where (z1, ..., zi) /∈ Zˆ then µ|J |(x|sˆ) = µ|J |(x|s) and it follows that
ρ|J |+1(x|sˆ) = ρ|J |+1(x|s). If P (h) = p(z1,...,zi) where (z1, ..., zi) ∈ Zˆ then µ|J |(x|sˆ) is
synonymous to µ|J |(x|s) given h within (T, P,M) and hence
P (ρ|J |+1(x|sˆ)) = P (h× µ|J |(x|sˆ)) = P (h× µ|J |(x|s)) = P (ρ|J |+1(x|s)).
We have established that P (ρ|J |+1(x|sˆ)) = P (ρ|J |+1(x|s)) for any x ∈ X, implying
α|J |+1(x|sˆ) = α|J |+1(x|s) because s, s′ ∈ S(T, P,M |d).
For any (z1, ..., zi) ∈ Zˆ choose y(z1,...,zi) ∈ Y where y(z1,...,zi) is different from the
candidate that is elected given any vote profile that contains (z1, ..., zi). Construct d
′
such that
d′(z1, ..., z|J |) =
{
y(z1,...,zi) if (z1, ..., zi) ∈ Zˆ and z|J | 6= z
d(z1, ..., z|J |) otherwise.
It is straightforward to verify that under d′ the collective choice is not determined
before voting in the last stage takes place. Let (T, P ′,M) be the institution repre-
senting (r, d′, t). Clearly P ′i = Pi for every i ≤ |J |. Choose any s′ ∈ S(T, P ′,M |d′)
such that mi(xi, p|s′) = mi(xi, p|sˆ) for any i ≤ |J |, xi ∈ Xi and p ∈ P ′i .
Arbitrarily choose x ∈ X. Denote g = ρ|J |(x|s′). Clearly ρ|J |+1(x|s′) = ρ|J |+1(x|sˆ) for
any x. If g(i) /∈ Zˆ then α|J |+1(x|s′) = d′(ρ|J |+1(x|s′)) = d(ρ|J |+1(x|sˆ)) = α|J |+1(x|sˆ) =
α|J |+1(x|s). If g(i) ∈ Zˆ then µ(x|s′) = z, and following a similar sequence of equalities
we have α|J |+1(x|s′) = α|J |+1(x|s). Thus α(·|s′) = α(·|s), implying C(T, P,M |d) ⊂
C(T, P ′,M |d′). It follows from Lemma 3.6.2 that (r, d′, t) dominates (r, d, t). 
B.13 Proof of Proposition 3.6.4
Proof. Fix institution (T, P,M) where there is some i such that |Pi| < |Ti|. Let P ′ be
a partition of T such that P ′j = Pj for every j 6= i and P ′i is a strict refinement of Pi.
That |Pi| < |Ti| implies such P ′i exists. Both complexity conditions in the proposition
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are satisfied by the institution (T, P ′,M). (T, P ′,M) dominates (T, P,M) by Lemma
3.5.4 because the former is obtained from the latter by refining. If (T, P,M) dominates
(T, P ′,M) then by Theorem 3.5.9 (T, P,M) can be obtained from (T, P ′,M) by a
sequence of operations of expanding, refining, trimming or relabeling. Note that
merging does not apply because none of the player has a singleton action set. Since
none of the operations decrease the number of perceptions of i, 4 it follows that
|Pi| ≥ |P ′i |, a contradiction. Thus (T, P,M) does not dominate (T, P ′,M). 
B.14 Proof of Proposition 3.6.5
Proof. Fix institution (T, P,M) where |Pi+1| ≥ 2 for some i ≥ 2. Let (T ′, P ′,M ′) be
obtained from (T, P,M) by expanding, such that
1. M ′j = Mj for any j < N and j /∈ {i− 1, i}.
2. Mi−1 ⊂M ′i−1.
3. M ′i = Mi ∪ {mi} for some mi /∈Mi.
4. |P ′j| = |Pj| for any j ∈ N .
5. There is some p′ ∈ P ′i such that h ∈ p′ for any h ∈ T ′i\Ti.
6. For any mi,m
′
i ∈M ′i there is some h ∈ p′ such that mi and m′i are not synony-
mous given h within (T ′, P ′,M ′).
An institution satisfying Properties 1 − 5 can be easily constructed by making new
messages available to players i − 1 and i, and put message profiles containing the
newly introduced messages to existing perceptions as prescribed by Property 5. If
the institution (T ′, P ′,M ′) expanded from (T, P,M) satisfying Properties 1-5 does
not satisfy Property 6, that is, there are mi,m
′
i ∈M ′i that are synonymous given any
h ∈ p′ within (T ′, P ′,M ′), then we can expand (T ′, P ′,M ′) by making an additional
message mi−1 available to player i− 1, and moreover:
• Put g ×mi−1 in p′ for every g ∈ T ′i−1.
• Put (g×mi−1)×mi and (g×mi−1)×m′i in different perceptions of player i+ 1
for every g ∈ T ′i−1.
• Put any message profiles of length j − 1 containing mi−1 arbitrarily to existing
perceptions of player j for any j > i+ 1.
4By Lemma B.6.2, trimming does not decrease the number of perceptions of any player.
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Let (T ′′, P ′′,M ′′) be the consequent institution. (T ′′, P ′′,M ′′) satisfies Properties 1-5.
Let p′′ ∈ P ′′i be the consequent perception enlarged from p′. It follows that mi and
m′i are not synonymous given g × mi−1 for any g ∈ T ′′i−1 and hence they are not
synonymous given p′′ within (T ′′, P ′′,M ′′). We can keep applying this particular type
of expanding until Property 6 is satisfied, without violating Properties 1-5.
Let (T ′, P ′,M ′) be expanded from (T, P,M) that satisfies Properties 1-6. (T ′, P ′,M ′)
dominates (T, P,M) by Lemma 3.5.3. If (T, P,M) dominates (T ′, P ′,M ′) then the
proof of Theorem 3.5.9 implies there are institutions (T 1, P 1,M1), (T 2, P 2,M2),
(T 3, P 3,M3) and (T 4, P 4,M4) such that
1. (T 1, P 1,M1) is obtained from (T ′, P ′,M ′) by merging.
2. (T 2, P 2,M2) is obtained from (T 1, P 1,M1) by refining.
3. (T 3, P 3,M3) is obtained from (T 2, P 2,M2) by a sequence of trimming opera-
tions.
4. (T 4, P 4,M4) is obtained from (T 3, P 3,M3) by relabeling.
5. (T, P,M) is obtained from (T 4, P 4,M4) by expanding.
(T 1, P 1,M1) = (T ′, P ′,M ′) because everyone’s action set is non-singleton. That
|P ′j| = |Pj| for every j implies (T 2, P 2,M2) = (T 1, P 1,M1) because strict refining
increases the number of perceptions for some player, which will not be decreased by
trimming, relabeling or expanding. Thus (T 2, P 2,M2) = (T ′, P ′,M ′). p′ ∩ T 3i ∈ P 3i
because trimming does not decrease the number of perceptions by Lemma B.6.2. Since
there do not exist mi,m
′
i ∈ M ′i which are synonymous given p′ within (T ′, P ′,M ′),
M3(p ∩ T 3) = M ′i . Thus for any h′ ∈ p′ ∩ T 3 we have |M3(h′)| = |M ′i | = |Mi| + 1,
implying there is h ∈ Ti such that |M(h)| = |Mi|+1 because relabeling and expanding
do not decrease the number of children of any message profile. This leads to a
contradiction because |M(h)| = |Mi| for any h ∈ Ti. Hence (T, P,M) does not
dominate (T ′, P ′,M ′). 
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